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 Perfectionism is implicated in the aetiology and perpetuation of various 
psychological disorders, such as depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive, and 
eating disorders. Perfectionism may also explain comorbidity rates between disorders 
and impede the treatment of these psychological disorders. Consequently, research 
has explored if treatment for perfectionism reduces perfectionism and associated 
psychopathology. While numerous studies have examined treatment for 
perfectionism, further research is required examining cognitive-behavioural models 
of perfectionism.    
The cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism specifies that an 
individual high in perfectionism may set excessively high standards for themselves, 
and base their self-worth on meeting these standards.  In addition to the definition of 
clinical perfectionism, factor analyses of common perfectionism measures have 
found two main dimensions; 1) perfectionistic concerns, which is related to concerns 
about making mistakes, and 2) perfectionistic strivings, which is related to striving 
for high standards. Within the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism 
there are several key hypotheses. For example, individuals with high levels of 
perfectionistic concerns may demonstrate distinct attentional and interpretation 
cognitive biases towards information viewed as a threat to achieving personally 
demanding goals. However, to date, there has been limited experimental research 
testing these assumptions. Furthermore, research has identified that other key 
cognitive constructs, such as repetitive negative thinking and imagery, may be 
important links between perfectionism and psychological distress. Yet, these two 
important cognitive constructs have not been evaluated together to determine their 
relative contribution to explaining the relationship between perfectionism and 
psychological distress. By understanding these mechanisms within perfectionism we 
may further improve treatment specificity and efficacy. Thus the present thesis aimed 
to test the relationship between key cognitive constructs and perfectionism across 
three studies.  
Study one was designed to test the prediction that perfectionism is 
characterised by a distinct attention bias toward information that signals failure. 
Study one compared participants characterised with heightened perfectionistic 
concerns (n = 31) to participants with low perfectionistic concerns (n = 25). The 




perfectionism, displayed a greater attentional preference to negative stimuli relative 
to positive stimuli, but only when the stimuli were perfectionism-relevant in nature.   
Study two was designed to test the prediction that perfectionism is associated 
with a distinct interpretation bias in situations that may activate underlying 
perfectionistic beliefs (N = 76). The findings revealed that perfectionistic concerns 
were positively associated with an interpretation bias toward a negative emotional 
interpretation of the scenarios. That is, perfectionistic concerns were positively 
associated with a tendency to rate negative test sentences as more similar to the 
original perfectionism-relevant scenarios, and a reduced tendency to rate positive test 
sentences as less similar to these original scenarios.  
Study two also revealed that perfectionistic strivings were positively 
associated with a bias in the emotional interpretation of the scenarios. Specifically, 
perfectionistic strivings were positively associated with a tendency to rate negative 
test sentences as more similar to the original perfectionism-relevant scenarios, and a 
reduced tendency to rate positive test sentences as less similar to these original 
scenarios. The pattern of ratings observed for perfectionistic strivings were specific 
to participants interpreting the affective interpretation of the ambiguous scenario. 
The findings from studies one and two provide support for the critical assumptions 
underpinning conceptualisations of perfectionism, that there are distinct attentional 
and interpretation biases for those who are heightened in perfectionism relative to 
those who are low in perfectionism. 
Study three was designed to test the prediction that perfectionistic concerns 
and strivings were associated with psychological distress directly and indirectly 
through repetitive negative thinking and imagery. A non-clinical population (N = 
397) was recruited to test three structural equation models. The first model evaluated 
the relationship between perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings, 
repetitive negative thinking, and psychological distress. Results indicated that 
repetitive negative thinking was an indirect pathway for the relationship between 
perfectionistic concerns and psychological distress.  
The second model included imagery as an additional intermediate variable to 
determine if imagery also carried a unique indirect effect between perfectionism and 
psychological distress. The second model revealed that imagery was an indirect 
pathway between perfectionistic concerns and psychological distress, while repetitive 




evaluated the addition of clinical perfectionism, measured by the Clinical 
Perfectionism Questionnaire, to model two, to determine which measure of 
perfectionism best predicted psychological distress. The third model revealed that the 
clinical perfectionism accounted for the variance between perfectionistic concerns 
and psychological distress, rendering perfectionistic concerns non-significant. 
Importantly, imagery operated as an indirect pathway from clinical perfectionism and 
perfectionistic strivings to psychological distress. Overall, study three identified that, 
in part, perfectionism is directly associated with psychological distress, and some of 
the distress experienced could be explained by the mode of cognition individuals 
may engage with. Additionally, study three identified that imagery may be an 
important pathway from perfectionism to psychological distress beyond repetitive 
negative thinking. As imagery has been shown to influence the emotional 
experiences of individuals more powerfully than verbal-linguistic processes, this 
finding highlights the importance of further research on imagery in perfectionism.  
The findings from the three studies support the validity of the cognitive-
behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, but also highlight that further research is 
required to evaluate specific measures of clinical perfectionism. Importantly, two key 
findings emerged from the present thesis: (1) that clinical perfectionism is 
characterised by attention and interpretation biases, and (2) that two cognitive 
products, repetitive negative thinking, and to a greater degree imagery, provide 
indirect pathways between clinical perfectionism and psychological distress.  
Based on the findings across this body of research, it would be informative to 
further determine whether the attention and interpretation biases present for 
perfectionism are distinguishable from attention and interpretation biases within a 
clinical population. It would also be important to determine the extent to which 
imagery explains the relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress 
within those with clinical diagnoses. If such perfectionism specific biased cognitive 
processes could be separated from the biased cognitive processes observed within 
clinical samples, then novel approaches such as computerised cognitive bias 
modification techniques could be evaluated. Furthermore, if imagery is found to be a 
powerful indirect pathway between perfectionism and psychological distress, then 
interventions that focus on imagery rescripting could be investigated as an adjunct to 
the verbal-linguistic processing techniques that are currently the primary focus in 
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Chapter 1: The Definition and Importance of Perfectionism 
 
1.1. Improving our Understanding of Emotional Disorders 
The World Health Organisation estimates that psychological disorders 
account for 13% of the global burden of disease (World Health Organization, 2013) 
and are the leading cause of years lived with a disability, surpassing both 
cardiovascular disease and cancer (Collins et al., 2011; Whiteford et al., 2013; 
Whiteford, Ferrari, Degenhardt, Feigin, & Vos, 2015). Within the category of 
psychological disorders, depressive disorders were rated as the second largest 
contributor to the burden of disease in the Global Burden of Disease Study (Ferrari et 
al., 2013). Between 2010 and 2030, psychological disorders are also projected to 
remain a leading cause of the global burden of disease with an estimated worldwide 
economic cost of US$2.5 trillion in 2010 and the economic cost is expected to 
surpass US$6 trillion by 2030 (Mathers & Loncar, 2006; World Health Organization, 
2013). Within the Australian context, the 2007 National Survey of Mental Health and 
Wellbeing estimated that nearly 50% of Australian adults had experienced a 
psychological disorder in their lifetime, while 20% had experienced a psychological 
disorder within the previous 12 months (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Begg, 
Vos, Stevenson, Stanley, and Lopez (2007) further estimate that psychological 
disorders are the largest contributor to non-fatal burden of disease among 
Australians.  
Given the global economic burden of psychological disorders and, more 
importantly, to the individuals living with a disorder, further research is required to 
improve our understanding of psychological disorders and the efficacy of available 
treatments. Although research has continued to adjust and incorporate new treatment 
foci within the field of psychological disorders (e.g., Brewin et al., 2009; McEvoy, 
Erceg-Hurn, Saulsman, & Thibodeau, 2015; McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014; Salemink, 
Kindt, Rienties, & van den Hout, 2014), recent research has also explored the 
concept of targeting transdiagnostic processes. A transdiagnostic process is a 
construct that is implicated as a risk or maintaining factor across multiple disorders 
(Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011; Sauer-Zavala et al., 2017). The transdiagnostic 
approach to psychopathology provides a framework for researchers and clinicians to 
move beyond distinct diagnostic categories, and focus on core processes that 




(Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Mansell, Harvey, Watkins, & Shafran, 
2008; Newby, McKinnon, Kuyken, Gilbody, & Dalgleish, 2015). Understanding the 
transdiagnostic processes that contribute to multiple disorders may provide an 
explanation for the rates of comorbidity amongst psychological disorders often 
observed in clinical practice (Bieling, Summerfeldt, Israeli, & Antony, 2004). 
Transdiagnostic treatments then focus on these core processes that occur across 
disorders without specific tailoring for the disorder (McEvoy, Nathan, & Norton, 
2009). An important clinical implication for using the transdiagnostic approach is 
that targeting common mechanisms across emotional disorders may be an effective 
and efficient strategy for simultaneously treating multiple disorders (Barlow, Allen, 
& Choate, 2004). Perfectionism has been identified as one such important 
transdiagnostic process across a range of psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 
2011; Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2012). Despite the clinical significance of 
perfectionism (Shafran & Mansell, 2001) it remains unclear whether cognitive 
factors such as attention and interpretation biases, repetitive negative thinking, or 
imagery are crucial components of how perfectionism is associated with 
psychological distress. 
1.2. What is Perfectionism? 
Perfectionism has been described in the literature for over 100 years (Frost & 
Steketee, 1997), with the majority of early definitions describing perfectionism as a 
dysfunctional characteristic. The first account of perfectionism dates back to Janet 
(1898), who described perfectionism as being characterised by rigidity with regards 
to thoughts or ideas. Since Janet’s original description, there have been numerous 
definitions that attempt to capture perfectionism (Shafran, Cooper, & Fairburn, 
2002). The present section of the chapter will explore and critique the definitions of 
perfectionism and the key measures that reflect each definition. The exploration of 
the key measures of perfectionism is important as research on perfectionism has been 
driven by equating perfectionism with its measurement, with limited grounding in 
theory (Shafran et al., 2002). There are a range of measures for perfectionism, yet it 
is beyond the scope of the present literature review to identify and analyse every 
such measure, therefore the present chapter will only explore the key measures used 
in research for each definition. For further information and an overview of the 
complete range of measures available for perfectionism see Egan, Wade, Shafran, 




1.2.1. Early Definitions and Measures of Perfectionism  
The first cognitive-behavioural conceptualisation of perfectionism originated 
from Ellis (1958), who detailed perfectionism as an unrealistic, impossible, cognitive 
goal around being perfectly capable, intelligent, and successful in all respects. The 
key theme of Ellis’s definition was the unrelenting high standards that the individual 
should achieve, as opposed to their attempts to achieve their standards. Hollander 
(1965) asserted that perfectionism was the practice of demanding a performance at a 
higher quality than what may be required for the situation. Hollander (1965) also 
described that individuals with perfectionism were unlikely to ever live up to the 
standards to which they evaluated their performances, yet they would be driven to 
achieve these standards as this achievement would determine whether they (or 
others) found them acceptable. Sorotzkin (1985) also argued that individuals with 
perfectionism were unlikely to live up to their standards, and highlighted that 
individuals with perfectionism measured their worth against unrealistic goals and any 
deviation from achieving these goals would be met with self-criticism. Across these 
early definitions emerged the clear theme that perfectionism was maladaptive, which 
involved the pursuit of unattainable goals and the debasement of an individual’s 
sense of worth if they failed to achieve their goals (Ellis, 1958; Hollander, 1965; 
Sorotzkin, 1985).  
 Hamachek (1978) was the first to highlight that there could be two 
components of perfectionism, that is, individuals may have normal perfectionism or 
neurotic perfectionism. Normal perfectionists were considered to be those who 
recognised they may not attain all of their high standards, yet experienced the 
positive emotions and a sense of achievement from their striving and performances 
(Hamachek, 1978). Neurotic perfectionists encompassed those who strived for high 
standards despite adverse consequences, and rarely experienced the positive 
emotions or a sense of achievement from their strivings and performances 
(Hamachek, 1978). Hamachek posited that perfectionism may not always be 
maladaptive, rather, there could be a positive striving component to perfectionism 
(i.e., normal perfectionists). The argument was that what made perfectionism 
maladaptive (neurotic perfectionists), was the self-criticism and the sense of 
achievement, or lack thereof, that individuals experienced as a result of their 




There are several measures related to the early definitions of perfectionism, 
of which the key measures are the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & 
Beck, 1978), the Burns Perfectionism Scale (BPS; Burns, 1980), and the 
Perfectionism subscale of the Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI; Garner, Olmstead, & 
Polivy, 1983). The DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978) was designed to measure self-
defeating cognitions associated with anxiety and depression. The DAS was not 
initially designed to assess perfectionism; however a factor analysis yielded an item 
grouping that has been labelled the Self-critical Perfectionism subscale as the items 
covered high personal standards and a concern about making mistakes (Imber et al., 
1990). The Self-critical Perfectionism subscale has high internal consistency 
(α=0.91; Imber et al., 1990; Steele et al., 2013) and validity (Dunkley, Sanislow, 
Grilo, & McGlashan, 2004). The Self-critical Perfectionism subscale (Weissmann & 
Beck, 1978) was used to evaluate the relationship between perfectionism and 
psychopathology (e.g., Dunkley et al., 2004; Dunkley, Sanislow, Grilo, & 
McGlashan, 2009). The DAS was later adapted by Burns to develop the BPS (Burns, 
1980). The BPS contained items that reflected an individual’s pathological 
perfectionistic beliefs pertaining to self-evaluation and performance (Burns, 1980). 
Enns and Cox (2002) explained that the BPS has modest reliability at best and, as 
such, has had limited application in clinical research. 
Another early measure developed is the EDI (Garner et al., 1983). The EDI 
consists of eight subscales designed to measure psychological constructs related to 
eating disordered psychopathology. One subscale is the Perfectionism subscale (EDI-
P), which evaluates the extent to which individuals set excessive or disproportionate 
expectations for themselves (Garner et al., 1983). The EDI-P has been found to be 
reliable (e.g., α=0.74 – 0.76) and valid within an eating disorder population, however 
the EDI-P has been rarely used in other samples (Bardone-Cone et al., 2007). As the 
EDI-P has primarily been used within samples with eating disorders, it is unclear 
whether the psychometric properties of the EDI-P are adequate in other clinical 
samples (Bardone-Cone et al., 2007; Enns, Cox, & Clara, 2002).  
1.2.2. Multidimensional Definitions and Measures of Perfectionism 
Frost, Marten, Lahart, and Rosenblate (1990) and Hewitt and Flett (1991b) 
proposed that perfectionism is multidimensional and should be broadened from 
earlier definitions. To assess perfectionism, Frost, Marten, et al. (1990) and Hewitt 




Marten, et al. (1990) argued that perfectionism involved more than just setting high 
personal standards for oneself, because this does not distinguish between people with 
perfectionism and those who appeared to be highly competent and successful. 
Therefore, Frost, Marten, et al. (1990) developed a Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (FMPS) that examined six dimensions of perfectionism: Personal Standards 
(setting high personal standards), Concern over Mistakes (striving for perfection out 
of fear of making a mistake), Doubts about Actions (doubting the quality of 
performance), Parental Expectations (high parental expectations were placed on the 
individual), Parental Criticism (parental criticism for perceived failure of meeting 
parental expectations), and Organisation (focus on precision, order and organisation). 
Hewitt and Flett (1991b) suggested that perfectionism consisted of a 
combination of both intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions. As such, Hewitt and 
Flett (1991b) constructed a Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (HMPS) that 
included the Self-Oriented Perfectionism subscale, which involved setting high 
personal standards and becoming critical of oneself if they are not met (i.e., 
intrapersonal perfectionism). Other subscales included Socially-Prescribed 
Perfectionism, which involved meeting standards and perceived standards set for 
them by significant others, and Other-Oriented Perfectionism, which is similar to 
Self-Oriented Perfectionism but directed towards other people (i.e., interpersonal 
perfectionism).  
In support of the multidimensional conceptualisation of perfectionism, factor 
analyses have indicated that there are two higher order dimensions of perfectionism, 
one reported to be maladaptive, which is related to concerns about making mistakes, 
and one reported to be adaptive, which is related to striving for high standards 
(Bieling, Israeli, & Antony, 2004). The factor structure appears consistent across 
studies (Bieling, Israeli, et al., 2004; Frost, Heimberg, Holt, Mattia, & Neubauer, 
1993). Bieling, Israeli, et al. (2004) and Frost et al. (1993) found items from the 
FMPS and HMPS (subscales Doubts about Actions, Concern over Mistakes, Parental 
Expectations, and Parental Criticism from FMPS, and Socially-Prescribed 
Perfectionism from HMPS) loaded onto the maladaptive dimension, titled 
maladaptive evaluative concerns, and the other items (subscales Personal Standards, 
and Organisation from FMPS, and Other-Oriented Perfectionism  and Self-Oriented 
Perfectionism from HMPS) loaded onto the adaptive dimension, titled positive 




dimensions of perfectionism (Blankstein & Dunkley, 2002; Blankstein, Dunkley, & 
Wilson, 2008). Stoeber and Otto (2006) have referred to the two dimensions of 
perfectionism as perfectionistic concerns (i.e., maladaptive evaluative concerns) and 
perfectionistic strivings (i.e., positive striving). The importance of noting the terms 
perfectionistic concerns and strivings is that, more recently, research has used these 
terms to describe the two dimensions of perfectionism (e.g., Burgess, Frost, & 
DiBartolo, 2016; Smith et al., 2016).   
Frost et al. (1993) reported that perfectionistic concerns were positively 
correlated with depressive symptoms and negative affect, which was congruent with 
Bieling, Israeli, et al. (2004) findings that perfectionistic concerns were related to 
stress, anxiety, depression, and test anxiety. Perfectionistic concerns and its 
constituent subscales (i.e., Concern over Mistakes, Socially-Prescribed 
Perfectionism) are consistently higher in clinical than non-clinical samples, including 
those with mood, anxiety, and eating disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). A recent 
meta-analysis by Limburg, Watson, Hagger, and Egan (in press) highlighted that 
perfectionistic concerns retains a robust association with psychopathology across 
both clinical and non-clinical samples. Frost et al. reported that perfectionistic 
strivings were correlated with positive affect, which was consistent with Stoeber and 
Otto’s (2006) findings that perfectionistic strivings, when controlling for 
perfectionistic concerns, were associated with positive outcomes. The positive 
outcomes included achievement, positive affect, conscientiousness, greater perceived 
social support, and reduced symptoms of depression and suicidal ideation (Stoeber & 
Otto, 2006), suggesting that striving for high standards could be adaptive and healthy 
for the individual. In contrast, perfectionistic concerns has been found to consistently 
be associated with psychopathology (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Limburg et al., in 
press).   
However, other researchers have challenged the notion that perfectionistic 
strivings are an adaptive form of perfectionism, as there is evidence to suggest the 
Personal Standards subscale of the FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990), which is often 
associated with perfectionistic strivings, is a risk factor for eating disorders (Wade et 
al., 2008) and may influence eating disorder psychopathology (Bardone-Cone et al., 
2008). Reviews by Egan, Wade, et al. (2011) and Egan, Wade, et al. (2012) have also 
posited that perfectionistic strivings may not always be adaptive. This conclusion is 




perfectionistic strivings was positively associated with psychopathology within 
eating disorder samples, yet was less related to psychopathology in non-clinical 
samples. In light of the evidence to date, perfectionistic concerns have been 
universally accepted to be a maladaptive form of perfectionism, while perfectionistic 
strivings may be associated with some positive outcomes but is not universally 
adaptive (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011, 2012; Limburg et al., in press; Smith et al., 
2016).  
The FMPS and HMPS are the two most commonly used measures of 
multidimensional perfectionism. Beyond the FMPS and HMPS, another 
multidimensional perfectionism measure is the Positive and Negative Perfectionism 
Scale (PANPS, Terry-Short, Owens, Slade, & Dewey, 1995). The PANPS has two 
subscales, one is a Positive Perfectionism subscale, which assesses positive striving 
or achieving (e.g., I enjoy the glory gained by my successes), and the other a 
Negative Perfectionism subscale, which assesses the negative outcomes of 
perfectionism (e.g., No matter how well I do I never feel satisfied with my 
performance). Both the Positive and Negative Perfectionism subscales demonstrated 
high internal consistency within athlete samples (Egan, Piek, Dyck, & Kane, 2011). 
The Negative Perfectionism subscale has also been demonstrated to be a valid 
measure within clinical samples, however there has been inconsistent factor loadings 
for Positive Perfectionism subscale items (Egan, Piek, et al., 2011; Haase, 
Prapavessis, & Owens, 1999; Haase, Prapavessis, & Owens, 2002).  
Another multidimensional measure of perfectionism is the Almost Perfect 
Scale - Revised (APS-R; Slaney, Rice, Mobley, Trippi, & Ashby, 2001). The APS-R 
is a revised version of the Almost Perfect Scale (Slaney & Johnson, 1992, as cited by 
Slaney et al., 2001). The APS-R consists of three factors that assess the extent to 
which individuals have high personal standards, the extent to which individuals want 
order, and the extent to which individuals perceive a discrepancy between their own 
performance and their standards (Slaney et al., 2001). The Perfectionism Inventory 
(PI; Hill et al., 2004) is another multidimensional perfectionism measure. The PI 
consists of eight subscales including domains such as, but not limited to, having high 
standards for others, requiring validation or approval from others, concern about 
making mistakes, and the extent to which individuals ruminate over past mistakes or 
errors (Hill et al., 2004). There are several other multidimensional perfectionism 




Perfectionistic Self-Presentation Scale (Hewitt, Flett, Sherry, et al., 2003), and 
Consequences of Perfectionism Scale (Kim, 2010). However, the FMPS and the 
HMPS remain the most widely used perfectionism measures. For further information 
and an overview of the large range of measures available for perfectionism see Egan 
et al. (2014 p. 60-80). 
1.2.2.1. Critique of multidimensional perfectionism. One of the primary 
critiques of the multidimensional perfectionism conceptualisation is that the frequent 
use of the two original multidimensional perfectionism measures (Frost, Marten, et 
al., 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991b) has largely led perfectionism to be a construct 
equated with scores on the FMPS and HMPS (Shafran et al., 2002). Shafran et al. 
(2002) reported that the problem with the widespread acceptance of perfectionism 
being equivalent to the scores on perfectionism measures is that the multidimensional 
conceptualisation was not solely based on theoretical and clinical descriptions of 
perfectionism. Furthermore, Shafran et al. (2002) argued that the measures 
incorporated not only key constructs, but constructs that are not essential to 
perfectionism definitions. Shafran et al. (2002) explained that items in the Personal 
Standards, Concern over Mistakes, and Self-Oriented Perfectionism subscales of the 
FMPS and HMPS are the closest approximations to the original theoretical accounts 
of perfectionism (Ellis, 1958; Hollander, 1965), while the remaining subscales are 
related constructs, yet ultimately unnecessary when conceptualising the individual’s 
presentation of perfectionism. For instance, perceived parental pressure or parental 
concerns may be relevant for understanding the development of perfectionism for the 
individual, however does not provide a direct application within the clinical context 
(Burgess et al., 2016; Shafran et al., 2002). Shafran et al. asserted that the widespread 
acceptance and reliance on the multidimensional conceptualisation of perfectionism 
was one reason as to why there has not been any further development in the 
theoretical understanding and clinical intervention for perfectionism. The authors 
argued that for research to further develop and understand perfectionism’s role in 
psychological disorders, it needs to be more clearly defined within a clinical context 
(Shafran et al., 2002).   
1.2.3. Cognitive-Behavioural Definition and Measure of Perfectionism  
Shafran et al. (2002) proposed a cognitive-behavioural model of clinical 
perfectionism, which was later updated by Shafran, Egan, and Wade (2010). Shafran 




high standards, and then base their own self-worth upon achieving these standards. 
The clinical perfectionism definition was based on other clinicians’ reports and 
observation in a clinical setting with individuals with eating disorders. Shafran et al. 
defined clinical perfectionism as “… the setting of, and striving to meet, very 
demanding standards that are self-imposed and relentlessly pursued despite this 
causing problems. It involves basing one’s self-worth almost exclusively on how 
well these high standards are pursued and achieved.” (Shafran et al., 2010, p. 9).  
The clinical perfectionism definition encompassed three core features. The 
first feature is that individuals set personally demanding standards. The standards are 
set in the areas of the individual’s life that are personally relevant to the individual 
(i.e., weight, work quality, athletic ability). When individuals perceive either real or 
imagined failure to satisfy their high standards, they view failure as a reflection of 
their worthlessness, and suffer negative emotional consequences such as anxiety or 
depression (Shafran et al., 2002; Shafran, Lee, & Fairburn, 2004). The second feature 
is that individuals will strive to meet their high standards despite negative 
consequences. Individuals with clinical perfectionism are reported not to diminish 
their ambitions or attempts to achieve their high standards even when the outcomes 
are negative. These outcomes may occur across a variety of domains, including 
emotional (e.g., anxiety, depressed mood), social (e.g., social isolation or exclusion), 
physical (e.g., exhaustion, insomnia), and cognitive domains (e.g., self-criticism, 
distractibility) (Shafran et al., 2002; Shafran et al., 2010). The third feature is that an 
individual’s self-worth is based on meeting their personally demanding standards. 
Failure to achieve a goal can result in the individual generalising their perceived 
inadequate performance to a global negative perception of themselves, such as 
viewing themselves as a failure as a person (Shafran et al., 2010). Acknowledging 
past literature, Shafran and colleagues highlighted that aiming for high standards is 
not problematic per se, but when an individual’s self-worth is predominantly based 
on achieving those standards, and their standards are pursued despite negative 
outcomes, the individual is no longer in a pursuit of excellence, rather they are 
experiencing clinical perfectionism. 
The Clinical Perfectionism Questionnaire (CPQ; Fairburn, Cooper, & 
Shafran, 2003a) is a measure based on the conceptualisation of clinical 
perfectionism. It was designed to assess the setting of and striving to achieve high 




have not been met. The CPQ has demonstrated good internal consistency, and 
convergent and predictive validity (Chang & Sanna, 2012; Dickie, Surgenor, Wilson, 
& McDowall, 2012; Egan et al., 2016; Steele, O'Shea, Murdock, & Wade, 2011). 
However, recent evidence has indicated that there may be potential issues regarding 
the structure of the questionnaire, specifically that items requiring reverse coding 
may weaken the overall validity of the CPQ (Stoeber & Damian, 2014). Research 
that has removed these items have found significant improvements in the overall 
measurement model (Egan et al., 2016). 
Although there is no other measure of clinical perfectionism available as far 
as the author is aware, studies have also used the Concern over Mistakes and 
Personal Standards subscales of the FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990) to capture 
aspects relevant to clinical perfectionism, as the definition of clinical perfectionism 
includes the setting of, and striving for, demanding standards and responding 
negatively to perceived mistakes or errors within the performance (Egan, Dick, & 
Allen, 2012; Handley, Egan, Kane, & Rees, 2014). Handley and colleagues (2014) 
developed a cut-off score for high levels of perfectionism (Concern over Mistakes 
score > 24.7) from the average Concern over Mistakes score across studies using 
clinical samples, and a cut-off score for low levels of perfectionism based on the 
average Concern over Mistakes score for non-clinical controls (Concern over 
Mistakes score < 18.5).  
1.2.3.1. Critique of clinical perfectionism. Shafran and colleagues’ (2002) 
conceptualisation of clinical perfectionism is not without criticism. Hewitt, Flett, 
Besser, Sherry, and McGee (2003) asserted that the clinical definition of 
perfectionism did not account for interpersonal processes and was thus problematic. 
Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2003), in turn, responded and highlighted that the 
clinical conceptualisation concentrated on specific intrapersonal processes, which 
tend to be the factors targeted within clinical practice. Stoeber and Damian (2014) 
have also critiqued a unidimensional conceptualisation of clinical perfectionism by 
highlighting that the CPQ has yielded two factors that reflect perfectionistic concerns 
and perfectionistic strivings. However, Stoeber and Damian’s argument is contingent 
on the assumption that the clinical perfectionism model is a unidimensional approach 
to perfectionism. It should be noted that Shafran et al. have never reported that the 
CPQ would yield a single factor structure, nor that clinical perfectionism is 




subscales of the FMPS or HMPS did not necessarily reflect or measure how 
perfectionism may present for individuals who are affected by perfectionism in their 
day-to-day lives. For example, items that correspond with parental concerns and 
expectations in the FMPS appear to relate to the past and contexts within which 
perfectionism may have developed rather than current symptoms (Shafran et al., 
2002, 2003). Shafran and colleagues reported that items relating to perfectionistic 
concerns (e.g., Concern over Mistakes subscale of the FMPS) and perfectionistic 
strivings (e.g., Personal Standards subscale of the FMPS) were a better 
representation of how perfectionism may operate within an individual’s life. To date, 
there is a wide range of definitions and measures of perfectionism. Despite the lack 
of consensus regarding the definition of perfectionism, research has consistently 
demonstrated that perfectionism is important in the development and perpetuation of 
multiple psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011).  
Despite there being no agreed definition in use in the literature, the 
definitions are largely overlapping on the core components that constitute 
perfectionism. That is, there are two generally accepted components in 
perfectionism; 1) perfectionistic concerns, which is related to concerns about making 
mistakes, and 2) perfectionistic strivings, which is related to striving for high 
standards. In this way perfectionism in the following literature review will be used to 
refer to the over-arching construct of perfectionism (i.e., the striving for personally 
demanding standards which can be accompanied with intense self-critical evaluations 
if these standards are not met) and discrepancies between studies using different 
definitions will be described where relevant. The research in the present thesis will 
focus on using the FMPS, which is one of the most widely used measures in 
perfectionism research. Furthermore, the subscale Concern over Mistakes and 
Personal Standards, which align with perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic 
strivings respectively, are used in perfectionism treatment research and as a measure 
of clinical perfectionism (Handley, Egan, Kane, & Rees, 2015). It is also important 
to consider, where relevant, the CPQ as a measure of perfectionism as the CPQ has 
also been used in treatment research and is a measure of clinical perfectionism.  
1.3. Why is Perfectionism Important? 
 Studies reported that comorbidity rates for adults with psychological 
disorders in the general population can exceed 40%, indicating nearly half of the 




Walters, 2005). Comorbidity rates are considerably higher within clinical 
populations, where comorbidity is the norm rather than the exception (Brown et al., 
2001). It has also been argued that comorbidity may occur due to psychological 
disorders sharing predisposing and perpetuating factors (Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al., 
2004) and as such treating shared predisposing or perpetuating factors may help to 
efficiently treat the primary and comorbid disorders. Since perfectionism is 
implicated as a predisposing and perpetuating factor in several psychopathologies, it 
could explain comorbidity in psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; 
Shafran & Mansell, 2001). The majority of the research that has associated 
perfectionism with psychological disorders is cross-sectional in nature. Cross-
sectional research only captures a single point in time, which precludes any 
inferences regarding the nature of perfectionism, namely causality or directionality of 
effects, which would be best explored through experimental and longitudinal 
designs. In light of this, there are several prospective studies, specifically a meta-
analysis of ten longitudinal studies, which indicates that perfectionistic concerns and 
perfectionistic strivings predict depressive symptoms over time (Smith et al., 2016).  
Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al. (2004) found that in a sample of 345 clinical 
participants perfectionism predicted the number of comorbid anxiety and mood 
disorders. These findings remained significant after controlling for depression, stress 
and anxiety (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). There is also evidence that perfectionism 
impedes the outcome of interventions for psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et 
al., 2011). While the consideration that perfectionism as a transdiagnostic process is 
a burgeoning research area, a key implication is that targeting perfectionism in 
treatment may ameliorate a broad range of psychopathological symptoms (Bieling, 
Israeli, et al., 2004; Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 2003b; 
Harvey et al., 2004). Evidence for the relationship between perfectionism and 
various emotional symptoms and disorders will now be reviewed. 
1.3.1. Perfectionism is Associated with Multiple Disorders 
1.3.1.1. Perfectionism and mood disorders. The association between 
perfectionism and mood disorders has been consistently reported across clinical and 
non-clinical samples (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). Perfectionism was described as 
“destructive” within mood disorders (Blatt, 1995, p. 1014), with high perfectionism 
scores demonstrated for individuals with depression compared to non-depressed 




demonstrated moderate to strong positive correlations between perfectionism, 
depression, bipolar disorder, and suicidal ideation (Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al., 
2004; Blatt, Zuroff, Bondi, Sanislow, & Pilkonis, 1998). The correlations between 
perfectionism and depressive symptoms have been demonstrated across different 
perfectionism scales, including the CPQ, the Concern over Mistakes, Doubts about 
Actions, Parental Expectations, Parental Criticism subscales of the FMPS, and Self-
Oriented Perfectionism subscale of the HMPS (Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al., 2004; 
Chang, Chang, & Sanna, 2011; Chang & Sanna, 2012; Smith et al., 2016; Steele & 
Wade, 2008). A cross-sectional study by Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, and Mosher 
(1995) found that Self-Oriented Perfectionism was related to depressive symptoms. 
Although other cross-sectional findings did not observe the relationship between 
perfectionism and depressive symptoms (Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, & O'Brien, 1991), 
Flett et al. (1995) found that Self-Oriented Perfectionism was a prospective predictor 
for depressive symptoms three months later. Another prospective study by Dunkley, 
Sanislow, Grilo, and McGlashan (2006) indicated that high levels of perfectionism 
had predictive utility in the development of depressive symptoms over time. They 
suggested that heightened scores on the DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978, March) 
were significantly related to depression scores in a 3-year longitudinal study. The 
predictive utility of perfectionism was still observed when initial levels of 
psychopathology were controlled for (Dunkley, Sanislow, et al., 2006).  
The relationship between perfectionism and depressive symptoms has also 
been demonstrated in another recent meta-analysis by Smith et al. (2016), which 
examined 10 longitudinal studies published between 2001 and 2015. These 
longitudinal studies investigated the relationship between perfectionism and 
depressive symptoms. Importantly, Smith et al. controlled for neuroticism to 
determine whether perfectionism accounts for depressive symptoms beyond what is 
accounted for by baseline neuroticism and depression symptoms. The findings from 
the meta-analysis support theoretical accounts that individuals with perfectionistic 
concerns behave and think in ways that may lead to depressive symptomatology 
(Bekes et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2016). Furthermore, the 
findings from the meta-analysis indicated that perfectionistic strivings, previously 
considered to be adaptive (Stoeber & Otto, 2006), may also result in depressive 
symptoms. Smith et al. reasoned that perfectionistic strivings may result in 




individual’s self-worth, such as poor performances on a test. Furthermore, nature of 
cross-sectional studies that provide only a single assessment at a single time may not 
capture the longstanding extent to which perfectionistic strivings influences the 
individual (Smith et al., 2016). 
Perfectionism has also been associated with bipolar disorder (Corry et al., 
2013; Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). Research indicated that the cognitive style of 
individuals who meet diagnostic criteria of bipolar disorder is perfectionistic, where 
they tend to be highly critical of self, and achievement oriented (Alloy et al., 2005; 
Lam, Wright, & Smith, 2004).  Alloy et al. (2015) proposed in a review of the 
literature that perfectionistic concerns (i.e., maladaptive beliefs about performance 
expectations and self-critical thoughts about mistakes) of the individual could 
ultimately interact with events where the individual was striving for success (i.e., 
perfectionism relevant events) which may influence the depressive and hypomanic 
symptoms experienced in bipolar. This interaction was evaluated by Francis-Raniere, 
Alloy, and Abramson (2006) who found that when initial depressive and hypomanic 
symptoms were controlled for, the interaction between perfectionistic concerns and 
congruent events predicted increases in both depressive and hypomanic symptoms 
over a four month period (Francis-Raniere et al., 2006). More recent studies have 
suggested that the relationship between perfectionism and bipolar depressive 
symptoms is mediated by anxiety and stress (Corry et al., 2013). Corry et al. (2013) 
proposed that perfectionistic beliefs, such as the fears about making mistakes, can 
promote maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (e.g., repetitive negative thinking) 
to cope with the associated anxiety and stress in an attempt to prevent the feared 
outcome from occurring. By then engaging with avoidance of events that may trigger 
fears about making mistakes and subsequent anxiety, individuals may then isolate 
themselves, which can subsequently promote depressive symptoms (Corry et al., 
2013). 
One significant implication of the research on perfectionism as a 
transdiagnostic maintaining factor is that perfectionism could also impede the 
treatment efficacy of psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). Blatt, 
Quinlan, Pilkonis, and Shea (1995) used data from a collaborative research project 
for the National Institute of Mental Health Treatment of Depression Collaborative 
Research Program and found that perfectionism was a significant predictor of poor 




cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) and interpersonal treatment protocols. Blatt et 
al. (1998) completed a follow-up and found perfectionism was also a predictor of 
poor treatment outcomes at the 18-month follow-up. The relationship between 
perfectionism and the therapeutic alliance has also been explored (Zuroff et al., 
2000). Specifically, Zuroff et al. (2000) found that perfectionism was negatively 
related with the therapeutic alliance, and argued that participants with high 
perfectionism were less likely to engage in a constructive, cooperative, and 
collaborative relationship over the course of treatment. The importance of the 
influence on therapeutic outcome is that as perfectionism increased, ratings of the 
therapeutic alliance decreased, which was associated with poorer treatment outcomes 
(Zuroff et al., 2000).  
Research has also indicated that perfectionism may negatively affect 
treatment response for adolescents, such that adolescents with higher perfectionism 
continued to demonstrate elevated depression across a trial that involved participants 
receiving CBT, fluoxetine, a combination of CBT and fluoxetine, or pill placebo 
(Jacobs et al., 2009). Overall, a range of cross-sectional, longitudinal, and treatment 
studies provide support for the role of perfectionism with mood disorders, ranging 
from being a central component of the disorder through to interfering with treatment 
response and engagement (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011) 
1.3.1.2. Perfectionism and anxiety disorders. Associations between 
perfectionism and various anxiety disorders have also been reported across clinical 
and non-clinical samples (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). The meta-analysis by Limburg 
et al. (in press) identified that there was a strong, positive relationship between 
perfectionistic concerns and anxiety disorders, while perfectionistic strivings was not 
significantly associated with anxiety disorders. The association between 
perfectionism and anxiety disorders has most commonly been investigated in social 
anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), previously known as 
social phobia (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Ashbaugh et al., 2007). 
More recently, research has also explored the relationship between perfectionism and 
panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (Wheeler, Blankstein, Antony, McCabe, 
& Bieling, 2011), generalised anxiety disorder (Handley et al., 2014) and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Egan, Hattaway, & Kane, 2014).   
Models of social anxiety indicate perfectionism is involved in the 




Juster, Hope, Mattia, & Iketani, 1995). For example, it is proposed that individuals 
have early experiences that teach them to view social interactions as threatening. By 
viewing social interactions as threatening or potentially dangerous (e.g., humiliating) 
the individual develops perfectionistic beliefs that such threat may be avoided by 
perfect social performances (Clark & Wells, 1995). As a perfect social performance 
cannot be attained, the individual will likely have several negative automatic 
thoughts about the consequences of not achieving these standards (i.e., social 
rejection), or viewing the self as worthless (Clark & Wells, 1995). Shafran et al. 
(2002) proposed that individuals with perfectionism may not only scrutinise their 
performance during a social interaction, but may also selectively attend to negative 
experiences that confirmed their belief that social interactions could be dangerous. 
Individuals may also engage with repetitive thinking patterns where they evaluate 
their past performances, often highlighting flaws or discounting positive aspects of 
the social interactions (Shafran et al., 2002). 
Studies in student samples have indicated that Concern over Mistakes, 
Doubts about Actions (Shumaker & Rodebaugh, 2009), Socially-Prescribed 
Perfectionism (Flett, Hewitt, & de Rosa, 1996), and perfectionistic concerns 
(DiBartolo, Li, & Frost, 2008) are associated with social anxiety symptoms. Findings 
from student samples are consistent with findings that suggested Concern over 
Mistakes, Doubts about Actions, and Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism scores are 
associated with social anxiety symptoms in individuals diagnosed with social anxiety 
disorder (Antony, Purdon, Huta, & Swinson, 1998; Lundh & Öst, 1996, 2001; 
Wheeler et al., 2011). Lundh and Öst (2001) indicated that if perfectionism is central 
to social anxiety, then treatments that successfully ameliorate social anxiety 
symptomology would note a reduction in associated perfectionism. Both Lundh and 
Öst (2001) and Ashbaugh et al. (2007) reported that CBT for social anxiety resulted 
in significant reductions in Concern over Mistakes, Doubts about Actions, Personal 
Standards, and Parental Criticism scores. Moreover, the pre- to post-treatment 
change in Concern over Mistakes and Doubts about Actions predicted changes 
between pre- to post-treatment of social anxiety, which is consistent with the notion 
that perfectionism may maintain social anxiety (Ashbaugh et al., 2007).  
Lundh and Öst (2001) also found that changes in Doubts about Actions 
scores from pre- to post-treatment predicted the pre- to post-treatment change in 




Lundh and Öst (2001) described that individuals who did not respond to CBT for 
social anxiety had significantly higher Concern over Mistakes scores than treatment 
responders, and that post-treatment nonresponders Concern over Mistakes scores 
were reduced to the level of treatment responders’ pre-treatment Concern over 
Mistakes scores. It may be that those who were more concerned about making 
mistakes than their treatment responder counterparts were not able to engage with 
CBT as well as those who were less concerned about making mistakes, especially 
considering behavioural experiments in CBT for social anxiety disorder often 
involve making mistakes in social situations (Bennett-Levy et al., 2004). Although 
the observation that change in perfectionism predicts change in social anxiety 
symptoms is consistent with a possible causal role, it still does not provide direct 
evidence for causality, rather it could still be a correlate of social anxiety. 
Several studies have also indicated that individuals with panic disorder (with 
or without agoraphobia) experience significantly higher scores on Concern over 
Mistakes, Personal Standards, and Self-Oriented Perfectionism (Antony, Purdon, et 
al., 1998; Frost & Steketee, 1997; Iketani et al., 2002a; Iketani et al., 2002b). It is 
proposed that individuals with panic disorder may want to remain in ‘perfect’ control 
of their emotional states, which may subsequently lead to catastrophic 
misinterpretation of bodily sensations and emotions judged as being ‘out of control’ 
(Egan, Wade, et al., 2014; Ellis, 2002). In contrast, Wheeler et al. (2011) found that 
there was no difference between scores of perfectionism in those diagnosed with 
panic disorder and control participants. The disparate findings may also highlight the 
necessity for further research, in particular on whether the difference between those 
with panic disorder and those without is the result of perfectionism, or whether it is 
the result of another, though not unrelated, construct such as the intolerance of 
uncertainty. Further research is required to evaluate the relative contribution 
perfectionism has towards panic disorder and whether this contribution remains 
unique even when accounting for intolerance of uncertainty.  
There has been limited evaluation of the relationship between perfectionism 
and generalised anxiety disorder. Studies using student populations have found 
associations between FMPS and HMPS subscales and worry, a defining symptom of 
generalised anxiety disorder (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Santanello & Gardner, 2006). 
Buhr and Dugas (2006) found both Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism and Self-




as measured by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Importantly, Self-Oriented Perfectionism scores 
continued to be a significant predictor of PSWQ scores, after controlling for 
demographic characteristics and intolerance of uncertainty, while Socially-Prescribed 
Perfectionism scores were not a significant predictor of PSWQ scores. Given the 
importance of intolerance of uncertainty within established models of generalised 
anxiety (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & 
Dugas, 2000), and pathological worry (Buhr & Dugas, 2006), it is important to 
recognise that perfectionism continued to account for unique variance in pathological 
worry. Other researchers have found that perfectionistic concerns scores (Kawamura, 
Hunt, Frost, & DiBartolo, 2001; Santanello & Gardner, 2006; Stoeber & Joormann, 
2001), are positively related to pathological worry.  
To date, only one study, as far as the author is aware, has evaluated the 
relationship between perfectionism, as measured by the Concern over Mistakes and 
Doubts about Actions subscales of the FMPS and the CPQ, in individuals diagnosed 
with generalised anxiety disorder (Handley et al., 2014). The finding that Concern 
over Mistakes scores predicted worry is consistent with previous research, however 
Handley et al. (2014) did not observe a significant relationship between Doubts about 
Actions scores and worry. The authors argued that the lack of relationship between 
Doubts about Actions scores and worry, which was found in previous research, could 
be explained by the fact that past research (Santanello & Gardner, 2006; Stoeber & 
Joormann, 2001) has used composite Concern over Mistakes and Doubts about 
Actions subscale scores. It is possible that the significant relationship may be 
accounted for by Concern over Mistakes scores alone (Handley et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, Handley et al. (2014) was one of the few studies to use a measure of 
clinical perfectionism (CPQ; Fairburn et al., 2003a), which yielded a similar pattern 
of results to the Concern over Mistakes subscale of the FMPS, and indicated a clear 
association between clinical perfectionism and worry in a clinical sample. The 
association between clinical perfectionism and worry is consistent with theoretical 
explanations originally proposed by Shafran et al. (2002), who indicated that 
individuals with clinical perfectionism are more likely to engage with repetitive 
thoughts about future performances and the implications of not reaching their self-




Research has also explored the relationship between perfectionism and 
symptoms of PTSD (Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014; Kawamura et al., 2001). 
Kawamura et al. (2001) found significant correlations between perfectionism, 
represented by perfectionistic concerns and Personal Standards scores, and 
symptoms of PTSD. More recently, Egan, Hattaway, et al. (2014) explored the 
relationship between perfectionism, rumination, and symptoms of PTSD in patients 
diagnosed with PTSD. The findings from Egan, Hattaway, et al. (2014) demonstrated 
that perfectionistic concerns, measured by Concern over Mistakes scores, and 
clinical perfectionism, measured by CPQ scores, were each positively associated 
with symptoms of PTSD. Egan et al. also found a robust association between 
repetitive negative thinking and symptoms of PTSD. Furthermore, repetitive negative 
thinking mediated the relationship between perfectionism and symptoms of PTSD, 
whereby individuals high in perfectionism who responded by ruminating about their 
past experiences were, in turn, more likely to experience symptoms of PTSD (Egan, 
Hattaway, et al., 2014).  
It is important to note that treatment for anxiety disorders may also be 
impeded by high levels of perfectionism. For example, Lundh and Öst (2001) found 
that adults who did not respond to CBT for social anxiety had higher Personal 
Standards, Concern over Mistakes, and Doubts about Actions scores than those who 
did respond to treatment. Lundh and Öst (2001) also found that after treatment, the 
perfectionism scores of individuals who did not respond to treatment were reduced to 
the same level as pre-treatment scores for the treatment responders. The findings that 
individuals’ perfectionism scores reduced to the same level as treatment responders 
prior to treatment further implies that high levels of perfectionism impede the 
benefits individuals with social anxiety receive from CBT. A limitation of Lundh and 
Öst’s (2001) trial is that it is not clear whether the effects of perfectionism are 
independent of baseline symptom severity. However, as identified by Shafran and 
Mansell (2001) it may be that perfectionism needs to be reduced before individuals 
can benefit from targeted CBT for anxiety. 
1.3.1.3. Perfectionism and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Perfectionism 
has also been seen as a factor that impacts on the development and maintenance of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group, 1997). The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG) 




Cognitions Working Group, 1997). The OCCWG stated that perfectionism in OCD 
was “the tendency to believe there is a perfect solution to every problem, that doing 
something perfectly (i.e., mistake free) is not only possible, but also necessary and 
that even minor mistakes have serious consequences” (OCCWG, 1997, p.678). 
Although perfectionism was described as a central belief, research has indicated that 
perfectionism is related to two specific experiences within OCD, checking 
behaviours and not just right obsessions (Moretz & McKay, 2009; Pinto et al., 2017). 
Perfectionism may influence checking behaviours, which are one of the key 
maintaining features in OCD, where individuals report the need to feel that they have 
completed a task perfectly (Julien, O’Connor, Aardema, & Todorov, 2006). In order 
to determine if the task has been completed perfectly, individuals often check their 
performance (Moretz & McKay, 2009). Individuals with high levels of perfectionism 
may also perceive more personal responsibility for negative events, which in turn 
may lead to increased checking behaviours in an attempt to prevent the negative 
outcome from occurring (Bouchard, Rhéaume, & Ladouceur, 1999; Moretz & 
McKay, 2009; Pinto et al., 2017) 
Moretz and McKay (2009) identified that the relationship between 
perfectionism and OCD is clearer when not just right obsessions are considered. Not 
just right obsessions are thoughts or an experience that a task has not been completed 
at all, or has not been completed to the required performance level (Moretz & 
McKay, 2009). It is important to note that not just right obsessions and the need to 
complete a task perfectly are part of the collection of symptoms that drive checking 
compulsions in OCD (McKay et al., 2004). When individuals assume more 
responsibility for the prevention of negative events, it is understandable that if the 
individual has a not just right obsession and the drive to perform perfectly, the 
individual could be more likely to engage with checking behaviours.  
Researchers have found that in non-clinical samples, Concern over Mistakes, 
Doubts about Actions, Parental Expectations and Parental Criticism subscale scores 
of the FMPS are positively correlated with OCD symptoms, and there is some 
evidence to suggest that Personal Standards subscale scores are also related to OCD 
symptoms (Frost & DiBartolo, 2002; Frost, Novara, & Rhéaume, 1990; Frost & 
Steketee, 1997; Wu & Cortesi, 2009). Perfectionistic concerns have been found to 
predict total obsessive-compulsive symptoms as well as washing behaviours, 




demonstrated that relative to control participants, individuals with OCD have 
significantly higher scores on Concern over Mistakes, Doubts about Actions, and 
Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism (Moretz & McKay, 2009; Wu & Cortesi, 2009). 
Further, Limburg et al. (in press) highlighted that that when considered together, 
Concern over Mistakes, Doubts about Actions, and Socially-Prescribed 
Perfectionism were associated with OCD symptoms in a recent meta-analysis. 
Limburg et al. argued, however, that the relationship between OCD and 
perfectionism (in particular the Doubts about Actions scale) may be exaggerated as 
some items comprising doubts about actions were adapted from a measure of OCD 
symptoms (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990), and thus there is likely to be some overlap 
between the Doubts about Actions subscale and measures of OCD symptoms. 
Studies have also found perfectionism may be associated with OCD severity, 
whereby a significant positive relationship was found between Concern over 
Mistakes and Doubts about Actions scores and measures of OCD severity (Rhéaume 
et al., 2000; Wu & Cortesi, 2009). Perfectionism may also impact on the treatment of 
OCD. From a trial that involved cognitive therapy for OCD, Wilhelm, Berman, 
Keshaviah, Schwartz, and Steketee (2015) found that reductions in perfectionism and 
intolerance of uncertainty beliefs, measured by the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire 
(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working, 2005), were associated with greater 
reductions in OCD symptoms over time. Wilhelm et al.’s findings were consistent 
with other studies, such as Manos et al. (2010) and Kyrios, Hordern, and Fassnacht 
(2015), which reported that changes in perfectionism from pre- to post-treatment 
were a unique predictor of changes in OCD symptom severity. Other researchers 
have suggested that there may be an interaction between perfectionism constructs 
that are related to performance, such as Concern over Mistakes and Doubts about 
Actions subscales, which impede treatment response, particularly for those who 
receive exposure and response prevention OCD (Chik, Whittal, & O’Neill, 2007). 
Such findings are in line with Frost and DiBartolo’s (2002) predictions that high 
levels of perfectionism may interfere with an individual’s ability to engage with 
exposure to ultimately disconfirm unhelpful beliefs about obsessive thoughts. It is 
important to note that other findings, such as those by Su, Carpenter, Zandberg, 
Simpson, and Foa (2016), indicate that perfectionism may not impede OCD 
treatment. Su et al. (2016) tested whether obsessive beliefs, such as perfectionism, 




and colleagues found that perfectionism did not mediate the relationship between 
exposure and response prevention and OCD symptom reduction. It may be that there 
are other constructs that could impede OCD treatment such as metacognitive beliefs 
(Rees & Anderson, 2013) and as such this requires further research. Overall, these 
studies provide support for the role of perfectionism on obsessive and compulsive 
experiences, ranging from being a central component of the disorder through to 
interfering with treatment response and engagement (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011).  
1.3.1.4. Perfectionism and eating disorders. Studies have also suggested 
that perfectionism has a central role in the development and maintenance of both 
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa (Bardone-Cone, 2007; Bardone-Cone et al., 
2007; Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). Specifically, perfectionism constructs such as 
Personal Standards, Doubts about Actions, and Concern over Mistakes scores 
(Shafran, Lee, Payne, & Fairburn, 2006; Tozzi et al., 2004), and Self-Oriented 
Perfectionism and Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism scores (Ashbaugh et al., 2007), 
have been found to be related to eating disorders. Limberg and colleagues (in press) 
reported that although perfectionistic concerns is a consistent predictor of 
psychological disorders, for eating disorders both perfectionistic concerns and 
perfectionistic strivings approximately predict eating disorder pathology equally. 
Studies that have investigated non-clinical populations have found a 
consistent association between Self-Oriented Perfectionism scores and eating 
behaviours (Bardone-Cone, 2007; Joyce, Watson, Egan, & Kane, 2012), and 
perfectionism has been shown to predict symptoms of bulimia (Bardone-Cone, 2007; 
Bardone-Cone et al., 2007; Fitzsimmons-Craft, Bardone-Cone, Brownstone, & 
Harney, 2012). A study that investigated a non-clinical sample of females also found 
a positive association between Concern over Mistakes, Doubts about Actions, and 
Organisation subscale scores and body satisfaction (Wade & Tiggemann, 2013).  
To further investigate the role of perfectionism and body satisfaction, Boone 
and Soenens (2015) investigated whether a manipulation of an individual’s 
performance standards in day to day living (e.g., strive for perfection in everything 
someone does) could reveal a vulnerability factor for eating disorder symptoms. The 
authors predicted that performance standards would be a particular vulnerability for 
individuals who were already dissatisfied with their body relative to those who were 
satisfied with their bodies. Boone and Soenens recruited 47 female students, of 




over the next day to the highest possible standards, while the other half were to 
engage with tasks in their usual routine with the lowest possible standards. Boone 
and Soenens (2015) found that those women who were asked to strive for high 
standards in a 24-hour period and were dissatisfied with their body were more likely 
to endorse symptoms of eating disorders than those who were striving for high 
standards and were satisfied with their body. Women who were asked to strive for 
high standards in a 24-hour period and were dissatisfied with their body were also 
more likely to endorse symptoms of eating disorders than those who were asked to 
aim for low standards and had either high or low body satisfaction. The manipulation 
of personal standards and subsequent influence on an individual’s symptoms of 
eating disorders is consistent with previous research (Boone & Soenens, 2015; 
Boone, Soenens, Vansteenkiste, & Braet, 2012; Shafran et al., 2006). Past research 
found that those who were placed in conditions that emphasised high personal 
standards (Boone & Soenens, 2015; Boone et al., 2012; Shafran et al., 2006) or 
required a flawless performance (Boone & Soenens, 2015) engaged with greater food 
restriction, consumed fewer high calorie foods (Shafran et al., 2006), or engaged 
with greater restraint and binge-eating relative to individuals in the low personal 
standards conditions (Boone & Soenens, 2015).  
In a longitudinal study, Sutandar-Pinnock, Blake Woodside, Carter, Olmsted, 
and Kaplan (2003) found that EDI-P scores (Garner et al., 1983) were significantly 
related to illness status and prognosis for those diagnosed with Anorexia Nervosa, 
whilst lower EDI-P scores being associated with better outcomes at follow-up for 
those diagnosed with Anorexia Nervosa. Other prospective studies with non-clinical 
student samples indicated that EDI-P and Personal Standards scores interacted with 
factors such as self-esteem, perceived weight status and body dissatisfaction, and 
predicted bulimic symptoms for up to nine months (Steele, Corsini, & Wade, 2007).  
Fairburn et al. (2003b) proposed that clinical perfectionism is one of the key 
perpetuating factors for eating disorders, in addition to low self-esteem, distress 
intolerance, and interpersonal difficulties. Fairburn et al. argued that clinical 
perfectionism is similar in nature to the core psychopathology of eating disorders as 
both clinical perfectionism and eating disorders are underlined by stringent self-
evaluations. Based on the assertion that perfectionism is similar to the 
psychopathology of eating disorders, Fairburn et al. developed a transdiagnostic 




individuals with an eating disorder. Within the CBT-E treatment protocol, the core 
eating disordered psychopathology is targeted, while modules that reduce clinical 
perfectionism, and improve self-esteem, distress tolerance and interpersonal skills 
could be incorporated when these factors are important perpetuating factors. 
Treatment studies that have utilised the transdiagnostic model of eating disorders 
have supported the efficacy of CBT-E (Byrne, Fursland, Allen, & Watson, 2011; 
Fairburn et al., 2009). Furthermore, studies with large samples have lent support to 
the use of the overall transdiagnostic model of eating disorders in explaining dietary 
restraint (Hoiles, Egan, & Kane, 2012; Lampard, Tasca, Balfour, & Bissada, 2012). 
The support for CBT-E as an effective treatment was maintained even when CBT-E 
was compared with other treatments, such as interpersonal psychotherapy, at post-
treatment and over a 60-week follow-up (Fairburn et al., 2015). It remains unclear 
how much content was covered in these treatment studies on perfectionism, as 
perfectionism is considered an optional module to be included if relevant to the 
client. However research does indicate that recovery from eating disorders is 
associated with reduced levels of perfectionism that are comparable to scores 
demonstrated by individuals in the general population (Bardone-Cone et al., 2007), 
whereas those who have higher levels of perfectionism are less likely to recover from 
an eating disorder (Sutandar-Pinnock et al., 2003). 
It is unsurprising then that research has also reported that higher 
perfectionism scores were associated with poorer treatment responses for individuals 
with anorexia nervosa (Sutandar-Pinnock et al., 2003). However, a pilot study by 
Goldstein, Peters, Thornton, and Touyz (2014) found that the inclusion of a 
perfectionism treatment in a hospital setting for individuals with anorexia nervosa 
did not significantly enhance treatment outcomes. Lloyd, Fleming, Schmidt, and 
Tchanturia (2014) targeted perfectionism in anorexia nervosa with a six week group 
treatment that targeted perfectionism based on the cognitive-behavioural model of 
clinical perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002) and the use of modules developed by 
Fursland, Raykos, and Steele (2002). In contrast with the findings by Goldstein et al., 
Lloyd et al. found significant reductions in perfectionistic concerns, as well as 
significant improvements in body mass index. Surprisingly however, the body mass 
index change was not associated with the changes in perfectionism. Lloyd et al. 
reported that it would be unlikely to find a direct association in such a short treatment 




engagement with eating disorder treatments. Lloyd et al.’s conclusion was consistent 
with the results from a study by Steele, Bergin, and Wade (2011), which indicated 
that perfectionism scores were negatively correlated with improvements in the global 
score on the Eating Disorder Examination (Fairburn & Cooper, 1993).  
1.3.1.5. Perfectionism and personality. Perfectionism has also been 
associated with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD) as reflected by 
the diagnostic criterion specifying that “perfectionism interferes with task completion 
(e.g., is unable to complete a project because his or her own overly strict standards 
are not met” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 678; Pinto et al., 2017). 
Research supports the notion that perfectionism is a core feature in OCPD (Ansell et 
al., 2010; Ansell, Pinto, Edelen, & Grilo, 2008). Although there may be overlap 
between OCPD and perfectionism, they are not interchangeable constructs. As both 
Shafran et al. (2002) and Egan, Wade, et al. (2011) identified, there are other 
requirements for a diagnosis of OCPD that are not consistent with various definitions 
of perfectionism, such as hoarding worn-out or worthless objects or extremely 
restricted spending on the self or others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Stoeber (2014) explored the relationship between perfectionism, measured by 
scores on the HMPS, and scores on the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (Krueger, 
Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol, 2013). Stoeber found that the HMPS 
subscales of Self-Oriented Perfectionism, Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism, and 
Other-Oriented Perfectionism were related to traits of personality disorders beyond 
OCPD, such as schizotypal personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, 
antisocial personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder (Stoeber, 2014). 
Stoeber’s findings are consistent with previous research that explored the association 
between perfectionism and other personality disorders. For example, McCrown and 
Carlson (2004) reported that individuals with narcissistic personality disorder 
demonstrated higher Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism scores than those diagnosed 
with antisocial personality disorder or mood disorder, and Hewitt, Flett, and 
Turnbull-Donovan (1992) reported that individuals with borderline personality 
disorder had higher scores of Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism than control 
participants. The studies by Hewitt et al. (1992), McCrown and Carlson (2004), and 
Stoeber (2014), provided some insight into the relationship between perfectionism 
and personality, however, these studies are correlational in nature, which precludes 




implication of the association between perfectionism and personality is that it may 
provide further evidence for the conclusion that perfectionism is a transdiagnostic 
mechanism that is related to several psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 
2011, 2012).  
1.3.2. Potential Mechanism of Comorbidity  
An important implication of perfectionism as a transdiagnostic process is that 
it may provide further understanding as to rates of comorbidity of psychological 
disorders (Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al., 2004; Egan, Wade, et al., 2011, 2012). 
Harvey et al. (2004) argued that comorbidity between disorders may be the result of 
common maintaining mechanisms. Given perfectionism has been shown to be 
elevated across multiple mood, anxiety, eating, and personality disorders (Egan, 
Wade, et al., 2011), perfectionism may provide an explanation for disorder 
comorbidity (Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al., 2004). 
Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al. (2004) explored the relationship between 
perfectionism, measured by the HMPS and FMPS, and comorbidity between anxiety 
and mood disorders. Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al. (2004) found that subscales of the 
HMPS, including Self-Oriented Perfectionism and Socially-Prescribed 
Perfectionism, and the total score of the FMPS and single scale scores from the 
FMPS including Concern over Mistakes, Parental Criticism, and Doubts about 
Actions were correlated with the number of overall comorbid diagnoses. The results 
from Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al. (2004) indicated that perfectionistic concerns 
predicted comorbidity after controlling for current symptoms of depression, anxiety, 
and stress. Later research by Wheeler et al. (2011) were consistent with Bieling, 
Summerfeldt and colleagues findings. Wheeler et al. (2011) found that after 
controlling for current symptom severity in a clinical sample, subscale scores on the 
Concern over Mistakes and Doubts about Actions from the FMPS, and Socially-
Prescribed Perfectionism from the HMPS, and were positively correlated with 
comorbidity. Wheeler et al. split participants into two groups who were classified as 
having high comorbidity (with two or more comorbid diagnoses) or low comorbidity 
(zero to one comorbid diagnoses) and found that those with high comorbidity were 
associated with higher perfectionism scores relative to those with low comorbidity. 
Wheeler et al. (2011) also found that perfectionistic concerns predicted comorbidity 
status after controlling for current symptom severity. Further research, specifically 




however an important implication of perfectionism being fundamentally related to 
comorbidity is that treatment that targets perfectionism may subsequently reduce the 
symptoms of comorbid disorders (Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al., 2004).  
1.3.3. Targeting Perfectionism in Treatment 
Egan, Wade, et al. (2011) proposed that if perfectionism is involved in the 
development and maintenance of psychological disorders then it has important 
implications for the transdiagnostic treatment of such disorders. Namely, by targeting 
perfectionism, there may be resolution of not only perfectionistic concerns, but also 
symptom reduction across the disorders perfectionism may maintain (Bieling, 
Summerfeldt, et al., 2004; Shafran et al., 2002). Given the potential for perfectionism 
to interfere with the treatment of multiple disorders, researchers have developed 
targeted treatments for perfectionism (Lloyd, Schmidt, Khondoker, & Tchanturia, 
2015), which may also resolve associated symptoms of anxiety, depression, and 
eating disorders (Egan & Hine, 2008; Egan, van Noort, et al., 2014; Glover, Brown, 
Fairburn, & Shafran, 2007; Handley et al., 2015; Riley, Lee, Cooper, Fairburn, & 
Shafran, 2007; Steele & Wade, 2008; Steele et al., 2013). CBT for perfectionism has 
also been demonstrated to be effective in group (Handley et al., 2015) and individual 
(Egan, van Noort, et al., 2014) session formats. These randomised controlled trials 
(RCT; Egan, van Noort, et al., 2014; Handley et al., 2015), the largest RCTs to date, 
were not included in a recent meta-analysis by Lloyd et al. (2015), which examined 
eight studies of CBT for perfectionism and found it is possible to reduce 
perfectionism. Lloyd et al. (2015) found a large pooled effect size for pre- to post- 
treatment reductions specifically for the Personal Standards and Concern over 
Mistakes subscales of the FMPS. Lloyd et al. (2015) also found medium pooled 
effect sizes for reductions of anxiety and depression symptoms, small to large pooled 
effect sizes for reductions in eating disorder symptoms, and very large effect size for 
reductions in obsessive compulsive symptoms. The importance of finding a moderate 
to large pooled effect size in treatment effects is that it is comparable to other 
transdiagnostic treatment protocols (e.g., Farchione et al., 2012) 
Importantly, it can be hypothesised that if perfectionism maintains 
psychological disorders, then cognitive-behavioural treatments for perfectionism 
should not only result in symptom amelioration, but also a reduction in diagnoses 
and comorbid diagnoses. Egan, van Noort, et al. (2014) found that for two 




significant reductions in individuals meeting criteria for a psychiatric disorder, from 
54% of participants at pre-treatment down to 29% at post-treatment, and 18% at 
follow-up. Egan, van Noort, et al. (2014) also found that the number of participants 
with comorbidity reduced from 21% at pre-treatment, 17% at post-treatment, to 2% 
at follow-up. It is also important to note that the authors found face-to-face treatment 
was effective for reducing symptoms of anxiety and depression, however the 
reduction of anxiety and depression symptoms was not observed in the pure self-help 
group. Egan, van Noort, et al.’s findings are consistent with another RCT that found 
an indirect effect for the pre- to post- change in social anxiety, anxiety sensitivity, 
rumination, and depression through the pre- to post- change in perfectionism scores, 
specifically the change in scores for the Concern over Mistakes subscale of the 
FMPS (Handley et al., 2015). The finding that there is an indirect pathway for the pre 
to post changes in psychological symptoms through the changes in perfectionism 
highlights how CBT for perfectionism may reduce associated psychopathology while 
only focusing on reducing clinical perfectionism.  
The use of CBT for perfectionism as a transdiagnostic treatment may provide 
a flexible and cost-effective treatment option to be used by clinicians, which may 
provide comparable results to disorder specific treatments (see McHugh, Murray, & 
Barlow, 2009). It is important to highlight the potential of research to explore 
perfectionism targeted CBT given the wide-spread impact perfectionism can have, 
research into understanding perfectionism can help bridge the gap between research 
and clinical practice when dealing with comorbidity (Egan, Wade, et al., 2012). To 
further improve the treatment efficacy of CBT for perfectionism, further 
investigation needs to be done on the models that underpin the therapy. Specifically, 
there is one model, the clinical perfectionism model, that has conceptualised the 
maintenance factors of perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002) and has been used to 
guide the development of effective treatments for perfectionism (Egan, van Noort, et 
al., 2014; Egan, Wade, et al., 2014; Handley et al., 2015). Although a clinical 
perfectionism model has been generated, there is an opportunity to test hypotheses 
generated by the clinical perfectionism model that have, to date, not been tested. By 
further testing hypotheses generated by the clinical perfectionism model, further 
revisions of the clinical perfectionism model can be made that can inform the 




Chapter 2: Exploring the Model of Perfectionism 
 
2.1. The Clinical Perfectionism Model 
Shafran et al. (2002) created a cognitive-behavioural model that aims to 
explain how clinical perfectionism is maintained. The original model was refined by 
Shafran et al. (2010), which explicitly included the role of performance-related 






















Figure 1. The revised cognitive-behavioural model of the maintenance of clinical 
perfectionism (reproduced from Shafran et al., 2010 with permission from Little 
Brown Book Group). 
 
The top of the model identifies that individuals with clinical perfectionism 
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standards they set. The standards are expressed as rigid, dichotomous rules, such as, I 
must achieve above 80% in an assessment, anything less is a complete failure (for 
further examples see Egan, Piek, Dyck, Rees, & Hagger, 2013). Alternatively, an 
individual may set an inflexible standard with regards to weight that they must 
always weigh 50kg and therefore anything over 50kg would be considered a failure 
(Shafran et al., 2002). 
The clinical perfectionism model then indicates that cognitive-behavioural 
processes influence these inflexible standards as a result of various thinking biases 
(i.e., overgeneralisation or catastrophising), which influence how an individual will 
interpret and evaluate their striving towards and achievement of their standards 
(Shafran et al., 2002). For example, if an individual did not achieve 80% in an 
assessment and perceived that they are a complete failure, the individual may predict 
that they may fail an entire class, drop out of study, and end up without a job. 
Shafran et al. (2002) also suggests that individuals will selectively attend to features 
of their performances, such as perceived flaws in their striving towards and 
achievement of their standards. The model also proposes that the individual may 
engage in counter-productive performance-related behaviours such as, 
procrastination, avoidance of tasks, reassurance seeking and performance checking 
(Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Shafran et al., 2010). 
It was proposed that one potential outcome of the dichotomous, inflexible 
thinking style and counter-productive behaviours is that the individual experiences 
‘real’ or ‘perceived’ failure, which causes a cycle of intense self-criticism about the 
failure (Shafran et al., 2010). For instance, when an individual does not achieve 80% 
on an assessment they may criticise their effort, with thoughts such as ‘others will 
not respect me if I do not achieve’ or ‘I should have done better, I am an idiot for not 
getting that mark’. The perceived or real failure, and the resultant thoughts, then 
reinforce their original belief, that their self-worth is dependent on striving for 
standards. Shafran et al. (2002) also proposes that the individual may set their 
standards at a level that is so personally demanding, that the individual has fears 
about not attaining those standards and eventually avoids trying to reach them 
(Shafran et al., 2002). For example, if an individual perceives that they may not 
achieve 80% on an assessment and is afraid of the consequences (based on their own 
catastrophic thoughts), the individual may procrastinate starting the assignment. A 




individual subsequently fails to reach the standard originally set. As a result of the 
failure, the individual may then engage in a cycle of intense self-criticism (i.e., ‘I am 
stupid and worthless for not achieving the standard’), which contributes to a negative 
view of themselves and ultimately reinforces the idea that their self-worth is 
contingent on striving and achieving their standards (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; 
Shafran et al., 2002; Shafran et al., 2010).  
Shafran et al. (2002) suggested that even when the individual attains their 
standards, there may be a momentary experience that enhances self-esteem, which 
may reinforce the individual’s belief that they should continue striving for personally 
demanding standards. However, Shafran et al. (2002) also proposed that the 
individual may discount their achievement and therefore no longer experience a 
positive sense of achievement. The individual may also re-assess their standards as 
they believe their standards are no longer personally demanding enough. Individuals 
may then re-set their standards higher. For example, if an individual achieves 82% on 
an assessment they may re-evaluate their original standard of 80% and aim to 
achieve 85% on their next assessment. By increasing their personally demanding 
standards, it increases the likelihood that individuals will experience perceived or 
real failure to achieve their standards in the future. The increase in personally 
demanding standards can result in more self-criticism, and therefore reinforce the 
cycle of self-criticism and basing self-worth on attaining personally demanding 
standards (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Shafran et al., 2002; Shafran et al., 2010).  
Evidence has indicated that individuals with clinical perfectionism identified 
that they set imposing standards (Bieling, Israeli, Smith, & Antony, 2003), react with 
self-criticism in response to perceived failure (Riley & Shafran, 2005), endorse 
dichotomous thinking styles when evaluating performances (Egan, Piek, Dyck, & 
Rees, 2007; Egan et al., 2013), engage in counter-productive performance-related 
behaviours (Lee, Roberts-Collins, Coughtrey, Phillips, & Shafran, 2011; Yiend, 
Savulich, Coughtrey, & Shafran, 2011), and make negative internal attributions for 
perceived failures (Egan et al., 2013). While preliminary evidence has provided 
support for the clinical perfectionism model, it is only recently that research has 
started testing some of the underlying cognitive assumptions conceptualised in the 
model (Kobori & Tanno, 2012; Yiend et al., 2011).  
Identifying the underlying maintaining mechanisms may allow for greater 




highlighted by Shafran et al. (2002) is that information processing biases may be an 
important maintaining factor in perfectionism. However, there is scant research 
exploring these biases in clinical perfectionism. To clarify the nature of information 
processing biases involved in clinical perfectionism beyond what is currently 
accounted for within the model it is important to consider the original model on 
which many models of psychological disorders are based on, the information 
processing model (Beck & Clark, 1988).  
2.2. The Information Processing Model 
The information processing model proposed that psychopathology can be 
explained by a three stage schema-based model (Beck & Clark, 1988). At the core 
level it was proposed that there are cognitive structures, which represent an enduring 
collation of prior knowledge and experiences. These structures assist individuals with 
the screening and organisation of information, such that any stimuli consistent with a 
cognitive structure is often elaborated, encoded, and more easily retrieved, while 
irrelevant or inconsistent stimuli tends to be ignored or forgotten (Beck & Clark, 
1988). Cognitive structures tend to remain dormant until triggered by environmental 
cues or events.  
Once activated, cognitive structures lead to cognitive processes that distort 
the processing of information. Cognitive processes are reciprocal in nature, whereby 
the cognitive processes can bias the way individuals attend to, interpret, and recall 
information that then reinforces the maladaptive cognitive structures, which in turn 
increases the likelihood of biased cognitive processes being activated. Beck and 
Clark (1988) argued that cognitive processes can largely occur outside of awareness 
such as an attention biased towards threat or interpretation biases of ambiguous 
information. These biased cognitive processes can then underpin other cognitive 
biases, which often include, though are not limited to, overgeneralisation (taking one 
instance either past or present and applying the outcome to all current/future 
scenarios), personalisation (blaming one’s self for external events), and dichotomous 
thinking (evaluating experiences as two mutually exclusive categories) (Beck & 
Clark, 1997). These cognitive processes are responsible for directing attention to 
particular information for encoding (attention bias), and deriving particular meanings 
from otherwise ambiguous information (interpretation bias), which can then give rise 




Cognitive products are the patterns of cognition that are then generated from 
the cognitive processes and include automatic thoughts or internal dialogues (Beck & 
Clark, 1988, 1997; Beck, 2011). Cognitive products tend to be the cognitions often 
observed in clinical practice such as mental imagery and repetitive negative thinking 
(Beck & Clark, 1988). It has been argued that the function of repetitive negative 
thinking can include avoidance of emotional content or to focus on the experiences 
around the individual’s distress and attempt to problem solve a range of issues 
(Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004).  
Mental imagery could be viewed as transdiagnostic; being a repetitive 
cognition that engage with or contain sensory experiences (Horowitz, 1970). Kosslyn 
et al. (2001) described mental imagery as “seeing with the mind’s eye or hearing 
with the mind’s ear” (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001, p. 635), and can be 
experienced in any sensory modality (Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007). The nature 
of imagery is such that mental imagery can be a sensory representation of an 
experience (e.g., imagining hearing another person stating they are disappointed in 
you) in addition to being the emotional impact (e.g., feeling guilty or nauseated by 
imaging hearing someone state they are disappointed). Repetitive negative thinking 
could also be viewed as transdiagnostic; being a pattern of “repetitive thinking about 
one or more negative topics that is experienced as difficult to control” (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008, p. 193).  
The specific content of cognitive products will depend on the nature of 
emotionally salient stimuli to a particular individual, although common themes occur 
within particular diagnoses (e.g., social-evaluative mental images or thoughts for 
social anxiety disorder, physical threat mental images or thoughts for panic disorder). 
Given the transdiagnostic nature of perfectionism, it is important that investigations 
of cognitive products are also transdiagnostic. In this way perfectionism in the 
following literature review will be used to refer to the over-arching construct of 
perfectionism (i.e., the striving for personally demanding standards which can be 
accompanied with intense self-critical evaluations if these standards are not met) and 
discrepancies between studies using different definitions will be described where 
relevant 
For the purpose of this thesis, mental imagery will therefore be used to refer 
to the over-arching process of mentally experiencing sensations or pictures of 




repeatedly experience mental images linked with previous memories or experiences, 
or could be about future events. These mental images may be about positive or 
negative experiences or events, yet even when mental images contain positive 
experiences, some of the resultant positive aspects of hyperarousal (i.e., excitation) 
could become negative when it is associated with a pre-occupation with the future 
and goal pursuit (Deeprose & Holmes, 2010). Additionally, repetitive negative 
thinking will therefore be viewed as the process of dwelling on cognitive products, 
whereby individuals repetitively engage with thoughts about future or past events. 
Both mental imagery and repetitive negative thinking may be driven by lower level 
cognitive processes, such as attention biases or interpretative biases, which serve to 
selectively favour emotionally threatening or negative information.  
These cognitive products then have a reciprocal relationship with an 
individual’s behaviour and mood, such that imagery or repetitive negative thoughts 
reinforce particular behaviours, which may then lead to people engaging more with 
imagery or repetitive negative thinking as maladaptive coping processes. Of 
particular relevance to the information processing model is that each section of the 
model, cognitive structures, processes, and products, operate at increasing levels of 
awareness. For example, an individual may be aware of the cognitive products or 
their behaviours that result from cognitive products, but not of the underlying 
cognitive processes or structures that give rise to these products.  
2.3. Integrating the Information Processing Model with the Clinical 
Perfectionism Model  
As a cognitive-behavioural model, the clinical perfectionism model draws on 
the processes represented in the information processing model. For instance, the 
information processing model proposes a core cognitive structure that influences the 
cognitive processes and products observed. Within the clinical perfectionism model, 
the core cognitive structure is that the individual’s self-worth is contingent upon 
striving for and meeting personally demanding goals. Both models incorporate 
cognitive processes, which specifically within the clinical perfectionism model is 
conceptualised as erroneous thinking styles (e.g., dichotomous thinking, 
overgeneralisation, or jumping to conclusions). Shafran et al. (2002) stated that 
attentional biases may lead to these erroneous thinking styles, similar to the 
information processing model. For the purpose of this thesis, attention bias in clinical 




that signals failure and inattention or discounting of achievements (Shafran et al., 
2010). The cognitive processes observed within the clinical perfectionism model may 
lead to various cognitive products such as self-criticism, or the reappraisal of 
standards, consistent with the pattern observed in the information processing model 
(Beck, 2005).  
Understanding the clinical perfectionism model from an information 
processing basis provides an opportunity to propose where additional research can be 
directed to improve our understanding of clinical perfectionism. Using the 
information processing model highlights several cognitive processes and cognitive 
products that allows for examination of the clinical perfectionism model to improve 
understanding of perfectionism as a construct and how it relates to psychological 
distress. Both the information processing model and clinical perfectionism model 
identify selective attention as one such underlying cognitive process. Selective 
attention is described as the systematic tendency to preferentially allocate attention 
towards specific stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & 
Van, 2007), however limited research has evaluated the potentially biased process 
within perfectionism groups (Kobori & Tanno, 2012). Of particular importance, the 
component attentional processes underlying patterns of biased attention in 
perfectionism has not been systematically examined. Specifically, it is uncertain 
whether people with clinical perfectionism quickly orient their attention to stimuli 
confirming their beliefs, or experience difficulty moving their attention away from 
the stimuli once it is observed. 
Another cognitive process that is proposed within the information processing 
model is biased interpretations (Beck & Clark, 1997). An interpretative bias indicates 
individuals ascribe negative meaning to emotionally ambiguous sensory information, 
such as an individual with social anxiety interpreting ambiguous social cues as 
threatening to one’s self, such as a yawn as an indication that they are boring rather 
than the listener being tired (Beck & Clark, 1997). For the purpose of this thesis, 
interpretation bias in clinical perfectionism will therefore be used to refer to 
individuals reappraising standards as insufficiently demanding; however there has 
been limited exploration as to whether people have interpretive biases relating to 
perfectionism when confronted with different situations (Yiend et al., 2011). It 
should also be noted that the clinical perfectionism model suggests that many of the 




according to the clinical perfectionism model, a situation where an individual 
achieved a high standard (e.g., 85% on an exam), but it was slightly below their own 
personally demanding goal (e.g., 95% on an exam), has unambiguously achieved 
below their own standard.  Where there is ambiguity is how an individual interprets 
the consequences of these experiences. For example, an individual with clinical 
perfectionism may negatively interpret this experience and subsequent consequences 
and become self-critical as a result of these interpretations. This explanation is 
consistent with evidence suggesting that individuals with heightened perfectionism 
are more likely to react negatively to failure (Besser, Flett, & Hewitt, 2004), however 
there has been limited empirical research evaluating early information-processing 
biases, such as interpretation bias.  
Shafran et al. (2002) also identified that an individual may engage with 
repetitive negative thinking, asserting that individuals with clinical perfectionism 
will continually think about and evaluate their past performances with increasing 
scrutiny until they find an error in that performance. This process is similar to how 
Frost, Marten, et al. (1990) described individuals who are high in perfectionism 
being repeatedly and highly critical of their own behaviours (e.g., concern over 
mistakes). However, the construct of repetitive negative thinking is not explicitly 
conceptualised within the clinical perfectionism model.  
Another cognitive product hypothesised to operate within perfectionism is 
imagery, which may also occur recurrently. Mental imagery can be defined as mental 
cognitions that engage with or contain sensory experiences (Horowitz, 1970). Other 
researchers have defined mental imagery as “seeing with the mind’s eye or hearing 
with the mind’s ear” (Kosslyn et al., 2001, p. 635). These definitions embrace all of 
the types of imagery that can be observed, which is of importance for practitioners 
and researchers, since it does not just occur in terms of mental pictures, but can be 
experienced in any sensory modality. Although mental imagery is not conceptualised 
within current models of perfectionism, Lee et al. (2011) found that individuals who 
score high on the full FMPS, compared to those who score low on the full FMPS, 
were more likely to experience more distress from perfectionism-related mental 
imagery, and have greater difficulty dismissing these mental images. For example, a 
negative image in perfectionism might relate to the individual being shamed at work 
in front of their colleagues due to a project being completed to a less than perfect 




research, Egan, Wade, et al. (2014) identify that mental imagery treatment techniques 
can easily be incorporated in treatment of perfectionism, yet will require further 
research to determine the effectiveness of incorporating mental imagery modification 
techniques. 
Both repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery can significantly impact 
on negative emotional experiences such as anxiety, stress, and depression (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008; Krans, 2011). Repetitive negative thinking may be an indirect 
pathway between perfectionism and psychological distress (Harris, Pepper, & 
Maack, 2008; Macedo, Marques, & Pereira, 2014; Short & Mazmanian, 2013), 
perfectionism and depression (Di Schiena, Luminet, Philippot, & Douilliez, 2012), 
and perfectionism and PTSD (Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014). Repetitive negative 
thinking and mental imagery as cognitive products may assist clinical explanations as 
to how and why individuals with clinical perfectionism experience negative affect. 
Thus there is a theoretical role for these cognitive processes and products in 
perfectionism. The following will first briefly consider converging evidence from 
other research fields highlighting the importance of these cognitive processes and 
products before the currently limited direct evidence regarding the presence of 
cognitive processes, attention and interpretation bias, and cognitive products, 
repetitive negative thinking and imagery, in perfectionism is considered.  
2.4. Cognitive Processes in Perfectionism  
Despite limited studies, there is preliminary evidence for an attention bias and 
interpretation bias occurring within perfectionism (Kobori & Tanno, 2012; Yiend et 
al., 2011). The preliminary evidence highlights that there is scope for further 
evaluation of cognitive processes involved in perfectionism, both for theoretical 
understanding and clinical practice (Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014). To date, these 
cognitive biases have not yet been stringently tested within perfectionism models. 
2.4.1. Attention  
Attention bias refers to attentional allocation towards any specific cue; for 
example, an attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli relative to neutral or 
positive stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). It has been proposed that attention biases 
can contribute to the development and maintenance of psychological disorders 
(Harvey et al., 2004), with attentional focus varying depending on the presenting 
psychopathology. Bias toward threat-related information is particularly evident in 




disorders (Shechner et al., 2012), and mood disorders (Joormann & Arditte, 2013). 
Some examples of attention biases within various psychopathologies are where 
individuals rapidly engage with or have difficulty disengaging from physically 
threatening stimuli in panic disorder (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & Houwer, 
2006; Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014), or attentional avoidance of 
social-threat cues (e.g., emotional faces) or engagement with socially threatening 
stimuli in social anxiety (Schofield, Johnson, Inhoff, & Coles, 2012). Biased 
attention also plays a role in PTSD, OCD, eating disorders, mood disorders (e.g., 
unipolar and bipolar depression), and substance abuse disorders (Beard, Sawyer, & 
Hofmann, 2012; Dozois, Seeds, & Collins, 2009; Harvey et al., 2004; Koster, De 
Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011; Shechner et al., 2012). A thorough 
exploration of the different mechanisms involved in, and mediators or moderators of, 
attentional biases is beyond the scope of this literature review (see Richards et al., 
2014 for further information).  
There have been several tasks designed to assess biased attention, such as the 
emotional Stroop task, dot-probe task, emotional spatial cueing, and visual search 
tasks (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, to date the two most popular tasks are the 
emotional Stroop task and dot-probe task. The emotional Stroop task is a variant of 
the original Stroop interference task (Stroop, 1935), whereby participants are 
required to name the colour of words that vary according to emotional valence. The 
response latency between a threat related word (e.g., judge or harm) would be 
compared to the response latency for a neutral word (e.g., rainbow or bowl) as an 
index of attention bias. Whilst the emotional Stroop task requires participants to 
respond to a single word stimulus, the dot-probe task involves presenting pairs of 
words with their members differing in content, presented briefly on a computer 
screen. Participants then discriminate a small probe stimulus that then appears in the 
loci of where one of the words in the pair was shown. The relative speed to which the 
individual successfully discriminates the probe that appears in the locus of one 
category of words (i.e., threat related words), relative to the speed the probe is 
identified in the locus of the other category of words (i.e., neutral words), provides 
an indication as to the attentional distribution between the two types of words 
(Grafton & Macleod, 2014; Grafton, Watkins, & MacLeod, 2012; Macleod, 




The importance of sensitive measurement and understanding of the influence 
of attention biases is clear when considering that induced attentional biases have 
been causally linked with emotional vulnerability and subsequent interpretation of 
events (White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011). It is also interesting that while 
research has tended to focus on biased attention to disorder relevant stimuli across a 
range of conditions (e.g., social threat for SAD, trauma-relevant for PTSD) there has 
been a comparative paucity of research focusing on the patterns of biased attention 
for a transdiagnostic process (i.e., perfectionism) that may be common to the 
development and maintenance of many of these disorders. The evaluation of biased 
attention in perfectionism may help to identify patterns of cognition that are a 
fundamental risk factor for many different types of psychopathology. 
2.4.1.1. Attention bias and perfectionism. Within the clinical perfectionism 
model, attention bias is broadly characterised as selective attention towards failure 
related information and inattention or discounting of achievements (Shafran et al., 
2002). In the perfectionism field, there has been limited experimental research 
examining the type of information that captures attention, that is, whether 
perfectionism-related attention is automatically captured by perfectionism-relevant 
stimuli per se (i.e., mistakes) or emotional valence in general (i.e., all negative 
stimuli). These concepts are comparable to attention bias research evaluating 
cognitive mechanisms underpinning subclinical and clinical anxiety (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010; Koster et al., 2006; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012) or depression 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003). 
To date, one study observed a relationship between perfectionism and social 
anxiety-related attention bias (Lundh & Öst, 1996), while only one other study has 
evaluated and found a relationship between perfectionism and attention bias (Kobori 
& Tanno, 2012). Lundh and Öst (1996) assessed attentional biases, self-focus, and 
perfectionism in participants with social anxiety (n = 42) and matched controls (n = 
42). An emotional Stroop task was used to assess attentional bias, which required 
individuals to name the colour of socially threatening or benign words as quickly as 
possible. In the emotional Stroop task, attentional bias towards socially threatening 
information was indexed by longer colour-naming latencies for social-threat words 
relative to non-threat words. Lundh and Öst (1996) found that perfectionism, 
specifically Concern over Mistakes scores of the FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990), 




participants with a diagnosis of social anxiety and their matched controls. Using 
these findings to describe attentional bias in perfectionism is difficult for two 
reasons. First, the study focused on attention biases to socially threatening words 
(e.g., dull) in individuals with social anxiety, rather than perfectionism-relevant 
stimuli related to mistakes or failure. Second, participants were selected and then 
compared based on the presence or absence of social anxiety, which did not allow for 
the comparison of attention biases across varying levels of perfectionism severity 
(e.g., high vs. low).  
To examine attention bias across perfectionism groups, Kobori and Tanno 
(2012) investigated selective attention with Self-Oriented Perfectionism scores of the 
HMPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991b) while controlling for state anxiety. The authors 
controlled for state anxiety due to its relationship with both perfectionism and 
perfectionistic cognitions, and the potential impact it has on experimental 
performance (Kobori & Tanno, 2012). Similar to Lundh and Öst (1996), Kobori and 
Tanno (2012) used a modified Stroop colour-naming task, yet they targeted 
perfectionism-related stimuli (e.g., failure, flaw, imperfection) rather than social-
threat stimuli. The authors screened 245 undergraduate students using the Self-
Oriented Perfectionism scores of the HMPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991b) and classified 
participants as high perfectionists (> 75th percentile, n = 20) or low perfectionists (< 
25th percentile, n = 20). Kobori and Tanno assumed that individuals would 
demonstrate an attention bias if there was a slower reaction time to name the colour 
of words when content was perfectionism relevant relative to naming the colour of 
neutral words. The results indicated that reaction times between high and low 
perfectionists did not differ for the colour naming of neutral words, but high 
perfectionists took significantly longer to react to (i.e., their attention was captured 
by) failure-related words compared to their low perfectionist counterparts.  
Whilst Kobori and Tanno (2012) specifically recruited and tested for a 
perfectionism-relevant attention bias, there are two methodological limitations that 
preclude the conclusion that individuals with greater perfectionism scores 
demonstrate a distinct attentional bias relative to individuals with lower 
perfectionism scores. The first limitation of Kobori and Tanno’s (2012) study 
involves the use of the emotional Stroop task. The premise of the emotional Stroop 
task is that individuals will demonstrate slowing in reaction time to naming the 




Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Critics have identified that individuals 
may display a general slowdown in the presence of certain information as a result of 
behavioural freezing, rather than a reflection of attention being directed to the 
semantic meaning of the word (Algom et al., 2004). This criticism of the emotional 
Stroop task led to the development of attentional assessment tasks, such as the dot-
probe task, that can index attention without concern for a general slowdown in the 
presence of certain information. 
To date, the most widely used method to assess attention bias is the 
attentional dot-probe task.  The dot-probe task involves presenting pairs of words 
with their members differing in content, presented briefly on a computer screen. 
Participants must then discriminate a small probe stimulus that then appears in the 
loci of where one of the words in the pair was shown. The relative speed to which the 
individual successfully discriminates the probe that appears in the locus of one 
category of words, relative to the speed the probe is identified in the locus of the 
other category of words, provides an indication as to the attentional distribution 
between the two types of words (Grafton & Macleod, 2014; Grafton, Watkins, & 
MacLeod, 2012; Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). The use of dot-probe 
methodology would allow more thorough testing of the hypothesis that there is a 
distinct attentional preference between individuals with clinical perfectionism.  
The second limitation related to Kobori and Tanno’s (2012) study is that only 
negative perfectionism-relevant words and neutral perfectionism-irrelevant words 
were compared. Restricting the stimuli to only two categories of stimulus words 
precludes any conclusions about whether there are distinct attentional biases to either 
positive perfectionism-relevant or negative perfectionism-relevant stimuli. Kobori 
and Tanno claim to have demonstrated that individuals with high perfectionism 
attend to negative perfectionism-relevant stimuli relative to individuals with low 
perfectionism. However, the effect observed could be the result of the individuals 
with high perfectionism attending to the valence of the words (i.e., negative) 
regardless of whether the information presented was perfectionism-relevant or not. 
Equally, the observed effect may be the result of individuals with high perfectionism 
demonstrating an attentional preference for all perfectionism-relevant stimuli 
regardless of its valence. In response to the limitation regarding the stimuli used, the 
question as to whether biased attention in perfectionism is specific to positively or 




stimuli, or a combination of valence and perfectionism-relevance serves the basis of 
the investigation of study 1.  
2.4.2. Interpretation 
Interpretation bias refers to a consistent resolution of ambiguity across a 
range of experiences such as ambiguity within a situation (e.g., a speaker noticing an 
audience member yawning), or of the different moods and sensations an individual 
experiences (e.g., anxiety related physiological sensations) (Hirsch, Meeten, Krahe, 
& Reeder, 2016). Cognitive models of anxiety and depression (Beck & Clark, 1988, 
1997) emphasise the importance of how people interpret past and future events in a 
benign (positive or neutral) or threatening manner. For example, a benign 
interpretation of noticing an audience member yawning could be that the audience 
member did not get enough sleep, whilst a threatening interpretation could be that the 
presenter views themselves as a terrible public speaker. As a result, the presenter 
could remain calm or experience symptoms of anxiety respectively.  
With interpretation biases theorised to have consequences for mood, and 
behaviour (Harvey et al., 2004, p. 138; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000), research has 
confirmed these associations, in particular the association between negative 
interpretation biases, and subsequent anxiety and depressive symptoms (Salemink, 
van den Hout, & Kindt, 2009; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010) .. Other 
psychopathologies with demonstrated interpretation biases include PTSD, eating, 
body dysmorphic, and substance abuse disorders (Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 
2000; Harvey et al., 2004; Lee & Shafran, 2004; Mobini, Reynolds, & Mackintosh, 
2013). The exact nature of the interpretation biases vary between disorders, however 
the common theme is that each interpretation bias across disorders is congruent with 
an individual’s primary concern. The specificity of interpretation biases could be 
illustrated by the difference between interpretations made by an individual with a 
substance disorder compared to an individual with PTSD. Within substance abuse 
disorders an individual may interpret neutral stimuli to be relevant to their substance 
of use, for example, the words ‘bar’ or ‘shot’ related to drinking, whereas a war 
veteran with PTSD may be more likely to interpret the same stimuli as a metal bar or 
gunshot, respectively, and thus as personally threatening rather than neutral.  
There are a range of paradigms designed to assess interpretation biases, for an 
overview of the complete range of paradigms available for interpretation biases see 




either generating interpretations, whether they are one word or sentence based 
interpretations, of an ambiguous scenario, or to be presented with a range of 
plausible interpretations that are then rank ordered by the participant. In each case 
the ratio of negative to positive interpretations generated or ranked highly are used as 
an index of the participants negative interpretation bias (Hirsch et al., 2016). These 
tasks can have the benefit of being participant generated, or easy to score and 
administer. However each of these tasks are particularly subject to demand effects 
(i.e., a participant responding in a manner they think the researcher wants), response 
bias (i.e., participant responding falsely), or a lack of sensitivity as to whether the 
participant is experiencing a genuine negative interpretation bias or just a lack of 
positive interpretations (Hirsch et al., 2016). 
A current leading paradigm for exploring interpretation biases is an 
interpretation bias recognition task (Yiend et al., 2011). Within this interpretation 
bias task, participants are exposed to ambiguous scenarios, from which, at a later 
time, they are then exposed to a range of disambiguating sentences that are either 
related to the scenario (target sentences) or unrelated to the scenario (foil sentences). 
The target sentences can then reflect benign, positive, or negative interpretations of a 
situation, and based on how similar participants rate these target sentences to the 
original scenario, can give an index of a participants interpretation bias (Hirsch et al., 
2016). Additionally, since all interpretations can be rated as being similar to the 
original scenario this approach does not encounter the same demand or response bias 
effects other interpretation tasks are limited by. The researcher is also able to 
determine if there is a general response bias towards particular types of 
interpretations through the use of the foil sentences. For instance, if a participant 
responds the same to both negative target and foil sentences, this may indicate a 
response bias rather than a true interpretation bias.  
Understanding the best paradigm to use for ongoing exploration of 
interpretation biases is important, not only due to the impact of interpretation on 
negative experiences and emotions, but also because of evidence that a change in 
interpretation can lead to changes in behaviour (Yiend et al., 2011). Similar to 
attention bias, research has tended to focus on interpretation biases with respect to a 
specific disorder. There has been a lack of research focusing on the patterns of biased 
attention for a transdiagnostic process (e.g., perfectionism) that may be common to 




biased interpretation in perfectionism may further inform theory as to the relevant 
patterns of cognition that are a fundamental risk factor across a range of 
psychopathologies. 
2.4.2.1. Interpretation bias and perfectionism. Shafran et al. (2002) argued 
that individuals with clinical perfectionism make negative interpretations when 
striving for perfection. For instance, if individuals with clinical perfectionism strive 
for a personally demanding goal, yet do not meet the goal, they may interpret 
ambiguous stimuli in these situations negatively (e.g., perceive themselves to be 
inadequate) and experience a negative emotional response (e.g., feel depressed about 
their performance). Moreover, if individuals with perfectionism interpret the 
unachieved goal as evidence of a failure to meet appropriately high standards there 
may still be negative cognitive (e.g., self-criticism) and affective responses (e.g., 
anxiety or depressed mood)  (Dunkley, Zuroff, & Blankstein, 2006) even if the 
outcome is positive (e.g., congratulations received for the level of achievement met). 
Negative affective consequences could also occur even when individuals with 
perfectionism reach their high standards if they interpret goal attainment as evidence 
that the previously expected standard was set too low. However, there is a lack of 
experimental studies testing the hypothesis derived from the cognitive-behavioural 
model of clinical perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2010), that individuals with high 
levels of perfectionism display an interpretation bias for perfectionism-relevant 
information. Understanding the nature of interpretation biases in clinical 
perfectionism may further inform interventions that aim to correct these biases. 
Only one study to date has examined whether there is a clear interpretation 
bias in relation to perfectionism. Yiend et al. (2011) aimed to explore naturally 
occurring interpretation biases associated with perfectionism. An ambiguous passage 
task was used to assess interpretation biases that required individuals to read a 
passage, which was ambiguous with respect to either emotional or perfectionist 
meaning, and then rated four interpretations on how similar in meaning the 
interpretations were to the corresponding passage after being presented all the 
scenarios. Yiend et al. (2011) selected 40 undergraduate students (20 high and 20 
low perfectionists) based on their scores on the Perfectionism subscale of the DAS 
(Weissman & Beck, 1978), and presented 20 scenarios with potential perfectionist 
meanings and 20 scenarios that were emotionally neutral taken from a study on 




and Mathews (1991). In the interpretation task, Yiend et al. required participants to 
first read the brief emotionally ambiguous passages, half of which were 
perfectionism unrelated (Eysenck et al., 1991) and half of which were perfectionism 
related specifically designed for the study. After reading all of the passages, the 
participants were required to rate the degree to which four members of a set of test 
sentences were similar in meaning to the original passage after all 40 original 
passages were presented. Two of the test sentences represented potential negative or 
positive interpretations of the original scenario (target sentences), whereas two were 
negative and positive sentences that did not represent potential interpretations of the 
original scenario (foil sentences). The four test sentences were rated in terms of their 
similarity to the meaning of the original passage (1 = very different in meaning to 4 = 
very similar in meaning), which was used to index the participants’ interpretation 
bias. The interpretations were designed by Yiend et al. to reflect perfectionist, non-
perfectionist, positive, or negative interpretations. Yiend and colleagues argued that a 
perfectionism-relevant interpretation bias would be demonstrated if high and low 
perfectionists differed in their interpretations of perfectionism related scenarios. 
Yiend et al. (2011) found that the pattern of responses were different between 
the high and low perfectionism groups across perfectionism related scenarios 
compared to perfectionism unrelated scenarios. When Yiend et al. (2011) further 
examined the interaction between perfectionism groups, they found that for the 
perfectionism related scenarios, compared to participants with low levels of 
perfectionism, participants with high levels of perfectionism rated items as being 
more similar in meaning when the item had perfectionist implications relative to non-
perfectionist implications. This finding was not observed for the emotional passage 
set used from Eysenck et al. (1991). The pattern of results highlighted that 
individuals with high levels of perfectionism were more likely to endorse 
perfectionistic interpretations compared to participants with low perfectionism. The 
findings reflected the reverse pattern for non-perfectionist interpretations, whereby 
individuals with low levels of perfectionism were more likely to endorse non-
perfectionistic interpretations compared to participants with high perfectionism 
(Yiend et al., 2011). Yiend et al.’s conclusions were strengthened by the 
methodological approach used to assess the interpretation bias (Hirsch et al., 2016).  
Further examination of perfectionism-relevant interpretation bias could 




individuals may interpret and evaluate their performance both personally and within 
social contexts (Shafran et al., 2010). The high degree of specificity in the 
interpretation tasks suggests the observed interpretation bias was a component of 
perfectionism rather than just a factor of general interpretation bias observed in 
anxiety or mood disorders (Yiend et al., 2011). It is important to note that in some of 
the test sentences employed by Yiend et al., the negative interpretation reflected an 
expected negative emotional interpretation as a result of a situation where an 
individual fell short of their own personal standard. For other test sentences, the 
negative interpretation reflected an expected negative outcome of such situations, for 
example a negative reaction from others directed towards the individual. Although 
both types of interpretations were assessed (emotions and outcomes), Yiend et al. did 
not directly compare the pattern of perfectionism-relevant interpretation bias on these 
two types of stimulus materials, but as will be discussed next it would be informative 
to do so.  
It is plausible that those considered to have clinical perfectionism are 
disproportionately more likely to infer that they would experience negative emotions 
when their performance falls short of perfection. When considering the cognitive-
behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, it could be considered a defining feature 
of perfectionism, as an individual may base their self-worth upon striving for and 
meeting personally demanding standards (Shafran et al., 2002). However, it is also 
possible that the effects reported by Yiend et al. were driven by a biased 
interpretation that concerned the anticipated affective consequence of failing to meet 
exceptionally high standards. The nature of the biased interpretations remains 
unclear. Specifically, it is unclear whether individuals with high levels of 
perfectionism specifically resolve only the ambiguity about the emotional (or 
affective) interpretation of the experience, or the ambiguity about the expected 
outcome of the experience. To determine whether the negative interpretation bias 
that characterises perfectionism is restricted to biased interpretations concerning 
one’s affective reactions, or also includes the biased interpretations regarding the 
meaning of a given result of events as a result from falling short of perfection, it is 
necessary to directly compare patterns of perfectionism-relevant interpretation bias 
involving both types of interpretations. In response to the limitation regarding the 
lack of clarity around these two types of selective interpretations (i.e., affective and 




question as to whether biased interpretation in perfectionism is specific to the 
affective interpretation or event expectations of an ambiguous scenario, positive or 
negatively valenced interpretations, or a combination of type of interpretations and 
valence serves the basis of the investigation of the research presented in Study 2.  
2.5. Cognitive Products in Perfectionism 
 Following the information processing model, cognitive processes then give 
rise to distorted cognitive products that are reflective of one’s core beliefs. Two 
particular cognitive products that may further explain the relationship between 
perfectionism and psychological distress are repetitive negative thinking and 
imagery. It is important to note that research to date has focused on the relationship 
between repetitive negative thinking and perfectionism (e.g., Egan, Hattaway, et al., 
2014; Flett, Coulter, Hewitt, & Nepon, 2011; Flett, Madorsky, Hewitt, & Heisel, 
2002), while the relationship between perfectionism and other potentially important 
cognitive products, such as mental imagery, has only been explored in one study 
(Lee et al., 2011). Given the significant impact imagery can have on emotion 
(Holmes, Geddes, Colom, & Goodwin, 2008; Holmes & Mathews, 2010), including 
it in models could provide further understanding as to the role these cognitive 
products have in maintaining psychological distress. 
2.5.1. Repetitive Negative Thinking 
Ehring and Watkins (2008) defined repetitive negative thinking as a pattern of 
thinking about a previous, present, or future problem or negative experience that is 
repetitive, intrusive, and difficult to disengage from. It is important to note that 
research has typically focused on one form of repetitive negative thinking, either 
rumination or worry, however, studies in recent years have suggested that there are 
many more commonalities across various forms of repetitive negative thinking than 
differences (Bird, Mansell, Dickens, & Tai, 2012; Mahoney, McEvoy, & Moulds, 
2012; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010; McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 
2013). There is some evidence that rumination focuses more on past events and 
worry focuses more on the future, although this is not exclusively the case, with both 
rumination and worry including both past- and future-oriented cognitions (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008). Given rumination and worry reflect a common underlying construct 
of repetitive negative thinking, and that worry, rumination, and repetitive negative 




Watkins, & Nathan, 2013), the present thesis will use the term repetitive negative 
thinking in reference to either rumination or worry.  
Repetitive negative thinking has been linked with attentional biases 
(Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Koster et al., 2011), interpretation biases 
(Laposa, Cassin, & Rector, 2010), and imagery (Brewin et al., 2009). Repetitive 
negative thinking was proposed to trigger intrusive memories, which can lead to a 
variety of emotions that can often be accompanied by physical sensations (Brewin, 
Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). Repetitive negative thinking has also been 
correlated with negative post-event processing, which is when an individual 
scrutinises their performance following a social interaction (Brozovich & Heimberg, 
2008). The relationship between repetitive negative thinking and post-event 
processing is demonstrated in both the general population and clinical population 
with social anxiety with elevated scores on the Social Phobia Scale (Heimberg, 
Mueller, Holt, Hope, & Liebowitz, 1993). Interestingly, repetitive negative thinking 
and post-event processing can occur even after experiences with positive events 
(Laposa et al., 2010), which further emphasises that repetitive negative thinking 
involves the process of engaging with repetitive thoughts rather than the specific 
thought content itself. Repetitive negative thinking was also significantly related to 
negative interpretations of memories after controlling for the intrusions frequency 
and severity, and it was also highly related to symptoms of depression (Starr & 
Moulds, 2006).  
Ehring and Watkins (2008) also reviewed whether repetitive negative 
thinking was a transdiagnostic process and reported that it was implicated across 13 
psychological disorders such as, depression, social anxiety, PTSD, OCD, eating 
disorders, and hypochondriasis. With a significant relationship with psychopathology 
and negative outcomes, repetitive negative thinking may contribute to the 
understanding of the pathways through which perfectionism is related to 
psychological distress or psychopathology.  
2.5.1.1. Repetitive negative thinking and perfectionism. As repetitive 
negative thinking and perfectionism are both important constructs that are commonly 
elevated across psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; O'Connor, 
O'Connor, & Marshall, 2007), research has explored whether repetitive negative 




psychological distress (Macedo et al., 2014). Identifying the role of repetitive 
negative thinking is important, because when an individual is striving for high 
standards they may also engage in repetitive negative thinking. Following the 
information processing model, evaluating cognitive products may provide an 
additional pathway through which perfectionism operates and influences emotion 
and behaviours. Recent studies have subsequently demonstrated that repetitive 
negative thinking acts as a mediator between perfectionism and constructs of 
psychological distress such as depression and anxiety (Blankstein & Lumley, 2008; 
Chang et al., 2007; Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014; Olson & Kwon, 2007; Randles, 
Flett, Nash, McGregor, & Hewitt, 2010; Stoeber & Joormann, 2001).  
Harris et al. (2008) investigated a sample of 96 college students who 
completed the FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990), and retrospectively reported levels 
of repetitive negative thinking and symptoms of depression following the 
recollection of a disappointing exam/test. The authors found that repetitive negative 
thinking was an indirect pathway between perfectionism and depressive symptoms in 
response to recalling an exam where the individuals did not perform at a desired 
level. Harris et al.’s (2008) findings are similar to those of previous studies that have 
demonstrated that the brooding ruminative response style was a mechanism 
identified to explain the relationship between perfectionism and psychological 
distress (O'Connor et al., 2007), and the relationship between perfectionism and 
depressive symptoms over time (Olson & Kwon, 2007).  
Macedo et al. (2014) emphasised that individuals with perfectionism may 
engage more readily with repetitive negative thinking. Individuals may focus on and 
repeat events in their mind, often to search for errors in their performance or engage 
with ‘what if’ scenarios about what could have happened if the individual responded 
differently (Shafran et al., 2002). Specifically, those who continually reviewed 
negative thoughts were more likely to prolong their negative emotional experiences 
(Blankstein & Lumley, 2008). Individuals may also avoid emotional processing by 
engaging with verbal-linguistic processes such as repetitive negative thinking 
(Blankstein & Lumley, 2008; Chang et al., 2007; Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014; Olson 
& Kwon, 2007; Randles et al., 2010; Stoeber & Joormann, 2001).  
Consistent with the prediction that individuals who experienced repetitive 
negative thoughts were more likely to prolong negative emotional experiences, Short 




rumination, was an indirect pathway that partly explained the relationship between 
perfectionism and psychological distress. Short and Mazmanian’s finding is 
consistent with that of Di Schiena et al. (2012), where repetitive negative thinking 
fully explained the relationship between perfectionism and depressive symptoms.  
Macedo et al. (2015) assessed 788 college students on two dimensions of 
perfectionism, perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings, from composite 
scores of both the FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990) and HMPS (Hewitt & Flett, 
1991b). Macedo et al. found that, as an indirect pathway, repetitive negative thinking 
partially explained how perfectionistic concerns predicted psychological distress. 
Furthermore, repetitive negative thinking fully explained the predictive relationship 
between perfectionistic strivings and psychological distress. This finding is 
consistent with past literature demonstrating that perfectionistic concerns is 
associated with psychological distress (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). It also highlights 
that when considering perfectionism, perfectionistic concerns is not the only 
explanation for the link between perfectionism and psychological distress, rather 
there are other factors that may be involved, such as the frequency and nature of the 
thoughts individuals engage with.  
Importantly, the finding that the relationship between perfectionistic strivings 
and psychological distress was fully explained by repetitive negative thinking may 
help explain inconsistent findings in the literature that suggest perfectionistic 
strivings is associated with positive outcomes (Bieling, Israeli, et al., 2004) yet could 
also be a vulnerability factor in mood disorders (Smith et al., 2016). According to 
Macedo et al.’s (2015) findings, the relationship between perfectionistic strivings and 
psychological distress or disordered psychopathology may be due to particular 
indirect pathways. It may be that perfectionistic strivings may only become negative 
if the individual consequently repetitively and negatively thinks about the possible 
outcomes of their strivings. Repetitive negative thinking may lead the individual to 
also become more self-critical regarding their performance (Macedo et al., 2014). 
These findings are not surprising considering other research that has found subscales 
of other perfectionism measures, such as Personal Standards from the FMPS (Frost, 
Marten, et al., 1990), are associated with eating disorders and depression (Egan, 
Wade, et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2016). Although repetitive negative thinking could 
be a relevant pathway through which individuals with perfectionism experience 




relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. As such, it is 
important to account for additional cognitive products that may be present in 
perfectionism to improve models and conceptualisations for transdiagnostic 
treatments. 
2.5.2. Mental Imagery  
Another cognitive product that may have significant implications is mental 
imagery. Mental imagery has also been considered transdiagnostic as it is involved in 
the development and maintenance of several disorders including, but not limited to, 
PTSD, depression, eating, and anxiety disorders (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Mental 
imagery has been widely recognised as a cognitive feature in psychological disorders 
(Krans, 2011), with research demonstrating imagery across PTSD, social anxiety, 
agoraphobia, panic disorder, health anxiety, and OCD (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). 
Mental imagery has also been observed in mood disorders, such as depression and 
bipolar disorder (Holmes et al., 2008), eating disorders, body dysmorphic disorder 
(Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison, 2003), and substance abuse 
disorders (Brewin et al., 2010).  
Mental imagery, in particular repetitive and intrusive images, can 
significantly affect an individual’s behavioural and emotional strategies (Hackmann, 
Bennett-Levy, & Holmes, 2011, p. 13). Typically, intrusive images result in 
behaviours triggered to avoid, suppress or neutralise the distress experienced from 
the image. These behaviours have been recognised in the context of different 
disorders, such as avoidance in PTSD or social anxiety (Hackmann et al., 2011; 
Moulds & Holmes, 2011), rumination in depression and bipolar disorder (Holmes, 
Lang, & Deeprose, 2009) and ritualised behaviours in OCD (Speckens, Hackmann, 
Ehlers, & Cuthbert, 2007). Mental imagery can amplify negative emotions, more so 
than emotion based verbal processing (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). As such, 
participants who focused on imaging a negative story experienced significant 
increases in state anxiety compared to people who focused on verbalising the story 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Conversely, positive imagery about positive events 
resulted in greater reductions in anxiety than when individuals just focused on words 
(Pictet, Coughtrey, Mathews, & Holmes, 2011). Furthermore, imagery based 
techniques have already been used to enhance existing treatments (McEvoy et al., 
2015; McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014). Given the significant impact imagery has on both 




key pathway between perfectionism and psychological distress as a mechanism 
through which individuals with perfectionism may experience psychological distress. 
2.5.2.1. Imagery and perfectionism. When considering the relationship 
between perfectionism and imagery it is important to consider that imagery can be 
experienced in any sensory modality (Holmes, Arntz, et al., 2007). For example, a 
negative image in perfectionism might relate to the individual being shamed at work 
in front of their colleagues due to completing a project to a less than perfect standard, 
and the individual imagines hearing the comments colleagues make, whilst also 
experiencing the physiological reactions that may accompany the feelings of anxiety 
the individual would experience in that situation.   
To date there has only been one study as far as the author is aware that 
examined the relationship between perfectionism and imagery. Lee et al. (2011) 
assessed the nature of imagery in perfectionism and the relationship between imagery 
and perfectionism-relevant behaviours (e.g., checking, avoidance, and spending 
excessive time on task). The authors divided a non-clinical sample into two groups, 
using a median split on FMPS scores, where one group reflected high perfectionism 
and the other low perfectionism. Lee at al. evaluated imagery through the use of a 
modified images interview (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000), which provided 
both interview content for thematic analysis in addition to ratings for several 
questions (e.g., on a scale of 1-10 how distressing is this particular image?). The 
authors found that from the ratings participants provided, the imagery score was 
significantly higher for the high perfectionism group compared to the low 
perfectionism group. The high perfectionism group also experienced more distress, 
more difficulty dismissing images, and greater negative impact from perfectionism-
relevant imagery compared to the low perfectionism group. Lee et al. also explored 
the influence imagery had on completing behavioural tasks, and found an association 
between higher imagery scores, such that higher imagery scores were significantly 
related to checking and safety behaviours, and difficulty in completing a task even 
when controlling for general psychopathology (Lee et al., 2011). Through thematic 
analysis of the qualitative component of the project, Lee et al. (2011) found that the 
images were most often negative or distressing, and the most common themes were 
work/academia related, followed by images about improving interpersonal 




Consistent with the view regarding clinical perfectionism as “a form of 
psychopathology maintained by specific cognitions and behaviour(s)” (Riley et al., 
2007, p. 2229) the findings from Lee et al.’s (2011) study suggest imagery is 
associated with perfectionism. More specifically, those with higher levels of 
perfectionism demonstrated distorted cognitive processes in the form of intrusive 
imagery. The relative impact that imagery may have as an indirect pathway between 
perfectionism and psychological distress, and whether this pathway was more 
powerful than that of repetitive negative thinking, serves the basis of the 
investigation of the research presented in Study 3.  
2.6. Potential Clinical and Theoretical Implications from the Present Thesis  
Future research evaluating the relationships between perfectionism, cognitive 
processes, cognitive products, and psychological distress, could not only improve our 
theoretical understanding of perfectionism but could also guide novel interventions 
targeting perfectionism. These aims are particularly important given that 
perfectionism has a significant impact on treatment outcomes, and targeting 
perfectionism can reduce disorder symptomology (Egan, Wade, et al., 2012; Lloyd et 
al., 2015). The main aim of CBT for perfectionism is to reduce the degree to which 
an individual’s self-worth is contingent on attainment of high personal standards, and 
to modify the associated maladaptive cognitions and behaviours (Shafran et al., 
2010). If future research provides an understanding of the underlying mechanisms of 
clinical perfectionism, then one of the future directions of research investigating 
cognitive processes and products is to develop novel treatments to more effectively 
and efficiently achieve the aims of CBT for perfectionism.  
With attention and interpretation biases potentially operating within 
perfectionism, and the significant implications of both biases in psychological 
disorders, developing novel techniques such as Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) 
to reduce these biased processes could augment the effectiveness of current CBT for 
perfectionism. CBT has long aimed to reduce cognitive biases through a variety of 
techniques, and CBM techniques may offer one way of achieving this as an 
extension of therapeutic tradition. CBM can be defined as a method of manipulating 
a cognitive bias that characterises a psychological disorder, through extensive 
practice on novel cognitive tasks. The information processing model indicates that 
cognitive processes do not operate in isolation, and early evidence has suggested 




useful. For example, Beard, Weisberg, and Amir (2011) explored a 4-week 
intervention that utilised a combined approach to CBM including both attention and 
interpretation training for individuals with social anxiety, which was compared to a 
placebo group. They found medium to large effect sizes, which were comparable to 
other CBT and pharmacological treatments for social anxiety. There were also 
significant behavioural changes (i.e., fewer avoidance behaviours demonstrated by 
several behaviours such as eye contact) in an impromptu speech task from to pre- to 
post-treatment (Beard, Weisberg, & Amir, 2011). 
The potential to use a computerised task to achieve comparable results to 
traditional CBT or pharmacological treatments could be useful for therapists to 
explore. Given we do not know the nature of the underlying cognitive biases in 
relation to perfectionism, it is understandable that computerised tasks have not yet 
been explored in perfectionism, however if an evidence base is developed for these 
underlying processes in perfectionism, research could then evaluate whether the 
inclusion of CBM as an adjunct protocol to current CBT for perfectionism could 
improve treatment outcomes. Evidence from novel CBM treatments could provide 
support for theoretical models of perfectionism. In particular, it may provide 
evidence for the potential attention or interpretation biases as maintaining factors 
within perfectionism.  
An interesting consideration is the inclusion of imagery based CBM 
techniques (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). Imagery is 
important to consider given the wide impact it has on emotions and information 
processing (Holmes & Mathews, 2010), as it serves to reduce the negative and 
overwhelming experiences of individuals with clinical perfectionism (Lee et al., 
2011). Treatment for disorders using imagery is not a new concept (Edwards, 2007), 
as it has been used in treatment for PTSD and for exposure purposes in social anxiety 
and OCD (Hackmann et al., 2011). Imagery rescripting helps individuals experience 
emotions that are commonly avoided or suppressed; which has been used 
successfully to target distressing images in social anxiety, eating disorders, and 
depression (Cooper, Todd, & Turner, 2007; Holmes, Arntz, et al., 2007; McEvoy et 
al., 2015; McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014; Nilsson, Lundh, & Viborg, 2012; Wheatley et 
al., 2007; Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2007). Imagery rescripting serves to reduce the 
individual’s perception of helplessness or victimisation, and can encourage positive 




(Hackmann et al., 2011). What is particularly important is that these improvements 
have been observed during follow-up periods of up to 12-month follow-ups 
(Wheatley et al., 2007; Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2008). There is evidence for CBT 
treatment protocols enhanced with imagery-based techniques throughout each 
component (see McEvoy et al., 2015), however further research evaluating the 
efficacy of these programs is required. Given the utility imagery has on influencing 
emotion, Holmes and colleagues (2006) tested whether the incorporation of imagery 
could improve cognitive biases. In particular imagery based CBM involves the 
repeated practice of generating mental images of positive interpretations of 
ambiguous situations (Blackwell et al., 2015). Although further research is required 
(Blackwell et al., 2015), research has indicated that getting participants to generate 
mental images of positive outcomes to ambiguous situations were more effective in 
reducing anxiety than the traditional focus on either written or spoken interpretations 
(Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). For example, Holmes et al. 
(2006) took 26 participants who were provided CBM for interpretation biases. Of the 
26 participants, 13 were required to listen to the ambiguous paragraphs and were told 
to imagine the positive outcomes, whilst the remaining 13 participants were required 
to listen and to think about the verbal meaning of the content. The findings indicated 
that those in the imagery training condition, were more likely to experience positive 
affect than their peers who focused on the verbal meaning of the content. The 
findings from Holmes et al. (2006) were replicated by Holmes et al. (2009), who 
found similar increases in positive mood in imagery training conditions compared to 
verbal training conditions. Interestingly, Holmes et al. (2009) also proposed that a 
focus on verbal training may prompt participants to compare their own experiences 
with those presented in the positive interpretation training material, which 
subsequently lowers the participant’s mood. The authors also speculated that imagery 
based interventions may not lead comparisons between positive interpretation 
training materials and their own experiences.  
Despite these promising findings (Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2009) it 
is unclear whether these benefits are also present for clinical samples. Both studies 
by Holmes and colleagues (2006; 2009) used non-clinical samples. Blackwell et al. 
(2015) evaluated imagery based CBM in a randomised controlled trial for 
participants with a current diagnosis of major depression. Blackwell et al. found that 




imagery based CBM did not offer any advantage over a verbal focus as a control. 
Although there was no distinct advantage between treatment conditions, the authors 
found in post-hoc analyses that the imager based CBM may improve client’s 
experiences of anhedonia, the lack of feeling pleasure from previously enjoyable 
activities (Blackwell et al., 2015).  
Before evaluating the utility of including imagery protocols within 
perfectionism treatments, the relationship between perfectionism and imagery needs 
to be explored. The clinical implications for both CBM and imagery methods move 
beyond improving CBT for perfectionism and provide an avenue for therapists to 
target comorbid disorders. It is unusual for clinicians to observe clients without some 
level of comorbidity, which often leads to complex conceptualizations and difficulty 
implementing disorder-specific CBT programs (McHugh et al., 2009; Shafran et al., 
2009). Comorbidity typically forces clinicians to face the dilemma of choosing one 
evidence-based practice over another, with the knowledge that one condition (e.g., 
depression) may be effectively treated while having little impact on the comorbid 
conditions (e.g. OCD; Craske, 2012). Complicating matters further is that clinicians 
often have limited time, and are therefore unable to facilitate multiple sequential 
interventions (Egan, Wade, et al., 2012). 
A transdiagnostic CBT intervention may provide a flexible treatment option 
for clinicians that can be used as a cost-effective treatment, which may provide 
comparable results to disorder specific treatments (see McHugh et al., 2009). The 
importance of a transdiagnostic CBT intervention for perfectionism is highlighted by 
evidence that perfectionism can impede treatment progress. For example, 
perfectionism may be a barrier to treatment if individuals refuse to conduct a 
behavioural experiment that appears to be unrelated to increasing productivity or the 
achievement of high standards (Egan, Wade, et al., 2014). It is important to highlight 
the potential of research in this field to explore perfectionism targeted CBT as one of 
a range of transdiagnostic treatments that are being investigated to deal with the issue 
of comorbidity in practice (Egan, Wade, et al., 2012). 
2.7. Summary, Rationale, and Aim of the Present Thesis 
There has been debate in the literature as to the best definition of 
perfectionism. It is generally accepted that perfectionism involves the striving for 
high personal standards that may be met with self-criticism if these standards are not 




conducted using two multidimensional measures of perfectionism, the FMPS (Frost, 
Marten, et al., 1990) and the HMPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991b). Shafran et al. (2002) 
critiqued the reliance upon the measures of perfectionism rather than theory and, 
based on theory and clinical observation, developed a maintenance model of clinical 
perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002; Shafran et al., 2010).  
Underpinning the model of clinical perfectionism are several assumptions 
about the cognitive processes involved with the processing of information, namely an 
attention bias and interpretation bias towards information that signals failure (real or 
perceived). Previous research has examined cognitive biases in relation to mood, 
anxiety, and eating disorders (Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Lundh & Öst, 2001; Posner, 
Snyder, & Davidson, 1980); however there is limited investigation of these processes 
in relation to the transdiagnostic construct of perfectionism. If perfectionism is a 
critical predisposing and perpetuating factor for a range of psychological disorders 
(Egan, Wade, et al., 2011), then better understanding some of the core features of 
perfectionism could allow for further developments and improvements in effective 
transdiagnostic treatments. Based upon the model of clinical perfectionism, it is 
possible that understanding whether other transdiagnostic mechanisms, such as 
cognitive biases, are present in perfectionism may further augment CBT for 
perfectionism. Another consideration for treatment is that if there are clear cognitive 
biases in perfectionism, future research can consider developing CBM protocols that 
target perfectionism relevant biases, which could be run as an adjunct to other 
cognitive-behavioural protocols. In this way, if perfectionism is a key maintaining 
feature of a disorder, clinicians can then target perfectionism both directly in session, 
and within CBM protocols presented at home outside of the clinicians practice. In 
considering the additional impact of these biased cognitive processes, they may then 
result in repetitive negative thinking about failure or increase the likelihood that an 
individual experiences images about failure. Repetitive negative thinking and mental 
imagery may be potential pathways through which individuals with perfectionism 
experience psychological distress.  
The overall aim of this thesis is to better understand the critical cognitive 
processes that underpin perfectionism and the possible cognitive products that may 
explain the relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. To 
achieve this aim, a series of three studies across two samples of the general 




the general population that are linked by the overarching aim to further understand 
whether there is an association between perfectionism and attention and 
interpretation biases. Study Three examined a sample of 397 participants from the 
general population to test theoretically driven models as to how perfectionism is 
associated with psychological distress. 
2.7.1. Summary, Rationale, and Aim of Study One 
 Based on the clinical perfectionism model and information processing 
model, researchers have hypothesised that perfectionism has a distinct cognitive 
process, specifically attention bias, which may be separate from the attention bias 
observed in anxiety and mood disorders (Kobori & Tanno, 2012). However, the only 
study to specifically explore attention bias in perfectionism did not have appropriate 
test materials to test this hypothesis (Kobori & Tanno, 2012). The previous study 
only measured the relationship between perfectionism and attention bias when either 
negative, perfectionist-relevant words (i.e., stimuli related to failure) were used or 
neutral words (i.e., stimuli with no inherent meaning). The key question remained as 
to whether individuals with perfectionism had their attention captured by the 
emotional valence of the stimuli (i.e., the negative valence) or the perfectionism 
relevance of the stimuli (i.e., stimuli signalling failure). It also remains unclear as to 
whether the individual’s attention would be captured by all negative stimuli, 
regardless of perfectionism relevance, or all perfectionism relevant stimuli, 
regardless of valence, or a specific combination (i.e., perfectionism relevant stimuli 
but only when negative). The aim of Study One was to answer these questions. 
Study One of the present thesis addresses this aim by examining the discrete 
prediction that those with high levels of perfectionistic concerns will attend to 
negative information more than positive information, but only when the information 
is perfectionism-relevant. If individuals who are classified as high in perfectionistic 
concerns demonstrate a distinct attentional bias when compared to those classified as 
low in perfectionistic concerns, this would lend further support for the cognitive-
behavioural model of perfectionism originally proposed by Shafran et al. (2002). 
Such evidence may provide a rationale for further exploring the conceptualisation of 
clinical perfectionism with the aim of developing novel cognitive bias modification 




2.7.2. Summary, Rationale, and Aim of Study Two  
Based on the clinical perfectionism model and information processing model, 
research has also supported perfectionism as having a distinct cognitive process, 
specifically interpretation bias, that is separate from the interpretation bias observed 
in anxiety and mood disorders (Yiend et al., 2011). Yiend et al (2011) found that, for 
perfectionism-relevant scenarios, those high in perfectionism assigned higher 
familiarity ratings to negative than to positive candidate interpretations compared to 
those low in perfectionism (Yiend et al., 2011). Though this was an important first 
study, the interpretation of ambiguous scenarios sometimes assessed a heightened 
anticipation of more negative emotional responses in situations where one falls short 
of perfection (e.g., I would feel bad if…). In other stimulus materials, the negative 
interpretation assessed heightened anticipation of more negative outcomes of such 
situations, for example, the negative reactions of others (e.g., others would be 
disappointed if…).  
The key question remained as to whether individuals with perfectionism were 
more likely to endorse negative interpretations of ambiguity than positive 
interpretations of ambiguity for just the emotional resolution of ambiguity (i.e., the 
emotional experience as a result of the ambiguity in a scenario) or whether it was 
also observed for the resolution of ambiguity for the expected outcomes (i.e., the 
events that may follow ambiguity in a scenario). It also remains unclear as to whether 
the individual’s interpretation of ambiguity would be biased towards all negative 
stimuli, regardless of the resolution of ambiguity, or specific to a certain type of 
resolution of ambiguity. Furthermore, there is no evaluation as to whether there is 
any difference in interpretations based on the two aspects of perfectionism, namely, 
perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings. It is possible that perfectionistic 
concerns are more likely to be associated with negative resolutions of ambiguity, 
whilst perfectionistic strivings may be more likely to be associated with positive 
resolutions of ambiguity. 
These questions formed the aim of Study Two, which was to test whether 
perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings predicted a perfectionism-
relevant interpretation bias. Study Two addresses this aim by testing two predictions. 
First, that perfectionistic concerns predicts a negative interpretation bias of 
ambiguity; and second, that perfectionistic strivings predicts a positive interpretation 




the perfectionism-relevant interpretation bias was disproportionate toward a specific 
affective interpretations or event expectations based on the ambiguous scenario.  
It is important to determine if perfectionistic concerns predict a greater 
interpretation bias towards a negative resolution of ambiguity for perfectionist 
scenarios than an interpretation bias towards a positive resolution of ambiguity. Such 
a finding would lend further support for the cognitive-behavioural model of 
perfectionism originally proposed by Shafran et al. (2002). It is important to note that 
perfectionistic concerns is only one aspect described within the cognitive-
behavioural model of perfectionism, and as such it would also be informative to 
evaluate the predictive utility of perfectionistic strivings and interpretation bias. Such 
evidence may provide a rationale for further exploring the conceptualisation of 
clinical perfectionism with the aim of developing novel interpretation cognitive bias 
modification treatments to be incorporated as an adjunct treatment option for 
perfectionism. 
2.7.3. Summary, Rationale, and Aims of Study Three  
Based on the clinical perfectionism model and information processing model, 
research has identified the potential influence that cognitive products have on the 
relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress (Macedo et al., 2015). 
Despite the importance of evaluating underlying cognitive products, such as 
repetitive negative thinking and imagery, research has not yet explored the relative 
contribution of these two cognitive products together to explain the relationship 
between perfectionism and psychological distress. Furthermore, the research 
conducted on repetitive negative thinking and perfectionism has involved the 
evaluation of perfectionistic concerns or perfectionistic strivings as measured by the 
FMPS or HMPS. However, no study has included an assessment of clinical 
perfectionism, as measured by the CPQ (Fairburn et al., 2003a), to determine the 
relative contribution that a specific measure of clinical perfectionism makes to the 
explanation of the relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. 
The CPQ includes items that are more tightly aligned with Shafran et al.’s (2002) 
definition of clinical perfectionism, and so may better capture individual differences 
in this dimension (Dickie et al., 2012). Although the Concern over Mistakes subscale 
of the FMPS is highly correlated with the CPQ (Egan et al., 2016), it is unclear 
whether the CPQ would continue to explain any additional variance in the 




already accounted for by the Concern over Mistakes subscale. Work of this type 
could provide important converging evidence regarding the use of different measures 
of perfectionism to assess the relative impact of perfectionism rather than relying on 
a singular measurement approach. 
These questions formed the aim of Study Three, which was to test the direct 
and indirect pathways between perfectionistic concerns, perfectionistic strivings, 
clinical perfectionism, and psychological distress. Study Three tested the prediction 
that perfectionistic concerns will positively predict psychological distress both 
directly and indirectly through repetitive negative thinking and imagery, whilst 
perfectionistic strivings would not demonstrate this relationship. Furthermore, a 
specific measure more closely aligned with the cognitive-behavioural model of 
clinical perfectionism could explain additional variance of psychological distress 
both directly and indirectly beyond what is accounted for by perfectionistic concerns.  
A structural equation model was used to test three theoretically driven models 
to best explain the relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. 
The first model tested the direct relationship between perfectionistic concerns and 
perfectionistic strivings with psychological distress and the indirect pathway through 
repetitive negative thinking. The second model determined the relative contribution 
of both repetitive negative thinking and imagery to the relationship between 
perfectionistic concerns, perfectionistic strivings, and psychological distress. The 
third model tested the direct relationship between perfectionistic concerns and 
perfectionistic strivings and psychological distress with the inclusion of clinical 
perfectionism. The indirect pathway through repetitive negative thinking and 
imagery was also tested. Such evidence may provide a rationale for further 
evaluating the indirect role repetitive negative thinking or imagery may have as 
treatment foci in research examining transdiagnostic treatments.  
Thus, across the three studies presented in this thesis, there were four central 
aims. The first two aims were to test the predictions about the relationship between 
perfectionism, attention bias, and interpretation bias. The third aim was to assess the 
relationship between perfectionistic concerns, perfectionistic strivings, and clinical 
perfectionism with psychological distress. In addition to examining different 
measures of perfectionism, the fourth aim was also to examine the relative strength 
of the indirect pathways from perfectionism to psychological distress via repetitive 
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Chapter 3: Study One 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Clinical perfectionism has been defined as the pursuit of perfection and 
basing self-worth on achievement, despite adverse consequences (Shafran et al., 
2002). This definition of perfectionism has been central to the development of CBT 
for perfectionism, which have been found to be effective in reducing perfectionism, 
anxiety and depression (for a review see Lloyd et al., 2015). Perfectionism has been 
identified as a predisposing and perpetuating factor for eating, anxiety, and mood 
disorders and is associated with poorer treatment outcomes for these disorders (Egan, 
Wade, et al., 2011). Perfectionism has been proposed to be a transdiagnostic process 
that underpins numerous psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011) and this 
transdiagnostic nature of perfectionism may contribute to the high rates of 
comorbidity among psychological disorders (Bieling, Summerfeldt, et al., 2004; 
Egan, Wade, et al., 2012). Consequently, targeting perfectionism may be an efficient 
way of treating multiple psychological disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). This 
study aims to evaluate the hypothesis that selective attention, which is a type of 
attentional bias, is a maintaining mechanism of clinical perfectionism. A focus on 
changing unhelpful patterns of selective attention is already a component of CBT for 
perfectionism (e.g., Egan, Wade, et al., 2014), yet little research has examined the 
role of selective attention in perfectionism. Examining the role of selective attention 
in perfectionism in an experimental study may be helpful in confirming the need to 




determine if additional approaches that can change selective attention, such as 
attention bias modification (ABM), may be a useful adjunct to CBT for 
perfectionism in the future.  
A cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism was first proposed 
by Shafran et al. (2002), and later updated by Shafran et al. (2010). Shafran et al. 
(2002) postulated that individuals high in clinical perfectionism set excessively high 
standards for themselves, and base their self-worth on meeting these standards. 
Shafran et al. (2002) put forward the hypothesis, based on clinical observation, that 
perfectionism that is clinically relevant is maintained in part by a particular form of 
attentional bias. Attentional bias can be broadly defined as a systematic tendency to 
preferentially allocate attention towards specific types of information (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007). Information can be considered perfectionism-relevant when it concerns 
the evaluation of performance, and perfectionism-irrelevant when it bears no 
relationship to performance standards. Such information can be further subdivided 
according to whether it is negative in emotional tone or positive in emotional tone. 
Thus, negative perfectionism-relevant information would concern failure and 
criticism, whereas positive perfectionism-relevant information would concern 
success and praise. Shafran et al. (2002) proposed that people with high levels of 
clinical perfectionism, namely those with perfectionistic concerns, but not those with 
low levels of clinical perfectionism, allocate greater attention to negative 
perfectionism-relevant information than to positive perfectionism-relevant 
information. Shafran et al.’s proposition is consistent with early clinical impressions 
of perfectionism, such as that put forward by Hollander (1965), who stated that the 
perfectionist “looks so intently for defects or flaws that he lives his life as though he 
were an inspector at the end of a production line.” (p. 95). According to Shafran and 
colleagues, because this attentional bias increases the processing of negative 
perfectionism-relevant information, relative to positive perfectionism-relevant, it 
gives rise to cognitive distortions such as overgeneralising failure, and discounting of 
success (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Shafran et al., 2010).  
Shafran et al.’s (2002) proposal has guided the development of therapeutic 
interventions for perfectionism. CBT for perfectionism includes treatment 
components that are specifically designed to alter patterns of biased attentional 
responding to negative perfectionism-relevant information (Egan, Wade, et al., 




Shafran et al.’s theoretical position that individuals high in clinical perfectionism, but 
not those low in clinical perfectionism, will display an attentional bias towards 
negative perfectionism-relevant information compared to positive perfectionism-
relevant information. Importantly, if the prediction regarding selective attention were 
to be confirmed, then this would support the therapeutic value of including such 
components in CBT for perfectionism. Alternatively, if this prediction were not to be 
confirmed, then this would suggest that future research would be useful to determine 
the most effective components of CBT for perfectionism through examining 
alternative mechanisms of change.  
Only one study to date has compared attentional bias in people who score 
high and low in perfectionism, and while the results of this study are encouraging, 
interpretation of its findings is constrained by limitations associated with the adopted 
methodology. Specifically, in this study, Kobori and Tanno (2012) screened 243 
undergraduate students on the Self-Oriented Perfectionism subscale of the HMPS 
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991b). They compared the performance of those who scored in the 
top 25% (high perfectionism) and who scored those in the bottom 25% (low 
perfectionism) on an emotional Stroop task that required them to colour name 
negative perfectionism-relevant words (e.g., failure, flaw, imperfection) and neutral 
words unrelated to perfectionism (e.g., air, temperature, printer). Kobori and Tanno 
assumed that when participants’ attention was captured by word content, then their 
colour naming of these words would be slowed. The high perfectionism group took 
significantly longer than the low perfectionism group to colour name the negative 
perfectionism-relevant words, whereas the groups did not differ in their colour 
naming latencies for the neutral perfectionism-irrelevant words. Although Kobori 
and Tanno’s (2012) findings are consistent with the possibility that people high in 
perfectionism may attend disproportionately to negative perfectionism-relevant 
information, two limitations prevent the study from adequately testing Shafran et 
al.’s (2002) hypothesis. The first limitation concerns Kobori and Tanno’s use of the 
emotional Stroop task to assess attentional bias, while the second limitation concerns 
the nature of the stimulus words used in their study. Each limitation will be 
considered in turn. 
There has been compelling criticism of the assumption that slowing to colour 
name particular words on the emotional Stroop task permits the conclusion that 




et al., 2007; Macleod et al., 1986). As critics have pointed out, some participants may 
display general response slowing in the presence of certain information, reflecting 
behavioural freezing, without this involving greater attention to the content of that 
information. Moreover, critics also have noted that, even if an attentional bias is 
implicated in slowing to colour name certain words, this could just as readily involve 
attentional avoidance of these particular coloured word as attentional vigilance to the 
semantic content of these words (Lavy & van den Hout, 1994). Such concerns have 
led researchers to advocate the use of attentional assessment tasks that more clearly 
index the distribution of selective attention between the differing information of 
interest. The most widely used approach for achieving this is the attentional probe 
task, in which pairs of words, with their members differing on the dimension of 
interest, are briefly exposed on a computer screen, and participants must discriminate 
small probe stimuli that then appear in the locus where either word was shown. 
Degree of speeding to discriminate probes that appear in the locus of one category of 
words, relative to those that appear in the locus of the other category of words, 
indicates that attention was preferentially allocated to the former type of words 
compared to the latter (Grafton & Macleod, 2014; Grafton et al., 2012; Macleod et 
al., 1986). The use of this attentional probe methodology would permit more rigorous 
testing of the hypothesis that high perfectionism, unlike low perfectionism, is 
characterised by greater selective attention to failure related than success related 
information. This will be the attentional assessment approach adopted in the present 
study.  
The second limitation of Kobori and Tanno’s (2012) study is that it compared 
only negative perfectionism-relevant words and neutral perfectionism-irrelevant 
words. The restriction of consideration to these two categories of stimulus words 
precludes conclusions concerning whether high in perfectionism, but not low in 
perfectionism, is characterised by greater attention to negative perfectionism-relevant 
information than to positive perfectionism-relevant information. Kobori and Tanno 
claim to have shown that those high in perfectionism attend more than do those low 
perfectionism to negative perfectionism-relevant information, whereas this is not the 
case for neutral perfectionism-irrelevant information. However, this effect could 
result from those high in perfectionism showing an attentional bias shown to all 
negative information, regardless of whether or not this information is related to 




an attentional bias to all perfectionism-relevant information regardless of whether or 
not this information is negative in emotional valence. To adequately test the 
hypothesis that clinical perfectionism is characterised by greater attention to negative 
perfectionism-relevant information than to positive perfectionism-relevant 
information, it is vitally important to include negative and positive words, some of 
which are perfectionism-relevant (e.g., inept/exceptional) and some of which are 
perfectionism irrelevant (e.g., attack/fun), when assessing the patterns of attentional 
bias that characterise heightened perfectionism. 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate the nature of attentional 
bias in perfectionism while addressing the limitations of previous research. The 
attentional probe approach was employed to compare the patterns of attentional 
selectivity exhibited by those high in perfectionism and low in perfectionism. The 
physical and temporal parameters we adopted in the current probe task were based on 
those employed in studies that have used this approach to investigate the attentional 
basis of anxiety vulnerability (c.f. Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Importantly, the stimulus 
material included both emotionally negative and emotionally positive words, with 
half of the words of each emotional category being perfectionism-relevant and the 
other half being perfectionism-irrelevant. Using such a design enabled us to test the 
critical prediction based on Shafran et al.’s (2002) model of perfectionism that 
participants high in perfectionistic concerns, but not those low in perfectionistic 
concerns, will exhibit greater attention to negative than to positive information, but 
only when this information is perfectionism-relevant. The rationale for the study is 
that if selective attention is shown to be related to perfectionistic concerns then this 
would support its role as a maintaining factor as proposed by Shafran et al (2002), 
support the focus on selective attention in CBT for perfectionism, and suggest that 
future research may examine if it is useful to modify selective attention through 




Groups of participants who were high and low in perfectionistic concerns 
were required. Previous research investigating the association between biased 
patterns of attentional selectivity and individual difference dimensions, such as 




Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Assuming an effect size of 
a similar magnitude in the present study, an a priori-power analysis using G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed that approximately 50 
participants (25 in each perfectionistic concerns group) would be required to detect a 
such an effect (power = 0.8, two-tailed alpha = .05).  
The criteria for classifying individuals as high in perfectionistic concerns 
were guided by prior CBT treatment studies that included a cut off for high 
perfectionistic concerns of ≥24.7 on the Concern over Mistakes (CM) subscale of the 
FMPS (e.g., Egan, van Noort, et al., 2014; Frost, Marten, et al., 1990; Handley et al., 
2015). This score was based on the average CM score of anxiety disorder samples 
included in a review by Egan et al. (2011). Individuals low in perfectionistic 
concerns were defined as a cut-off of ≤18.5 on CM, which was the average CM score 
of control participants in the Egan et al. (2011) review. 
Seventy-six participants were recruited from the community through flyers 
placed at a University, and local newspaper and radios ads, were screened. A total of 
25 (17 males, 8 females) and 31 (11 males, 20 females) met criteria for the low and 
high perfectionistic concerns groups, respectively and took part in the study (see 
Table 1). A chi-square test of goodness of fit (α = .05) revealed that gender did not 
differ between the groups, χ2 (3, N = 56) = 6.43, p = .09, Φ = .006. As can be seen in 
Table 1, the two groups did not differ in age, depression, anxiety, and stress scores. 
Participants in the high perfectionistic concerns group had significant higher scores 
perfectionism than the low perfectionistic concerns group. 
















Age 26.08 (11.23) 28.48 (10.25)   0.80 .43           0.22 
CM subscale 15.92 (1.77) 28.86 (3.46) 18.21 <.001 4.71 
DASS-21 
(depression) 
1.48 (1.71) 1.81 (1.14)   0.85 .40 0.23 
DASS-21 
(anxiety) 
2.80 (2.90) 2.97 (3.124)   0.18 .86 0.06 
DASS-21 
(stress) 






 3.2.2.1.1. Concern over Mistakes (Frost Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale).  (CM; Frost, Marten, et al., 1990). CM is seen as a core 
component of clinical perfectionism and is highly correlated with a measure of 
clinical perfectionism (Egan et al., 2016); hence, it was chosen to measure 
perfectionism in the present study. The CM subscale of the FMPS consists of nine 
items assessing concern about making errors. Individuals respond using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale with higher scores indicating higher perfectionism. The CM 
subscale has good test-retest reliability, and construct validity (Egan, Wade, et al., 
2011). Internal consistency in this study was high (α = .85). 
3.2.2.1.2. Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale-21.  (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995a). This 21-item scale was administered to check whether the high 
and low perfectionistic concerns groups differed in anxiety, depression or stress, and 
if so control for this potential confound as attentional responding to emotional 
information differs as a function of anxiety and depression (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Harvey et al., 2004). Respondents rate items describing emotional symptoms over 
the past week on a 4-point Likert type scale. The DASS-21 has strong concurrent and 
discriminant validity (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998). Internal 
consistencies for were high in this study for depression (α = .87), anxiety (α = .77), 
and stress (α = .79). 
3.2.2.2. Stimulus Words. The attentional probe task allowed for the 
assessment of attentional preferences for the word members of a word/non-word 
pair, which was determined by comparing speeding to discriminate probes presented 
in the locus of the word, compared to probes presented in the locus of the non-word. 
We were interested in the degree to which attentional preference to words differed 
across the following four categories of experimental words: 1) negatively valenced 
and perfectionist-irrelevant (e.g., attack, intimidated, lonely), 2) negatively valenced 
and perfectionist-relevant (e.g., failure, inept, insufficient), 3) positively valenced 
and perfectionist-irrelevant (e.g., gregarious, fearless, fun), 4) positively valenced 
and perfectionist-relevant (e.g., excel, success, exceptional). To select these words, 
we first created a pool of 200 candidate stimulus words, and had these rated by 6 
psychology graduates on two dimensions. Raters assessed the degree to which each 




(extremely perfectionist-relevant) to +3 (extremely perfectionist-irrelevant). To help 
guide these judgments, the raters were provided Shafran et al. (2002) definition of 
perfectionism i.e., “the over dependence of self-evaluation on the determined pursuit 
(and achievement) of self-imposed personally demanding, standards of performance 
in at least one salient domain, despite the occurrence of adverse consequences” (p. 
773). The raters also assessed the emotional valence of each word using a 7-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from -3 (extremely negative) to +3 (extremely positive), 
where the mid-point (0) was identified as emotionally neutral.  
Using these ratings we selected 16 words in each of the four categories listed 
above. Thus, half of the 64 words were emotionally negative and half were 
emotionally positive, giving rise to a Stimulus Emotional Valence factor. Half of 
each emotional subtype were perfectionism-relevant while half were perfectionism-
irrelevant, giving rise to a Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance factor. A two-way 
ANOVA, considering the Stimulus Emotional Valence factor and the Stimulus 
Perfectionism-Relevance factor, was carried out on the emotional valence ratings 
given to the selected words by the independent raters. There was a significant main 
effect of the Stimulus Emotional Valence factor, reflecting as required more negative 
valence ratings for words in the negative subset than for words in the positive subset; 
F(1,60) = 1470.00, p <.01, ƞ2=.961 (negative valenced stimuli M = -2.47, SD = .51; 
positive valenced stimuli M = 2.34, SD = .48). There was no significant main effect 
of the Stimulus Perfectionism-Relevance factor, F(1,60) = 0.001, ns, ƞ2<.001, and no 
interaction between the two factors, F(1,60) = 0.248, ns, ƞ2=.004. Thus, the selected 
perfectionism-relevant and perfectionism-irrelevant words did not differ in terms of 
average of emotional valence. When an equivalent ANOVA was carried out on the 
perfectionism-relevance ratings this revealed the required significant main effect of 
the Stimulus Perfectionism-Relevance factor, reflecting higher perfectionism-
relevance ratings for words in the perfectionism-relevant subset than for words in the 
perfectionism-irrelevant subset; F(1,60) = 1069.36, p <.01, ƞ2=.947 (perfectionism-
relevant stimuli M = 2.34, SD = .48; perfectionism-irrelevant stimuli M = -2.50, SD = 
.67). There was no significant main effect of the Stimulus Emotional Valence factor, 
F(1,60) = 0.045, ns, ƞ2=.001, and no interaction between the two factors, F(1,60) = 
0.401, ns, ƞ2=.007. Thus, negative and positive words did not differ in terms of 




Additional ANOVAs were carried out on word length (expressed as numbers 
of letters per word), and frequency (according to the norms of Brysbaert & New, 
2009). No significant effects emerged from either ANOVA (all F < 3.40, p > .05), 
indicating that word length and frequency did not differ as a function of emotional 
valence or perfectionism-relevance.  
Finally, 32 emotionally neutral perfectionism irrelevant words were selected 
for use in baseline trials. The emotional valence ratings for these 32 words ranged 
from -1 to 1 with a mean of .03, which did not differ significantly from the 
emotionally neutral midpoint of zero, t(1, 31) = 0.37, p = .71, d = .10. The 
perfectionism relevance ratings of these words ranged from -1 to -3 with a mean of -
2.53, which did not differ significantly from the mean rating given to the 
perfectionism-irrelevant stimuli in the main set of 64 emotional words, t(1,31) = 
0.23, p = .81, d = .06.  
3.2.2.3. Apparatus.  A Dell Latitude E6530 laptop with a 17-inch colour 
monitor, and a standard two-button mouse, was employed to present stimuli and to 
record participant responses, and the attentional assessment task was presented in E-
Prime v2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). 
3.2.3. Experimental task 
3.2.3.1. Attention probe task. The attentional probe task used to assess 
selective attention delivered 384 trials, across which each stimulus word was 
exposed a total of 4 times, with presentation order randomised. Each trial began with 
a fixation display, followed 1150 ms later by the 500 ms exposure of one of the 
stimulus letter string pairs. One of the letter strings appeared just above and one just 
below the centre of the screen, with the two letter strings separated vertically by 3 
cm. The word member of the pair appeared in the upper or lower screen location 
with equal frequency across trials. Immediately after the letter strings disappeared, a 
small visual probe appeared in either one of the two screen positions where a letter 
string had just been shown. This probe appeared equally often in the upper and lower 
screen location. Thus, on 50% of trials the probe appeared where the word had just 
been presented, while on 50% of trials it appeared where the nonword had just been 
presented. The probe was a small grey line that sloped upwards either right or left. 
Participants were required to make a discriminative response based on the direction 
of this slope, as soon as they processed the probe. The participant’s latency to make 




Speeding to discriminate those probes that appeared in the locus of the words, 
relative to probes that appeared in the locus of the nonwords, indicated degree of 
increased attention to the word member of each pair. Using the equation below, we 
computed for each participant an index of the degree to which greater attention was 
paid to each of the four experimentally critical word types (i.e. emotionally negative 
perfectionism-relevant, emotionally negative perfectionism irrelevant, emotionally 
positive perfectionism-relevant, emotionally positive perfectionism-irrelevant), 
compared to the baseline words. A higher index score reflects greater attentional 
preference for that target word subtype. 
Attentional Preference for Target Word Subtype X = (discrimination latency 
for probes in locus of nonword paired with target word subtype X – discrimination 
latency for probes in locus of target word subtype X) – (discrimination latency 
probes in locus of nonword paired with baseline word – discrimination latency for 
probes in locus of baseline word). 
3.2.4. Procedure 
The research was approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (approval number HR88/2012). Participants were tested individually and 
provided informed consent before completing the FMPS and DASS-212. The 
participant was seated approximately 60 cm from the computer screen, and the 
requirements of the probe task were provided in verbal and written form. The 
instructions emphasised the need to discriminate the probe slope as quickly as 
possible, and to respond without delay as soon as probe slope was accurately 
identified. A brief practice period (16 trials) was completed using a separate set of 
neutral stimuli. Participants then completed the attentional probe task, before being 
debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
3.3. Results 
Participants displayed a high level of accuracy on the probe task, averaging 
less than 7% errors. Accuracy rates did not differ between the two perfectionism 
groups, F(1, 58) 1.65, p = .20, ƞ2=.02, (High perfectionistic concerns group , M = 
93.27, SD = 6.44; low perfectionistic concerns group, M = 95.04, SD = 2.88). Prior 
to computing the attentional preference indexes, outlier probe discrimination latency 
scores (defined as those falling > 2.58 SD from each participant’s mean probe 




latencies. Attentional preference index scores were then computed as shown in Table 
2. 
These attention preference index scores were subjected to a Generalised 
Linear Mixed Model (GLMM), that included participants as a random factor, and the 
following three fixed factors: perfectionistic concerns group (high perfectionistic 
concerns  vs. low perfectionistic concerns ); Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance 
(perfectionist-relevant vs. perfectionistic-irrelevant words); and Stimulus Emotional 
Valence (negative words vs. positive words). Perfectionistic concerns group was a 
between-groups factor while Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance, and Stimulus 
Emotional Valence were within-groups factors. GLMM was used in preference to the 
traditional ANOVA approach because it better accommodates violations concerning 
normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance (Stroup, 2012). The findings 
obtained using GLMM were equivalent to those found using ANOVA. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Stimulus Emotional 
Valence, reflecting higher attentional preference index scores for emotionally 
negative words (M = 33.95, SD = 159.49) than for emotionally positive words (M = -
9.59, SD = 170.83), F(1,455) = 11.34, p = .001, ƞ2 = .024. However, importantly, 
this main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between Stimulus 
Perfectionism Relevance x Stimulus Emotional Valence, F(1,455) = 4.50, p = .034, 
ƞ2 = .009, which was further subsumed within a higher order interaction involving all 
three factors, F(1,455) = 9.43, p < .01, ƞ2 = .020. The presence of this three-way 
interaction indicates that the relative impact of perfectionistic concerns group on 
attentional preference for negative information compared to attentional preference 
for positive information differed depending on the relevance of such information to 
perfectionism. Hence, we sought to determine whether the specific nature of this 
higher order interaction was in line with the experimental predictions.  
Specifically, we computed the significance of the component simple two-way 
interactions of perfectionistic concerns group x Stimulus Emotional Valence was 
calculated at each level of the Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance factor. Consistent 
with the hypothesis under test, the simple interaction was not significant when 
stimuli were perfectionism-irrelevant, F (1,228) = 2.98, p = .09, ƞ2 = .013, but was 





Figure 2 illustrates the two way interaction of perfectionistic concerns group 
x Stimulus Emotional Valence, observed for perfectionism relevant stimulus 
materials alone. As can be seen in Figure 2, the nature of this simple two-way 
interaction was completely consistent with predictions. Specifically, for these 
perfectionism-relevant stimuli alone, participants with high perfectionistic concerns 
displayed higher significantly higher attentional preference scores for negative words 
than for positive words (M = 62.45, SD = 142.78 vs. M = -38.47, SD = 181.70, 
respectively), t(1,228) = 3.76, p < .001, 95% CI [48.08, 153.76], d = .62, while those 
with low perfectionistic concerns did not (M = 0.51, SD = 137.43 vs. M = 20.85, SD 
= 155.85, respectively), t(1,228) = 1.06, p = .29, 95% CI [-17.61, 58.29], d = .13. 
Thus, unlike participants with low perfectionism, those with high perfectionistic 
concerns exhibited greater attention to negative than to positive information, but only 
when this information was perfectionism-relevant. 
 
 
Table 2. Mean attentional bias index scores (and SD) obtained on attentional probe task.  
 
Stimulus Perfectionism-Relevance 
                                    Perfectionism-Irrelevant  Perfectionism-Relevant 
Stimulus Emotional Valence 
Perfectionistic 
concerns group  













































Figure 2. Significant simple two way interaction between Perfectionism Group x 
Stimulus Emotional Valence shown on Perfectionism Relevant Words alone.  
 
3.4. Discussion 
This study is the first to test the prediction, generated by Shafran et al.’s 
(2002) model of clinical perfectionism, that people with high levels of perfectionistic 
concerns, unlike those with low levels of perfectionistic concerns, preferentially 
allocate greater attention to negative information compared to positive information, 
but only when this information is perfectionism-relevant. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, the findings indicate that only participants who scored high in 
perfectionistic concerns exhibited greater attention to negative than to positive 
information, and this pattern of attentional selectivity was evident only when this 
information was perfectionism-relevant. 
The present demonstration of a perfectionism-relevant attentional bias has an 
important theoretical implication. Most obviously, it lends weight to the cognitive-
behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, which proposes that biased attentional 
processing of negative perfectionism-relevant information plays an important role in 




Shafran et al., 2010). This contention has been based only on the clinical impressions 
of therapists concerning the patterns of selective attention they infer from clinical 
interactions with individuals identified as perfectionists, and on patient self-reports 
concerning their attentional processing (Glover et al., 2007). As pointed out 
elsewhere, self-report measures of cognitive processes are notoriously inaccurate, 
and so cannot permit confident conclusions concerning such processes (MacLeod, 
1993; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In the present study an objective performance 
measure, rather than subjective self-report measures, was used to infer attentional 
bias. Thus, this objective approach can provide greater confidence in the veracity of 
the prediction, generated by Shafran and colleagues’ cognitive-behavioural model of 
clinical perfectionism, that high levels of perfectionistic concerns are characterised 
by greater attention to negative than to positive information, when perfectionism-
relevant.  
The findings also have applied importance. In recent years, novel cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) interventions for perfectionism have been developed. 
CBT for perfectionism involves treatment components specifically designed to alter 
biased patterns of selective attention to negative perfectionism-relevant information 
and this has been found to be effective in reducing perfectionism, anxiety, depression 
and eating disorders (e.g., Egan & Hine, 2008; Egan, van Noort, et al., 2014; Glover 
et al., 2007; Handley et al., 2015; Riley et al., 2007; Shafran et al., 2010; Steele & 
Wade, 2008; Steele et al., 2013). Attention broadening techniques have been used to 
reduce selective attention in clinical perfectionism. For example, Shafran et al. 
(2010) described a client who had selective attention to flaws in a cake she produced 
for a dinner party and thought the whole night was ruined and that she was a failure. 
The client was encouraged to broaden her attention and consider evidence that others 
commented the food was excellent, and to shift her attention to external factors such 
as engaging in conversation, and noticing the details of a friend’s shirt colour. Egan, 
Wade, et al. (2014) also provided the example of asking a client how itchy their scalp 
is and then asking them to rate it, then asking the client to concentrate on the 
itchiness of their head and to close their eyes and focus on their scalp, and then re-
rate the itchiness, resulting in a higher rating and thus a demonstration of how 
powerful selective attention can be. Behavioural experiments are idiosyncratic to the 
individual, for example if a student had selective attention to long pauses or saying 




where they compare their results in class presentations and the degree of engagement 
of classmates in the presentation after purposely making more perceived flaws 
through pauses and saying ‘um’ more often. 
Ultimately, however, the therapeutic value of these components in CBT will 
critically depend upon whether this attentional bias makes a causal contribution to 
clinically relevant perfectionism, as argued by Shafran and colleagues (2002; 2010). 
The results of the current study cannot determine whether the attentional bias to 
negative perfectionism-relevant information makes a functional contribution to the 
symptoms of clinical perfectionism. Future researchers should seek to address this 
issue. One way in which investigators could appraise the causal role of such 
attentional bias in contributing to heightened perfectionism would be to assess 
attentional bias to negative perfectionism-relevant information immediately before, 
and immediately after, CBT treatment for clinical perfectionism. Of course, such 
attentional bias may be a consequence of high levels of perfectionistic concerns, in 
which case reductions in clinical perfectionism produced by CBT would be expected 
to mediate reductions of this attentional bias over the course of treatment. However, 
if attentional bias to negative perfectionism-relevant information plays a causal role 
in clinical perfectionism, then the reduction of this attentional bias over the course of 
treatment would instead be expected to mediate the attenuation of clinical 
perfectionism. 
Another way in which investigators could interrogate the causal involvement 
of this attentional bias in clinical perfectionism would be to employ appropriately 
designed variants of ABM procedures. The ABM approach involves exposing 
participants to training versions of the present attentional probe procedure, 
configured in a manner designed to implicitly alter attentional bias. Thus, for 
example, to increase or reduce attentional bias to a given category of information, 
probes are consistently presented either proximally or distally to such information, 
across many hundreds of trials. Such procedures have proven effective in 
experimentally manipulating selective attentional responding to target types of 
information (c.f. MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). It remains to be seen whether the use 
of this ABM approach, to directly reduce attention to emotionally negative 
perfectionism-relevant information in people with heightened perfectionism, would 
contribute to the attenuation of their perfectionism. Such a finding would not only 




perfectionist symptomatology, but also would open the door to the development of 
ABM based therapeutic interventions for clinical perfectionism. Despite limited 
evidence that perfectionism is associated with a specific attentional bias, CBT for 
perfectionism (e.g., Egan, Wade et al., 2014) includes a range of techniques designed 
to correct attentional biases and increase attentional flexibility, such as attending to 
competing information indicative of success. If a specific attentional bias is found to 
causally contribute to clinical perfectionism, then future research should determine 
whether adjunctive ABM offers additive benefits to CBT in terms of treatment 
outcomes. Furthermore, it would be useful for future research to determine if 
selective attention mediates reductions in perfectionism during CBT for clinical 
perfectionism. If selective attention is identified as a mediator then, following the 
recommendations of Kraemer, Wilson, Fairburn, and Agras (2002) on establishing 
mechanisms of change, trials using protocols enhanced with techniques to address 
selective attention may help to determine if it is a mechanism of change. This would 
have important clinical implications with regard to whether or not changing selective 
attention should be a treatment focus for perfectionism. 
Though these findings may yield some interesting theoretical and clinical 
implications, it is appropriate to acknowledge some limitations of the current study. 
As we did not assess clinically diagnosed participants, we cannot draw conclusions 
regarding the patterns of attentional selectivity that characterise clinical disorders in 
which high perfectionistic concerns has been identified as a predisposing and 
perpetuating factor (e.g., mood, anxiety and eating disorders). Future research should 
directly examine the patterns of attentional bias to negative perfectionism-relevant 
information that characterise such clinical conditions. we also recognise that the 
attentional probe assessment procedure used in the present study provides only a 
snapshot of selective attention at the specific point in time when the probes appeared. 
A more continuous measure of attention, such as that which can be obtained using 
eye-movement technology, could illuminate the temporal dynamics of the pattern of 
selective attention that characterises high levels of perfectionistic concerns. If the use 
of eye movement assessment approaches in future research yields similar results to 
those we have presently obtained using the attentional probe task, then this would 
represent powerful converging support for the current conclusion, that high levels of 




information over positive information, when this is related to perfectionism-relevant 
concerns. 
In the current study, the word stimuli presented in the attentional probe task 
were selected from a larger pool of candidate words that had previously been judged 
in terms of their relevance to perfectionism by a panel of independent raters. An 
advantage of adopting this common approach to stimulus development is that it 
helped ensure that the word stimuli ultimately selected for use, in general, were 
perfectionism-relevant or -irrelevant. A potential downside to this approach, 
however, is that not all of the word stimuli presented necessarily will have been 
perfectionism-relevant or –irrelevant for every participant. For example, the words 
‘lonely’ and ‘intimidated’ would likely be perfectionism-relevant for an individual 
with high perfectionistic concerns who is concerned about their social performance, 
but not for an individual who is concerned about their performance at work. While 
the current approach revealed perfectionism-relevant biases in attentional responding 
to information that, in general, can be classed as perfectionism-relevant, future 
researchers could consider maximising personal relevance of all stimulus words by 
selecting stimulus materials for each participant based on that individual’s ratings. If 
each participant were to rate the candidate stimulus words, prior to completing the 
probe task, then it would be possible to use only those words judged by that 
participant to be perfectionism-relevant as the perfectionism-relevant stimuli 
presented in the probe task (e.g., Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009). The use of 
such idiosyncratic word stimuli may enable an even more sensitive assessment of the 
patterns of attentional bias that characterise perfectionists.  
To assess individual differences in perfectionism in the present research we 
employed the widely used CM subscale of the FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990). 
The FMPS has undergone extensive psychometric analysis, which has consistently 
revealed that it has very good reliability and validity (e.g., Egan, Piek, et al., 2011; 
Frost et al., 1993; Frost, Marten, et al., 1990), providing high confidence in the 
scores obtained. However, some investigators have argued that other more recently 
developed questionnaire measures, such as the CPQ (Fairburn et al., 2003b), include 
items that are more tightly aligned with Shafran et al.’s the definition of 
perfectionism, and so may better capture individual differences in this dimension 
(Dickie et al., 2012). Although the CM subscale is highly correlated with the CPQ 




established (Dickie et al., 2012; Egan et al., 2016). Future researchers should deliver 
the current attentional probe task, and employ the CPQ to assess individual 
differences in perfectionism. Work of this type could provide important converging 
evidence for the presently observed findings.  
Future research should also consider recruiting participants from across the 
full distribution of perfectionism scores, irrespective of whether perfectionism is 
assessed by the CM subscale of the FMPS, the CPQ, or any other measure of 
perfectionism. In the present study, we adopted the commonly used extreme group 
approach (EGA) to recruit participants, whereby individuals were invited to take part 
in the study only if they met the criteria for high vs. low levels of perfectionistic 
concerns, which we based on established cut-offs reflecting perfectionistic concerns 
scores obtained by individuals with vs. without a diagnosis of clinical pathology, 
respectively. However, some investigators have pointed out that the EGA approach 
may obscure the detection of non-linear relationships between the variables of 
interest (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005). Thus, we suggest that 
future researchers should recruit participants from across the entire distribution of 
perfectionism scores, as such work could potentially extend understanding of the 
attentional basis of high levels of perfectionism, which we have shown in the current 
study to be characterised by an attentional bias that favours negative information 
over positive information, but only when this is related to perfectionism-relevant 
concerns. 
The present study has demonstrated that high levels of perfectionistic 
concerns is characterised an attentional bias towards negative perfectionism relevant 
information. High levels of perfectionistic concerns have been shown elsewhere to 
be characterised by an increased tendency to impose negative interpretations on 
situations that are perfectionism relevant (Yiend et al., 2011), and also by an 
increased tendency to forgo efficient task completion in order to achieve high levels 
of task performance (Stoeber, 2011b). It could be informative for future research to 
investigate whether or not these different cognitive anomalies represent independent 
characteristics of high levels of perfectionistic concerns. An intriguing possibility is 
that this attentional bias to negative perfectionism-relevant information may be the 
primary cognitive distortion that gives rise to these other anomalies. Future 




would be well positioned to test this hypothesis by examining the impact of this 
attentional manipulation on these other anomalies. 
It can be concluded that high levels of perfectionistic concerns, unlike low 
levels of perfectionistic concerns, are characterised by a bias that involves greater 
attention to negative than to positive information, but only when this information is 
perfectionism-relevant. We hope that this research serves to stimulate further 
research into the attentional basis of perfectionism, given the pervasive role that 





Chapter 4: Study Two 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Shafran et al. (2002) proposed that there are several cognitive processes that 
may maintain clinical perfectionism. Study One explored how individuals with high 
levels of clinical perfectionism, namely perfectionistic concerns represented by the 
Concern over Mistakes subscale of the FMPS, demonstrated an attentional 
preference for negative, perfectionistic stimuli. Based on the clinical perfectionism 
model, and the information processing model, it is also likely that individuals with 
clinical perfectionism demonstrate an interpretation bias.  
According to the cognitive-behavioural model of perfectionism, individuals 
with clinical perfectionism make negative emotional interpretations when striving for 
perfection. For instance, if an individual with clinical perfectionism aimed to achieve 
personally demanding goals, but did not meet them, they would be inclined to 
interpret this outcome negatively (e.g., as evidence of personal failure and 
inadequacy) and consequently experience a negative emotional response (e.g., feel 
anxious or depressed), even if their performance was actually good (Dunkley, Zuroff, 
et al., 2006). However, the negative interpretation that ambiguous situations are 
reflective of personal failure and inadequacy may only be constrained to those who 
strive for perfection and base their self-worth on attaining those standards (i.e., 
perfectionistic concerns). Based on the cognitive-behavioural model of 
perfectionism, it is possible that those who aim for high standards, but do not base 
their self-worth upon meeting these demanding standards, experience more positive 
or benign interpretations, as their attempt to achieve perfection was interpreted as 
evidence of positive self-worth or personal success (Stoeber & Otto, 2006; Stoeber & 
Yang, 2010).  
Such interpretation biases could be important aetiological and maintaining 
factors in psychological disorders, which should be targeted for effective treatment 
(Beck & Clark, 1988, 1997; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). However, there have 
been a lack of experimental studies specifically testing the hypothesis, derived from 
the clinical perfectionism model (Shafran et al., 2010), that individuals with clinical 






Only one study has evaluated whether a negative interpretation bias is 
characteristic of clinical perfectionism. Yiend et al. (2011) selected 40 undergraduate 
students (20 individuals high and 20 individuals low in perfectionism) based on their 
scores on the Perfectionism Subscale of the DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978). These 
researchers compared individuals who were high and low in perfectionism on an 
interpretation task. The interpretation task was based on Eysenck et al. (1991) 
method of assessing interpretation bias in social anxiety.  
In this task, participants read brief emotionally ambiguous passages, which 
can be interpreted in an emotionally negative or emotionally positive manner. 
Participants were presented with a set of four test sentences that were similar in 
meaning to each original scenario in a subsequent ‘recognition memory task’ 
designed to assess an interpretation bias. Two of these test sentences represented 
potential negative or positive interpretations of the original scenario (target 
sentences), whereas two were negative and positive sentences that did not represent 
potential interpretations of the original scenario (foil sentences). Elevated ratings for 
negative relative to positive test sentences, when these were targets rather than foils, 
served to indicate disproportionately negative interpretation of the previously 
presented scenarios. Yiend et al. found that, for perfectionism-relevant scenarios, 
those high in perfectionism assigned higher familiarity ratings to negative than to 
positive candidate interpretations compared to those low in perfectionism. This was 
not the case for perfectionism-irrelevant scenarios, where there were no group 
differences observed. Yiend et al. proposed that this pattern of findings is consistent 
with the content-specificity hypothesis, according to which those with high 
perfectionism display a negative interpretation bias when processing perfectionism-
relevant information only. 
Yiend and colleagues (2011) conclusions are bolstered by the methodological 
strength of their assessment task, and represent important support for the operation of 
a perfectionism-related interpretation bias.. In some of the stimulus materials 
employed by Yiend et al. (2011) the negative interpretations assessed concerned a 
heightened anticipation of more negative emotional responses in situations where 
one falls short of perfection (e.g., “you feel disappointed that…”). In other stimulus 
materials, the negative interpretation assessed concerned heightened anticipation of 





reactions of others (e.g., “feel criticised…”). Yiend et al. did not directly compare 
patterns of perfectionism-relevant interpretative bias on these two types of stimulus 
materials, but it would be informative to do so. As such, evaluating the nature of the 
interpretation bias beyond the findings of Yeind et al. may further illuminate the 
specific nature of perfectionism-relevant interpretation bias. If it can be determined 
whether individuals with perfectionism are more likely to interpret only negative 
affective responses or negative events occurring, these findings may lend further 
insight into the mechanisms through which interpretative biases maintain 
perfectionism. 
It is not surprising that individuals high in clinical perfectionism are 
disproportionately likely to infer that they would experience negative emotions when 
their performance falls short of perfection, as this could be considered a defining 
feature of clinical perfectionism. Indeed, the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical 
perfectionism indicates self-worth is dependent upon striving for and meeting 
personally demanding standards (Shafran et al., 2002). Thus, it is possible that the 
effects reported by Yiend et al. were exclusively driven by biased interpretations 
concerning the expected affective consequence of failing to meet exceptionally high 
standards. So it remains unknown whether individuals with high perfectionism also 
draw disproportionately negative interpretations concerning the outcomes of 
situations in which their performance falls short of perfection. For example, a 
negative interpretation concerning the outcome of a situation may be the 
interpretation that if they do not achieve 95% on an exam then they will not get a 
good job. With regards to a negative interpretation concerning the expected affective 
consequences may be the expected feelings of disappointment and anxiety about not 
achieving 95% on an exam regardless of the outcome of the event. Understanding 
whether the negative interpretation bias is based on expected affective consequences 
or anticipated outcomes of different situations could help to inform clinical 
conceptualisations of biased interpretations in perfectionism. Shafran et al. (2010) 
and Egan et al. (2014) emphasised the use of a range of cognitive and behavioural 
techniques to challenge perfectionistic interpretations, and if interpretation biases in 
perfectionism are located to a specific domain, then understanding the nature of the 
interpretation bias may inform the implementation and focus of these cognitive and 





interpretation bias may allow for a clearer conceptualisation of interpretation bias 
drawn directly into the cognitive-behavioural model of perfectionism. Including 
interpretation biases into the cognitive-behavioural model of perfectionism could 
also allow for a clearer client conceptualisation in practice that could inform a greater 
emphasis on challenging interpretation biases in CBT for perfectionism. To 
determine whether the negative interpretive bias that characterises clinical 
perfectionism is restricted to biased interpretations concerning one’s affective 
interpretations of falling short of perfection, or also includes biased interpretations 
concerning the event expectations that will result from falling short of perfection, it 
is necessary to directly compare patterns of perfectionism-relevant interpretive bias 
involving both types of interpretations. The present study also directly compares 
these two types of selective interpretations (i.e., affective interpretations and event 
expectations of perfectionism-relevant scenarios).  
It is also important to recognise that definitions of perfectionism consist of 
both perfectionistic concerns (i.e., concerns about making mistakes) and 
perfectionistic strivings (i.e., the striving for high personally demanding standards). 
Yiend et al. (2011) used the perfectionism subscale of the DAS, which measures self-
critical perfectionism, as the items covered both high personal standards and concern 
about making mistakes. The use of such a measure makes it difficult to ascertain 
whether the significant results Yiend and colleagues found were the result of 
perfectionistic concerns, perfectionistic strivings, or both. It may be expected that the 
source of a negative interpretation of ambiguity would primarily be associated with 
perfectionistic concerns, which is strongly associated with psychological distress 
(Limburg et al., in press). However, there is still a lack of clarity as to the exact 
nature of the interpretation bias associated with perfectionism, and whether this 
association is only observable for perfectionistic concerns or also demonstrated for 
perfectionistic strivings. The inclusion of perfectionistic strivings to determine 
whether perfectionism-specific interpretation biases are restricted to only 
perfectionistic concerns or also applies to perfectionistic strivings is an important 
extension to Yeind et al.’s findings. Given perfectionistic strivings may only be 
linked to psychological distress in certain populations, predominately eating 
disorders, (Limburg et al., in press) and could be considered adaptive in others 





perfectionistic strivings is associated with any interpretation biases. Based on the 
cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, it would be unsurprising to 
find that perfectionistic strivings is associated with negative interpretations as the 
very definition of clinical perfectionism includes both the striving for, and concerns 
about mistakes, in the definition of clinical perfectionism. To date, no research has 
evaluated the relationship between perfectionistic strivings and interpretation bias 
though it would be informative to do so.  
In addition to assessing both perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic 
strivings, it is important to note that the significant results could be exaggerated by 
the use of an extreme groups approach (Preacher et al., 2005). With uncertainty as to 
whether an interpretation bias is only observable in the extreme groups, or whether 
there is a linear relationship, it would be important to assess interpretation across the 
continuum of perfectionism. To determine the source of Yiend et al.’s (2011) 
significant finding, the present study will explore two different types of 
interpretations. Additionally, the present study will also extend Yiend et al.’s 
findings beyond perfectionistic concerns to perfectionistic strivings. 
Using such a design allows for the test of the key predictions generated by 
Shafran et al.’s (2002) cognitive-behavioural model of perfectionism. These 
predictions are that participant’s scores on perfectionistic concerns will be associated 
with a greater mean likelihood rating score for negative interpretations on 
perfectionistic scenarios, and that these interpretations will involve inferring both 
negative emotional consequences and negative objective outcomes when processing 
these perfectionistic scenarios. Furthermore, participants’ scores on perfectionistic 
strivings will predict a greater mean likelihood rating score for positive 
interpretations on perfectionistic scenarios, and that these interpretations will involve 
inferring both positive emotional consequences and positive objective outcomes 
when processing these perfectionistic scenarios. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
To investigate perfectionism-related interpretative bias, participants over the 
age of 18 years were recruited from the general population through advertisements 
placed at a local university campus, radio ads, a community newspaper, and flyers on 





indicated a minimum of 60 participants would be required, using this design, to 
detect a moderate-large effect, based on Yiend et al. (2011) findings (power = 0.80, 
two-tailed alpha = .05). 
Seventy-six participants were recruited and completed the questionnaire 
measures and interpretation bias task. This sample of participants had an age range 
between 18 to 65 (M = 27.50, SD = 10.06), was predominantly female (51 females, 
25 males), and had an average score on the Concern over Mistakes subscale of the 
FMPS (labelled perfectionistic concerns) of 23.13 (SD = 6.30, range = 12 to 38) and 
Personal Standards subscale of the FMPS (labelled perfectionistic strivings) of 24.79 
(SD = 4.87, range = 12 to 34). There was no association between perfectionistic 
concerns scores and age, r(76) = .05, p = .66, or gender, r(76) = -.08, p = .48. There 
also was no association between perfectionistic concerns scores and DASS 
depression, r(76) = .06, p = .61, anxiety, r(76) = .06, p = .59, or stress, r(76) = .08, p 
= .47. Perfectionistic strivings did not correlate with age, r(76) < .01, p = .98, or 
gender, r(76) = -.108, p = .35, nor was perfectionistic strivings associated with DASS 
measures of depression, r(76) = .08, p = .49, anxiety, r(76) = .10, p = .39, or stress, 
r(76) = .21, p = .07. 
4.2.2. Materials 
4.2.2.1. Questionnaires. 
4.2.2.1.1. Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost, Marten, et al., 
1990). The FMPS is a 35-item questionnaire divided into six subscales. For the 
purposes of this study, only the Concern over Mistakes (negative reactions to 
mistakes) and Personal Standards (setting high standards) subscales were used to 
represent perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings respectively (Burgess 
et al., 2016). The Concern over Mistakes subscale of the FMPS contains nine items 
that assess concern over making errors and mistakes, while the Personal Standards 
subscale of the FMPS contains seven items that assess the setting of high standards. 
Responses are made on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree), whereby scores can range between 9 to 45 for Concern over 
Mistakes, and 7 to 35 for Personal Standards. There are no traditional cut-off scores 
for high scores. Higher scores on the Concern over Mistakes or Personal Standards 
showing higher concern over mistakes or higher personal standards respectively. 





and although there is considerable shared variance, these constructs are considered to 
still account for independent variance (Smith & Saklofske, 2017). An example item 
of the Concern over Mistakes subscale is “If I fail at work/school, I am a failure as a 
person”, while an example item of the Personal Standards subscale is “I am very 
good at focusing my efforts on attaining a goal.”. The Concern over Mistakes and 
Personal Standards subscales have good test-retest reliability and good construct 
validity (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). In the present study the internal consistency was 
high for Concern over Mistakes (α = .85) and Personal Standards (α = .81), and were 
moderately correlated (r = .37). 
4.2.2.1.2. Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995a). The DASS-21 assesses depression, anxiety, and stress within the past week. 
Importantly, interpretation biases may differ as a function of depression or anxiety 
(Beck & Clark, 1988). Depression, anxiety, and stress were therefore assessed so any 
association between perfectionism and psychological distress could be controlled. 
Individuals rate items on a four-point Likert scale (0 = did not apply to me at all, to 3 
= applied to me very much, or most of the time). Scores on the subscale items are 
summed, with higher scores indicating higher psychopathology. The measure has 
good concurrent and discriminant validity (Antony, Bieling, et al., 1998). Internal 
consistencies were high in this study for depression (α = .87), anxiety (α = .77), and 
stress (α = .79). 
4.2.3. Apparatus 
A Dell Latitude E6530 laptop with a 17-inch colour monitor was used to 
present stimuli and to record participant responses. The interpretation bias task was 
presented in E-Prime v2.0 software (Schneider et al., 2012). 
4.2.4. Interpretation Bias Task  
An adaptation of the task described by Yiend et al. (2011) was used to assess 
patterns of an interpretation bias selectively adopted by participants who vary in 
terms of their perfectionism when processing perfectionism-relevant scenarios. In an 
initial encoding task, participants read 40 three-line scenarios, each describing 
perfectionism-relevant situation. Every scenario started with a brief identifying title, 
and then went on to describe a situation in which a protagonist aimed for a level of 
achievement that was well above what would be reasonably required and, despite 





taken to ensure that participants read each passage for meaning; the final word was 
missing some letters and participants had to provide the first missing letter, and a 
comprehension question followed each passage that could be answered only if 
participants had understood the situation. If participants made errors on either of 
these two comprehension checks, then the passage was excluded from further data 
analysis.  
Following this encoding task, an interpretation bias index was created based 
upon the interpretations that had been imposed on each passage which required 
participants to judge the degree to which eight test sentences were similar in meaning 
to the scenario described in that original passage. The test sentences were constructed 
to assess the relative degree to which emotionally positive and negative 
interpretations were imposed on these scenarios. Importantly, these materials were 
designed to also reveal whether such a perfectionism-relevant interpretive bias is 
restricted to drawing interpretations concerning the affective consequences of falling 
short of high standards, or also involves interpretations concerning the likely 
objective outcomes of situations when falling short of high standards. Within these 
four target sentences, two sentences were negative and two were positive in 
emotional content, with one sentence of each emotional valence describing a 
subjective emotional interpretation of the scenario and the other describing an 
emotionally toned outcome of the scenario. Evaluation of these critical test sentences 
would further illuminate the potential interpretation biases. An additional four foil 
test sentences were also included that were matched to the target test sentences 
according to emotional tone and type of interpretation. The distinguishing feature 
between the target and foil test sentences is that the foil test sentences were not 
plausible interpretations based on the information provided in the scenario. The 
purpose of these foil test sentences was to confirm that participants were not simply 
responding in a valence-congruent manner (e.g., endorsing all negative content) 
regardless of its relationship with the original scenario. Thus, there were eight test 
sentences associated with each originally presented scenario representing the nested 
combination of the following three factors: tests sentence status (target vs. foil), test 
sentence valence (negative vs. positive) and test sentence situation type (affect 





To ensure any difference observed between ratings for test sentence 
categories, care was taken to ensure the emotional intensity was equivalent across all 
nested test sentences as rated by reviewer’s independent to the initial design of the 
study. Across reviewer’s ratings who were independent to the initial design of the 
study there was no difference between emotional intensity across all test sentences. 
For example, there was no statistical difference between any negative test sentences 
which were all rated equally negative, additionally the negative test sentences were 
not more intense than the positive rated test sentences. For a complete explanation of 
the rating procedure see Appendix F. 
To illustrate the nature of the stimulus materials, consider the example initial 
scenario entitled “Exam preparation”, which read “You have worked hard studying 
throughout the year. You have studied almost all of the material covered throughout 
the year. You want to perform very well in your end of year…” followed by the word 
fragment “e-am-“ (exams), and by the comprehension question was “Did you study 
for your exams?” (correct answer YES). In this example, the crucial ambiguous 
component of the scenario is the ‘almost’ part of studying the material covered 
throughout the year. The description of ‘almost’ may be interpreted by someone with 
a negative perfectionism-relevant bias as falling short of an ideal or perfection, 
whereas for someone with benign or positive perfectionism-related bias may 
interpret ‘almost’ to be a positive achievement.  
The eight test sentences associated with this scenarios were as follows: 1) 
“You feel terrible because you haven’t studied enough.” (target test sentence; 
negative; affect interpretation); 2) “You feel great as you have studied a lot.” (target 
test sentence; positive; affect interpretation); 3) “You will perform terribly in the 
exams.” (target test sentence; negative; event expectations); 4) “You will perform 
exceptionally in the exams.” (target test sentence; positive; event expectations); 5) 
“You didn’t like your classes.” (foil test sentence; negative; affect interpretation); 6) 
“You really enjoyed your classes.” (foil test sentence; positive; affect interpretation); 
7) “You will be late to your exam.” (foil test sentence; negative; event expectations); 
8) “You will arrive on time for your exam.” (foil test sentence; positive; event 
expectations).  
Participants rated each of the test sentences on a 6-point scale, to indicate 





situation presented in the original scenario. These ratings will be referred to as 
“likelihood ratings”, with higher ratings indicating increased judged likelihood of the 
experiences and events described in the test sentences. The pattern of likelihood 
ratings given to the differing target sentences have the capacity to reveal biased 
affective interpretation of the original scenarios, as these target sentences each 
represent candidate interpretation that could be drawn from these scenarios. In 
contrast, likelihood rating given to the different foil sentences will instead control for 
response bias effects, unrelated to interpretation of the original scenarios, as these 
foil sentences do not represent candidate interpretations that could be drawn from 
these scenarios. Hence, perfectionism-related bias in interpretive processing will be 
indexed by differences in the pattern of likelihood ratings given across the target test 
sentences, which are distinct from the foil test sentences.  
4.2.5. Procedure 
The research was approved by the Curtin Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HR88/2012). Each participant provided informed consent before completing the 
FMPS and DASS-21 prior to being tested individually. Participants were seated 
approximately 60 cm from the computer screen, and the requirements of the 
interpretation task were communicated in both verbal and written form. Instructions 
emphasised that participants should read the passages carefully before completing 
the word fragment, and the comprehension question. Immediately following the last 
passage, the participants then completed the computerised interpretation bias 
assessment task and were thanked, debriefed about the purpose of the study, and 
placed into a randomised draw for a $25 gift voucher. 
4.2.6. Proposed Data Analysis 
Mean likelihood rating scores assigned to the test sentences under each 
experimental condition are shown in Table 3. These data were subjected to a 
Generalised Linear Mixed Model (GLMM). The GLMM represents a special class of 
regression model (Stroup, 2012). The GLMM is ‘generalised’ in the sense that it can 
handle outcome variables with markedly non-normal distributions; the GLMM is 
‘mixed’ in the sense that it includes both random and fixed effects (Stroup, 2012). 
GLMM was used in preference to the traditional least squares Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) approach to data analysis, because it better accommodates for violations 





variance (Stroup, 2012). The GLMM also allowed the analysis of perfectionism as a 
continuous variable, rather than it being dichotomized into ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups. 
4.3. Results 
Mean likelihood rating scores assigned to the test sentences under each 
experimental condition are shown in Table 3. These data were subjected to a 
Generalised Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) that considered the within subject factors 
Test Sentence Status (target vs. foil), Test Sentence Valence (positive vs. negative), 
and Test Sentence Situation Type (affect interpretation vs. event expectation). The 
relationship between perfectionistic concerns and the mean likelihood ratings were 
considered first, and then perfectionistic strivings was considered.  
4.3.1. Perfectionistic Concerns and Mean Likelihood Ratings 
In testing the hypothesis that participant’s scores on perfectionistic concerns 
are associated with greater mean likelihood rating score for negative interpretations 
on perfectionistic scenarios, and that these interpretations will involve inferring both 
negative affective consequences and negative event outcomes for perfectionistic 
scenarios, a significant three-way interaction that is not modified by the test sentence 
situation type is expected. The nature of this three-way interaction would be that 
perfectionistic concerns are associated with greater mean likelihood rating scores for 
negative disambiguated interpretations than positive disambiguated interpretations, 
and this effect is stronger for target sentences than foil sentences. This three-way 
interaction would not be modified by test sentence situation type.  
Perfectionistic concerns scores were entered as a continuous variable. This 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of Test Sentence Valence (F [1,1200] = 
43.59, p < .001, ƞ2 = .04), indicating participants were more likely to rate negative 
disambiguated test sentences as similar to the scenarios than positive disambiguated 
test sentences, which was subsumed within a significant two-way interaction of 
perfectionistic concerns x Test Sentence Valence (F [1,1200] = 16.95, p < .001, ƞ2 = 
.01).  
As illustrated in Figure 3, this interaction reflected that as perfectionistic 
concerns increased participants were more likely to assign higher likelihood ratings 
to the negatively valenced test sentences (b =.04, 95% CI = .021; .061) and more 
likely to assign lower likelihood ratings to the positively valenced sentences (b =-.03, 





they judged the  events in the negative test sentences as being more likely, and the 
events in the positive test sentences as  less likely. In this approach such differences 
in mean likelihood ratings can only be attributed to interpretive bias if participants’ 
scores for mean likelihood ratings were greater on target sentences than on foil 
sentences. It was indeed the case that the above described two way interaction of 
perfectionistic concerns x Test Sentence Valence (positive vs. negative) was 
significantly modified by Test Sentence Status (target vs. foil), in a higher order 
interaction involving these three factors (F[1,1200] = 4.51, p = .034, ƞ2 = .004). The 
fact that this higher order interaction was not further modified by test sentence 
situation type (affective interpretation vs. event expectations) (F[1,1200] = 1.38, p = 
.241, ƞ2 = .001), indicates that, as predicted, this three way interaction was equally 
evident across sentences describing affective responses and outcome events. Hence, 
the specific nature of this higher order interaction was to be explored.  
4.3.1.1. Perfectionistic concerns and test sentence valence. To examine the 
nature of perfectionistic concerns x Test Sentence Valence x Test Sentence Status 
three-way interaction, the significance of the component simple two-way interactions 
of perfectionistic concerns x Test Sentence Valence at each level of the Test 
Sentence Status factor was explored. Moreover, as illustrated in Table 4, the nature 
of the three-way interaction was indeed reflective of an interpretation bias rather than 
a general response bias to perfectionism-relevant scenarios as the magnitude of the 
effects underpinning the two-way interaction of perfectionistic concerns x Test 
Sentence Valence was greater on target tests sentences than on foil test sentences.  
Within the Target Test Sentence Status there was a significant main effect for 
Test Sentence Valence (F[1,600] = 34.34, p < .001, ƞ2 = .054), which was qualified 
by a significant perfectionistic concerns x Test Sentence Valence interaction 
(F[1,600] = 16.69, p < .001, ƞ2 = .027). The nature of this two way interaction was 
such that when Negative Test Sentence Valence was considered, perfectionistic 
concerns had a significant positive correlation, with mean likelihood ratings r(300) = 
.37, p < .001, while for Positive Test Sentence Valence, perfectionistic concerns had 
a significant negative correlation with mean likelihood ratings, r(300) = -.35, p < 
.001. The magnitude of these two correlations did significantly differed from one 





Test Sentence Valence and Positive Test Sentence Valence were differentially 
implicated in the observed mean likelihood ratings. 
Thus, consistent with the hypothesis, the perfectionistic concerns x Test 
Sentence Valence interaction reflected that as participants perfectionistic concerns 
increased participants were more likely to assign higher likelihood ratings to the 
negatively valenced test sentences (b = .04, t[300] = 2.82, p = .005, 95% CI = .011; 
.059) than to the positively valenced test sentences (b =  -.03, t[300] = -2.76, p = 
.006, 95% CI = -.056;-.009).   
If the mean likelihood ratings represent a systematic response bias rather than 
an interpretive bias, then there would be no difference between the pattern of 
likelihood ratings of the foil statements and the target test sentences. There was a 
significant two way interaction between perfectionistic concerns x Test Sentence 
Valence when considering the Foil Test Sentence Status (F[1,600] = 14.86, p < .001, 
ƞ2 = .024). The nature of the perfectionistic concerns x Test Sentence Valence 
interaction reflected that as perfectionistic concerns increased, participants were 
more likely to assign higher likelihood ratings to the negatively valenced test 
sentences (b =.03, t[300] = 2.61, p = .009, 95% CI = .006; .046) than to the positively 
valenced test sentences (b = -.02, t[300] = -2.53, p = .012, 95% CI = -.039;-.005). 
However, as predicted the magnitude of the relationship between perfectionistic 
concerns and mean likelihood rating scores at each level of test sentence valence was 
lower for foil test sentences than for target test sentences (see Table 4).  
In sum, there was a significant three-way interaction between perfectionistic 
concerns, Test Sentence Valence, and Test Sentence Status. The nature of the three-
way interaction was in line with the hypothesis that perfectionistic concerns are 
associated with greater mean likelihood rating score for negative interpretations on 
perfectionistic scenarios, in that as perfectionistic concerns increased, the magnitude 
of the difference between assigning higher likelihood ratings for negative valenced 
test sentences and lower likelihood ratings for positive valenced test sentences was 
greater for target test sentences than foil test sentences. This pattern of likelihood 
ratings is consistent with the hypothesis that perfectionistic concerns are associated 








Test Sentence Situation Type 
 Affect Event 
 Test Sentence Valence 
 Negative interpretations Positive interpretations Negative interpretations Positive interpretations 
 Test Sentence Status 
 Target Foil Target Foil Target Foil Target Foil 
Average 
rating 





























Figure 3. Scatterplot representation of the relationship between perfectionistic concerns and Mean Likelihood Ratings at each level of Test 
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4.3.2. Perfectionistic Strivings and Mean Likelihood Ratings 
To assess the hypothesis that participant’s scores on perfectionistic strivings 
will predict a greater mean likelihood rating score for positive interpretations across 
both positive emotional consequences and positive objective outcomes when 
processing these perfectionistic scenarios, a significant three-way interaction that is 
not modified by the test sentence situation type could be expected. The nature of this 
three-way interaction would be that perfectionistic strivings would be associated with 
greater mean likelihood rating scores for positive disambiguated interpretations, 
which is demonstrated more strongly for target sentences than foil sentences. This 
three-way interaction would not then be modified by test sentence situation type. 
Perfectionistic strivings was entered as a continuous variable. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Test Sentence Valence (F [1,1200] = 22.34, p < 
.001, ƞ2 = .018), indicating participants were more likely to rate negative 
disambiguated test sentences as similar to the scenarios, which was subsumed within 
a two-way interaction of perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence (F 
[1,1200] = 6.25, p < .001, ƞ2 = .005).  
As illustrated in Figure 4, the pattern of this interaction was consistent with 
that observed for perfectionistic concerns. As participants perfectionistic strivings 
increased, participants were more likely to assign higher mean likelihood ratings to 
the negatively valenced test sentences (b =.04, 95% CI = .010; .066). However, there 
was no predictive relationship between perfectionistic strivings scores and mean 
likelihood ratings for positively valenced test sentences (b =-.02, 95% CI = -.051; 
.002). Thus, participants with higher perfectionistic strivings judged the experiences 
and events described within the negative test sentences as being more likely. 
The GLMM also revealed a second two-way interaction between 
perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Situation Type (F [1,1200] = 6.81, p < .001, 
ƞ2 = .006). Both the perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence and 
perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Situation Type interaction were subsumed 
within a three-way interaction of perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence x 
Test Sentence Situation Type (F [1,1200] = 18.68, p < .001, ƞ2 = .015). In this 
assessment approach such differences in mean likelihood ratings can only be 
attributed to interpretive bias if participant’s scores for mean likelihood ratings were 





perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence x Test Sentence Situation Type was 
significantly modified by Test Sentence Status, in a higher order interaction 
involving these four factors (F[1,1200] = 5.06, p = .025, ƞ2 = .004). Hence, this 
higher order interaction indicates that the relationship between perfectionistic 
strivings and mean likelihood ratings differed depending on whether the test sentence 
was a plausible interpretation or not, whether it described an affective response or 
outcome event, and whether the test sentence was negative or positive.  
4.3.2.1. Four-way interaction. To determine the nature of a four-way 
interaction, the significance of the three-way interactions of perfectionistic strivings 
x Test Sentence Valence x Test Sentence Situation Type at each level of the Test 
Stimulus Sentence Type factor was explored. Moreover, as illustrated in Table 5, the 
nature of the four-way interaction was reflective of an interpretation bias rather than 
a general response bias to perfectionism-relevant scenarios as the magnitude of the 
effects underpinning the three-way interaction of perfectionistic strivings x Test 
Sentence Valence x Test Sentence Status factors was greater on target tests sentences 
than on foil test sentences. 
When the Target Test Sentence Status was considered there was a significant 
main effect for Test Sentence Valence (F[1,600] = 23.71, p < .001, ƞ2 = .038), which 
was qualified by a significant perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence 
interaction (F[1,600] = 9.33, p < .001, ƞ2 = .015). There was also a significant three-
way interaction between perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence x Test 
Sentence Situation Type (F[1,600] = 21.98, p < .001, ƞ2 = .035). To examine the 
nature of this three-way interaction within the Target Sentence Status, the 
significance of the component simple two-way interactions of perfectionistic 
strivings x Test Sentence Valence at each level of the Test Sentence Situation Type 





Figure 4.  

































Table 5. Correlation between mean likelihood ratings and perfectionistic strivings at each level of Test Sentence Valence and Test Sentence 
Status. 
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4.3.2.1.1. Perfectionistic strivings and target test sentence status. For Target 
Test Sentence Status and Affect Test Sentence Situation Type, there was a significant 
main effect for Test Sentence Valence (F[1,300] = 29.29, p < .001, ƞ2 = .089), where 
participants were more likely to rate negative disambiguated test sentences, which 
was qualified by a significant perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence 
interaction (F[1,300] = 17.07, p < .001, ƞ2 = .054). There was a significant main 
effect for Test Sentence Valence for Target Test Sentence Status and Event Test 
Sentence Situation Type, (F[1,300] = 16.51, p < .001, ƞ2 = .052), which was not 
qualified by any higher order interactions. These findings suggest that although 
participants were more likely to provide greater mean likelihood ratings for 
negatively valenced sentences than positively valenced sentences for event test 
sentences, participants mean likelihood ratings for affect test sentences vary as a 
function of scores on perfectionistic strivings and Test Sentence Valence. 
4.3.2.1.1.1. Perfectionistic strivings at each level of test sentence valence. 
The relationship between perfectionistic strivings and mean likelihood ratings were 
then evaluated at each level of Test Sentence Valence to determine the source of the 
two-way interaction found within Target Test Sentence Status and Affect Test 
Sentence Situation Type. When Negative Test Sentence Valence was considered, 
perfectionistic strivings had a significant positive correlation, r(150) = .46, p < .001, 
with mean likelihood ratings.  In contrast, for Positive Test Sentence Valence, 
perfectionistic strivings had a significant negative correlation, r(150) = -.30, p < 
.001, with mean likelihood ratings. The magnitude of these two correlations 
significantly differed from one another, Z = 6.96, p < .001. Hence, Negative Test 
Sentence Valence and Positive Test Sentence Valence were differentially implicated 
in the observed relationship between perfectionistic strivings and mean likelihood 
rating scores. The nature of the two-way perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence 
Valence interaction for target test sentences concerning the affect situation type, was 
that as participants perfectionistic strivings increased participants were more likely to 
assign higher likelihood ratings to the negatively valenced test sentences (b =.08, 
t[150] = 4.80, p = .005, 95% CI = .045; .107) than to the positively valenced test 




4.3.2.1.2. Perfectionistic strivings and foil test sentence status. As would be 
recalled, if the mean likelihood ratings reflected an overall response bias rather than 
an interpretive bias, there would be no difference between the pattern of likelihood 
ratings for the foil statements and the target test sentences. There was a significant 
three way interaction between perfectionistic strivings x Test Sentence Valence x 
Test Sentence Situation Type (F[1,600] = 8.57, p = .004, ƞ2 = .014) when Foil Test 
Sentence Status were considered  The nature of the perfectionistic strivings x Test 
Sentence Valence x Test Sentence Situation Type interaction reflected that as 
perfectionistic strivings increased, participants were more likely to assign higher 
likelihood ratings to the negatively valenced test sentences (b =.03, t[150] = 2.26, p = 
.025, 95% CI = .004; .065) than to the positively valenced test sentences (b = -.02, 
t[150] = -1.45, p = .145, 95% CI = -.053; .008), but this effect was restricted to the 
affect interpretations factor of Test Sentence Situation Type rather than event 
expectations. However, as hypothesised the magnitude of the relationship between 
perfectionistic strivings and mean likelihood rating scores at each level of test 
sentence valence was lower for foil test sentences than for target test sentences (see 
Table 5). The difference in the magnitude of the relationship confirms that the 
pattern of findings for target sentences is due to an interpretation bias rather than a 
general perfectionism-relevant response bias.  
4.3.2.1.3. The source of the four-way interaction. Thus, despite a significant 
four-way interaction between perfectionistic strivings Test Sentence Valence, Test 
Sentence Situation Type across both Target and Foil Test Sentences, the nature of the 
main three-way interaction was such that as perfectionistic strivings increased the 
pattern of assigning higher likelihood ratings for negative valenced test sentences and 
lower likelihood ratings for positively valenced test sentences was only observed for 
target test sentences. Furthermore, the magnitude of the difference between the 
ratings for negative and positively valenced test sentences was greater when 
participants considered the affective outcome rather than the event outcome. This 
pattern of likelihood ratings is not consistent with the hypothesis that perfectionistic 
strivings is associated with an inflated tendency to impose positive interpretations. 
However the pattern of findings is consistent with theory proposed by the cognitive-
behavioural model of clinical perfectionism that across both interpretations about 
affective experiences or about outcome events associated with the situations 
described in the perfectionism-relevant scenarios. The pattern of likelihood ratings 
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instead suggests that, similar to perfectionistic concerns, perfectionistic strivings is 
associated with an inflated tendency to impose negative interpretations across both 
affective experiences and event expectations associated with situations presented in 
perfectionism-relevant scenarios. 
4.4. Discussion 
The present study tested the prediction, generated by Shafran et al.’s (2002) 
model of perfectionism, that clinical perfectionism would be characterised by a 
disproportionate tendency to impose negative interpretations of perfectionism-related 
scenarios. The findings confirmed this prediction. Participants’ interpretation of 
scenarios that describe situations in which a protagonist performs at an acceptable 
level but falls short of perfection were assessed. Participants scoring higher in 
perfectionism demonstrated a tendency to impose negative interpretations on such 
scenarios. Of particular importance was that this pattern of findings was observed for 
both perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings. 
It is not surprising that perfectionistic concerns was associated with  negative 
interpretations for scenarios that depicted a protagonist striving for personally 
demanding standards and, although falling short of these standards, still achieved a 
level of performance that would generally be acceptable. This pattern of findings 
provides support for the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, 
which posits that a defining feature of those with clinical perfectionism is that they 
will formulate negative interpretations when presented with scenarios that involve 
perfectionistic beliefs relative to those with lower perfectionism (Shafran et al., 
2002). The findings are consistent with the conclusions drawn by Yiend et al. (2011), 
who used a similar objective measure of interpretation biases. Importantly, because 
the effects of interest were disproportionately greater on target test sentences, relative 
to foil test sentences, we can be confident that they reflect perfectionism-related 
differences in interpretative processing, rather than a more general perfectionism-
related response bias. These convergent findings provide further support for the 
cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, which posits that individuals 
with high levels of perfectionism have a greater tendency to display a negative 
interpretation of information relative to individuals with low levels of perfectionism.  
The present research has not only provided convergent findings with Yiend et 
al. (2011) results, but also clarifies the specific nature of perfectionism-relevant 
interpretive bias. As identified previously, it was unclear whether perfectionism was 
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associated with only an interpretation of negative affective responses or negative 
events occurring. The present findings have demonstrated that there is no differential 
interpretation bias based on the affective interpretation or event expectation of 
ambiguous scenarios, in that higher perfectionistic concerns were associated with a 
higher likelihood of interpreting ambiguous situations in a way that is consistent with 
a negative interpretation of perfectionism-relevant scenarios for both their emotional 
response and consequences of their actions.  
The present study also found perfectionistic strivings was associated with 
more negative interpretations for these scenarios that depicted a protagonist striving 
for, but ultimately falling short of, personally demanding goals. This may be 
surprising if researchers only consider perfectionistic strivings is aligned with an 
adaptive form of perfectionism (Bieling, Israeli, et al., 2004; Stoeber & Otto, 2006). 
Given perfectionistic strivings has always been a part of the definition of clinical 
perfectionism, it could be expected that perfectionistic strivings may lead to negative 
interpretations of events. The understanding that perfectionistic strivings is not 
adaptive is also consistent with recent meta-analyses that has linked perfectionistic 
strivings with psychological distress (Limburg et al., in press; Smith et al., 2016). 
The observed pattern of findings provides important considerations for the 
theoretical understanding of clinical perfectionism.  The present results highlight the 
inconsistent findings within the literature that suggest perfectionistic strivings is 
associated with positive outcomes (Bieling, Israeli, et al., 2004) yet could also be a 
vulnerability factor in mood disorders (Smith et al., 2016) or eating disorders (Egan 
et al., 2016; Limburg et al., in press). Importantly, the present findings indicate the 
need for more nuanced evaluations of the relationship between perfectionism and 
psychological distress, in particular it could be that perfectionistic strivings becomes 
a vulnerability factor if an individual also demonstrates an interpretation bias towards 
negative interpretations of scenarios. This is plausible given depression is 
characterised by biased interpretations of events (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Wisco 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Yiend et al., 2013), and so this may help explain why 
perfectionistic strivings is a vulnerability factor for depression (Limburg et al., in 
press). Furthermore, it is possible that perfectionistic strivings were linked with a 
negative interpretation bias if the individual consequently repetitively and negatively 
thought about the possible outcomes of the strivings (Macedo et al., 2015). 
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Repetitive negative thinking may lead the individual to also become more self-
critical regarding their performance (Macedo et al., 2014).  
The present findings have potential clinical implications.  There are several 
studies that have examined CBT interventions designed to reduce clinical 
perfectionism (e.g., Egan, van Noort, et al., 2014; Handley et al., 2015). CBT for 
perfectionism has specific components intended to reduce negative interpretations of 
situations that may activate perfectionistic beliefs, and these techniques have 
demonstrated therapeutic effects both on perfectionism and associated symptoms of 
depression and anxiety (Egan, van Noort, et al., 2014; Handley et al., 2015; Steele et 
al., 2013). Shafran et al. (2010) and Egan et al. (2014) emphasised the use of a range 
of cognitive and behavioural techniques to challenge perfectionistic interpretations. 
The current demonstration that negative interpretive bias is intimately associated 
with perfectionism lends weight to the theoretical assumptions underpinning the 
clinical use of such CBT components. Moreover, this type of performance based 
assessment task may provide clinicians with a useful tool for measuring resulting 
change in interpretive bias, in a manner that is not compromised by the demand or 
expectancy effects that may compromise self-report measures of interpretation.  
Although the present findings support the possibility that negative 
interpretation bias may contribute to clinical perfectionism as proposed by Shafran et 
al. (2002), it is important to recognise that the association between such 
interpretative bias and elevated perfectionism permits no conclusions concerning the 
causal nature of this association. The present study did not aim to ascertain the causal 
contribution of interpretation biases to clinical perfectionism, and as such future 
researchers should aim to evaluate this issue. One approach would be to assess this 
interpretation bias in individuals who have completed CBT for perfectionism, to 
determine whether therapeutic gains are mediated by the reduction of interpretation 
bias, as may be expected if such bias causally contributes to the dysfunctional 
symptomatology that characterises perfectionism. Investigators could also evaluate 
the causal role of interpretation bias in perfectionism by employing a cognitive bias 
modification procedure to directly manipulate interpretation (CBM-I). Although 
methodologies can vary, the CBM-I approach typically involves requiring the 
extended processing of emotionally ambiguous information under circumstances that 
require participants to repeatedly access its benign meaning (Amir & Taylor, 2012). 
This is intended to train the participants to consistently interpret ambiguous 
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information in either a positive (or in some cases a negative) manner. For example, 
to increase benign interpretation of ambiguity, ambiguous target information may be 
consistently preceded by cue information related to its benign interpretation, across 
many hundred trials of a task that requires individuals to identify the relationship 
between the target and cue information, and reinforces success in doing so. Such 
procedures have demonstrated effectiveness in experimentally manipulating 
interpretation biases in anxiety disorders (Amir & Taylor, 2012; Hayes, Hirsch, 
Krebs, & Mathews, 2010). Future research should now investigate whether CBM-I, 
designed to directly reduce the type of perfectionism-related negative interpretation 
identified in the present study, can assist in the attenuation of dysfunctional 
symptomatology experienced by clinical perfectionists. If CBM-I proves to be 
effective in this regard, it would not only confirm that this interpretation bias 
causally contributes to perfectionist symptomatology, but would also suggest that 
CBM-I may have value as an adjunct treatment alongside CBT for perfectionism.  
While the present study is one of the first to examine perfectionism-relevant 
interpretive bias, previous research has documented other types of cognitive 
anomalies in individuals with clinical perfectionism. For example, it has been shown 
that individuals high in perfectionism are characterised by attentional bias towards 
emotionally negative perfectionism-relevant information (see Chapter 3), and also by 
generally impaired cognitive efficiency (Stoeber, 2011b). It is unknown whether 
these various cognitive anomalies represent independent characteristics of high 
perfectionism, or whether they may be functionally related. One intriguing 
possibility, worthy of further investigation, is that the negative interpretative bias 
observed in the present study represents the “downstream” consequence of the early 
attentional bias to negative perfectionism-relevant information (see Chapter 3), 
which itself could be a consequence of impaired attentional control resulting from 
the compromised cognitive efficiency observed by Stoeber (2011). Future research, 
which discretely manipulates either interpretative bias, attentional bias, or cognitive 
control while assessing the impact of such manipulations on all three domains of 
cognitive functioning, could serve to illuminate the potential inter-relationships 
between these differing aspects of perfectionism-relevant information processing. 
Such research may also explore the intricacies of participant’s responses to both 
target and foil sentences to determine the nature of the stimuli that may increase the 
risk of a general response bias.  
 108 
 
The present study has several limitations. One limitation is that although the 
perfectionistic scenarios and test sentences were selected on the basis of equal 
emotional tone, it is likely that scenarios and test sentences were not equally positive 
or negative for every participant. For example, scenarios and test sentences 
concerning academic performance may have greater potential negative emotional 
impact for those perfectionistic individuals who are particularly concerned about 
their academic success, than for perfectionistic individuals who are instead 
concerned about their sporting achievements or physical appearance. Future 
researchers could strive to maximise the personal relevance of their stimulus 
materials by developing categories of interpretations consistent with prominent 
perfectionistic concerns or strivings (e.g., academics, social settings, and sporting 
accomplishments). Participants could then rate the category types prior to completing 
the interpretation task to identify the most concerning categories for them. It would 
then be possible to only use the scenarios from the categories that were judged by 
that participant to be personally relevant as the stimuli presented in the interpretation 
task. This approach may provide researchers with a more sensitive assessment of the 
interpretation bias patterns that characterises high perfectionists.  
Another consideration for the present research is that no relationship was 
observed between perfectionism (both perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic 
strivings) and symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress.  Depression, anxiety, and 
stress were assessed to ensure that the relationship between perfectionism and 
interpretation bias was not confounded by symptoms of psychological distress. Given 
that particular perfectionistic concerns in particular has previously demonstrated a  
robust relationship with psychological distress (Limburg et al., in press), it is 
surprising that there was no correlation observed between these constructs in this 
study. It is not clear why this may be the case. Range attenuation for perfectionism is 
unlikely to explain this finding given that there was a large range of scores for 
perfectionistic concerns (M = 23.13, SD = 6.30, range = 12 to 38) and perfectionistic 
strivings (M = 24.79, SD = 4.87, range = 12 to 34). For symptoms of depression (M 
= 1.94, SD = 1.87, range = 0 to 10), anxiety (M = 3.01, SD = 3.06, range = 0 to 16), 
and stress (M = 6.29, SD = 3.85, range = 0 to 19), the average was within the normal 
range (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). It is consistent that the average scores were in 
the normal range for each of depression, anxiety, and stress. Yet with a range of 
scores up to moderate for depression and extremely severe for anxiety and stress it is 
 109 
 
unlikely range attenuation would explain this finding. Given that we do not know the 
clinical status of the participants, we cannot draw firm conclusions that perfectionism 
specific interpretation biases are separate from interpretation biases observed in 
clinical disorders where high perfectionism has been identified as a common problem 
(Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). Future research could directly evaluate the patterns of 
interpretation bias in perfectionism and whether it can be distinguished from 
commonly held interpretation biases that characterise the clinical conditions 
associated with perfectionism (e.g., depression). It can be concluded from the present 
findings that perfectionistic concerns, and possibly perfectionistic strivings, are 
characterised by a negative interpretation bias, which operates during the processing 
of perfectionism-relevant information in ways that serve to inflate the perceived 
probability of negative affective experiences and negative event outcomes.  
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Chapter 5: Study Three  
 
5.1. Introduction 
Within the context of clinical perfectionism, Shafran et al. (2002) proposed 
that there are several cognitive processes and products that may influence an 
individual’s behaviour. Chapter 3 explored how individuals with high levels of 
clinical perfectionism, namely perfectionistic concerns represented by the Concern 
over Mistakes subscale of the FMPS, is associated with an attentional preference for 
negative, perfectionistic stimuli. Chapter 4 evaluated how individuals’ levels of 
clinical perfectionism, represented by scores for perfectionistic concerns and 
perfectionistic strivings, were associated with a negative interpretation bias.  
Based on the models of clinical perfectionism and information processing, it 
is also likely that the way individuals with clinical perfectionism engage their 
thoughts may explain the relationship between clinical perfectionism and 
psychological distress. The present study aimed to evaluate the relationship between 
clinical perfectionism and psychological distress both directly and indirectly through 
repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery. Although perfectionistic concerns 
and perfectionistic strivings are closely aligned with the concept of clinical 
perfectionism, it would also be informative to evaluate whether a specific measure of 
clinical perfectionism would explain any additional variance of psychological 
distress both directly and indirectly beyond what is accounted for by perfectionistic 
concerns and perfectionistic strivings. Research to date has typically focused on the 
factor structure of the CPQ (Chang & Sanna, 2012; Dickie et al., 2012; Egan et al., 
2016; Stoeber & Damian, 2014), additionally there is a lack of evaluation as to 
whether the CPQ can predict psychological distress beyond what is accounted for by 
more popular measures such as the FMPS.  
Perfectionism involves the setting of extremely high, personally demanding, 
goals despite negative consequences (Shafran et al., 2002). The setting of high 
standards is only maladaptive if an individual bases their self-worth on the unrealistic 
expectation that the standards must always be met (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). 
Perfectionism is widely regarded as a multidimensional construct that consists of two 
factors (Stoeber & Otto, 2006). The first is perfectionistic concerns, which involves 
the individual being excessively self-critical for not reaching a goal or being 
extremely worried about making mistakes on a performance. The second is 
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perfectionistic strivings, which is the setting of high goals and striving for 
achievement without excessive worry about performance. Shafran et al (2002) 
proposed that when the individual fails to meet their unrealistic standards, they 
interpret this as a personal failure and psychological distress ensues. Evidence has 
demonstrated that perfectionism is transdiagnostic (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011), which 
is defined as a process that plays a role in the development and maintenance of 
multiple psychological disorders (McEvoy et al., 2009). Importantly, perfectionism 
has been directly linked with the development and maintenance of psychological 
disorders such as, mood, anxiety, and eating disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011, 
2012; Shafran & Mansell, 2001; Wheeler et al., 2011). Accounting for additional 
transdiagnostic processes, such as repetitive negative thinking (Ehring & Watkins, 
2008; McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011) and mental imagery (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010), may further improve our understanding of the pathways through 
which perfectionism can lead to psychological distress.  
5.1.1. Perfectionism and Repetitive Negative Thinking 
Ehring and Watkins (2008) define repetitive negative thinking as a pattern of 
verbal linguistic thinking about a previous, present, or future problem or negative 
experience that is repetitive, intrusive, and difficult to disengage from. Given the 
transdiagnostic nature of perfectionism, it is important that investigations of 
cognitive products are also transdiagnostic such as repetitive negative thinking 
(Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; O'Connor et al., 2007), research 
has explored whether repetitive negative thinking is a pathway through which 
individuals with perfectionism experience psychological distress (Macedo et al., 
2014).  
Macedo et al. (2014) suggested that repetitive negative thinking in 
perfectionism may prolong negative emotions where an individual maintains focus 
on negative events, searching for errors in their performance, or generating ‘what if’ 
scenarios regarding what could have happened if the individual responded differently 
(Shafran et al., 2002). Verbal-linguistic activity such as repetitive negative thinking 
may also serve an avoidant function by suppressing more aversive and 
physiologically arousing mental imagery and thereby limiting emotional processing 
(Borkovec et al., 2004). Consistent with these predictions, repetitive negative 
thinking is associated with both perfectionism and other variables, including 
depression symptoms and anxiety (Blankstein & Lumley, 2008; Chang et al., 2007; 
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Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014; Olson & Kwon, 2007; Randles et al., 2010; Stoeber & 
Joormann, 2001).  
Short and Mazmanian (2013) theorised that perfectionism would lead to 
rumination and worry, which in turn would increase negative affect. Consistent with 
this theory, Short and Mazmanian found that repetitive negative thinking, 
represented by both rumination and worry, was an indirect pathway between 
perfectionism and negative affect. This finding is consistent with Di Schiena et al.’s 
(2012) finding that rumination was a complete indirect pathway for the relationship 
between perfectionism and depressive symptoms, such that perfectionism no longer 
had a significant association with depression symptoms after accounting for 
rumination.  
To further evaluate the relationship between perfectionism and repetitive 
negative thinking, Macedo et al. (2015) assessed 788 college students on repetitive 
negative thinking and two dimensions of perfectionism, perfectionistic concerns and 
perfectionistic strivings. Macedo et al. predicted that perfectionistic concerns would 
lead to repetitive negative thinking, which in turn would increase psychological 
distress. Consistent with this prediction, Macedo et al. found perfectionistic concerns 
had a significant indirect relationship with psychological distress through repetitive 
negative thinking, in addition to a direct relationship with psychological distress. The 
authors also found a significant indirect relationship between perfectionistic strivings 
and psychological distress through repetitive negative thinking.  
The finding that the direct relationship between perfectionistic concerns and 
psychological distress is maintained, even when the indirect pathway through 
repetitive negative thinking is considered, is consistent with past literature 
demonstrating that perfectionistic concerns is associated with psychological distress 
(Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). It is also important to recognise that as perfectionistic 
concerns predicted repetitive negative thinking, which in turn predicts increases in 
psychological distress also suggests that the way individuals engage with their 
thoughts may influence their wellbeing. According to Macedo et al.’s (2015) 
findings, the relationship between perfectionistic strivings and psychological distress 
or psychopathology may be, in part, due to particular indirect pathways. It is 
plausible that perfectionistic strivings may only become negative if the individual 
repetitively thinks about negative outcomes of these strivings (e.g., potential failure). 
Repetitive thinking about performance outcomes may then lead the individual to 
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become more self-critical regarding their own performance (Macedo et al., 2014), 
which helps to explain how perfectionistic strivings could be a vulnerability factor in 
mood disorders (Smith et al., 2016) and eating disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). 
 It is important to note that research has typically focused on one dimension 
of repetitive negative thinking, either rumination or worry, however, studies in recent 
years have suggested that rumination and worry are more common than distinct (Bird 
et al., 2012; Mahoney et al., 2012; McEvoy et al., 2010; McEvoy et al., 2013; 
Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). Rumination has almost exclusively been 
explored within the context of mood disorders and is viewed as a core cognitive 
feature of depression where individuals repetitively think about past events (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), whilst worry has been a focus of anxiety 
disorders, in particular generalised anxiety disorder where individuals repetitively 
think about possible future events (Watkins et al., 2005). In this way rumination and 
worry have been distinguished temporally (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). Furthermore, 
the specific content of cognitive products will depend on the nature of emotionally 
salient stimuli to a particular individual. To date, most studies have focused on 
diagnosis-specific forms of repetitive negative thinking, such as rumination 
(depression) or worry (anxiety) (Di Schiena et al., 2012; Short & Mazmanian, 2013). 
However, recent research suggests that rumination and worry are more similar than 
different and that the common underlying construct of repetitive negative thinking 
could be captured with a measure that treats repetitive negative thinking as a unified 
transdiagnostic construct (Bird et al., 2012; Mahoney et al., 2012; McEvoy, 
Thibodeau, & Asmundson, 2014; McEvoy et al., 2013). 
It would be informative to extend beyond the examination of just the 
relationship between perfectionism and repetitive negative thinking. Repetitive 
negative thinking may reflect just one way an individual engages with their thoughts, 
whilst there may be other, additional intermediate variables, which also contribute to 
the relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. One such 
intermediate variable could be mental imagery. It may be important to consider 
repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery in the same model, given mental 
imagery demonstrates stronger associations with emotions than verbal-linguistic 
activity such as repetitive negative thinking (Holmes et al., 2008). Additionally, 
repetitive negative thinking may also serve an avoidant function by suppressing more 
aversive and physiologically arousing mental imagery  and thereby limiting 
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emotional processing (Borkovec et al., 2004), and as such would be interesting to 
determine which process best explains the relationship between perfectionism and 
psychological distress.  
5.1.2. Perfectionism and Mental Imagery 
One such potential intermediate variable to consider between perfectionism 
and psychological distress is mental imagery. Mental imagery can be defined as 
mental cognitions that engage with or contain sensory experiences (Horowitz, 1970). 
Kosslyn et al. (2001) described mental imagery as “seeing with the mind’s eye or 
hearing with the mind’s ear” (p. 635), and indeed it can be experienced in any 
sensory modality (Holmes, Arntz, et al., 2007). For example, a multisensory negative 
image in perfectionism might include a mental image of being shamed at work in 
front of colleagues after completing a project imperfectly, hearing negative 
comments and laughter from colleagues, and experiencing a strong behavioural urge 
to escape. Mental imagery is widely recognised as a transdiagnostic process across 
psychological disorders (Hackmann et al., 2011; Krans, 2011).  
Of particular importance when considering the association between 
perfectionism and psychological distress is that negative intrusive mental imagery 
can significantly affect people’s behaviour and emotional regulation strategies 
(Hackmann et al., 2011). For example, in a sample of individuals with dysphoria, 
Pictet et al. (2011) found that those who engaged with positive mental imagery not 
only experienced an improvement in their ratings of positive and negative affect, but 
also in their performance on a behaviour task that required participants to catch 
magnetic fish. Mental imagery also amplifies positive and negative emotions, more 
so than emotion-based verbal processing such as repetitive negative thinking 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  
Lee et al. (2011) conducted the only study to date that has assessed mental 
imagery and behavioural expressions within perfectionism. Lee et al. examined 
mental imagery through the Imagery Interview, which is a 48-item semi-structured 
interview that asks participants to discuss any intrusive mental images, experiences, 
and sensations that may be related to a specific memory. Within this interview are 
twelve questions that ask participants to rate their experiences with the mental 
imagery, such as how intense the mental image is or a rating of the distress the 
mental image causes. The ratings provided by participants can then be summed to 
give an indication of the overall experience an individual has with mental imagery, 
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or used as subscales (e.g., imagery distress or impact on day-to-day behaviour). The 
FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990) and the Imagery Interview was explored in a non-
clinical sample (N = 59), and examined the relationships between perfectionism, 
imagery, and perfectionistic behaviours (e.g., checking performance and avoiding 
tasks) using the behavioural domain questionnaire (Lee et al., 2011). After using a 
median split to distinguish between individuals high and low in perfectionism on the 
basis of overall FMPS scores, the authors found that the individuals ratings for their 
overall experience of mental imagery was significantly higher for the participants 
with high perfectionism compared to low perfectionism. Additionally, individuals 
high in perfectionism experienced more distress, found it harder to dismiss the 
images, and experienced a negative impact from perfectionism related mental 
imagery. The overall experience of mental imagery also predicted higher checking 
behaviours and a greater difficulty completing the task as measured by the 
behavioural domain questionnaire. Further evaluation of the relationship is required 
as the study was largely exploratory and used a relatively small sample.  
It is also important to consider that the use of an Imagery Interview is not 
feasible across such a large sample, as each interview would last between 30 to 60 
minutes depending on the participant, as such the use of a validated self-report 
measure of mental imagery would allow for an evaluation of mental imagery in 
perfectionism in a larger sample. Deeprose and Holmes (2010) identified that as 
mental imagery can be experienced in any sensory domain (Hackmann et al., 2011) 
the general assessments of mental imagery (e.g., Spontaneous Use of Imagery 
Questionnaire; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003) or the vividness of mental 
imagery generation (e.g., Vividness of Visual Imagery; Marks, 1973) do not 
adequately assess intrusive prospective mental imagery. Given the lack of specific 
measures that assess intrusive prospective mental imagery, Deeprose and Holmes 
(2010) developed an adaptation of the impact of events scale – revised (Weiss & 
Marmer, 1997), which was designed assess the impact of intrusive prospective 
mental imagery across multiple sensory domains. 
Given the significant impact mental imagery has on emotion (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010), mental imagery may be a pathway through which perfectionism 
results in psychological distress. Research has tended to focus on the impact images 
may have within the context of a specific disorder (Brewin et al., 2010; Hirsch & 
Holmes, 2007; Holmes, Blackwell, Burnett Heyes, Renner, & Raes, 2016; Holmes, 
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Crane, Fennell, & Williams, 2007). There has been a lack of research focusing on the 
relative impact of mental imagery within a transdiagnostic process (i.e., 
perfectionism) that may be common to the development and maintenance of many of 
these disorders. The evaluation of the impact of mental imagery in perfectionism 
may further inform theory as to the relevant modes of cognition that may drive 
psychological distress and could become an important transdiagnostic treatment 
focus across a range psychopathologies. Mental imagery-based techniques have 
already been used to enhance existing treatments for emotional disorders (McEvoy et 
al., 2015; McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014), and if mental imagery is found to be an 
important indirect pathway between perfectionism and psychological distress then 
techniques such as imagery rescripting could be incorporated in the treatment of 
perfectionism. 
To date, research has not explored both repetitive negative thinking and 
mental imagery within the same model as possible intermediate variables between 
perfectionism and psychological distress. In addition, research has only assessed 
perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings through the use of either the 
FMPS or HMPS. No research to date has evaluated whether a measure of clinical 
perfectionism such as the CPQ (Fairburn et al., 2003a) further contributes to 
understanding the relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. The 
inclusion of clinical perfectionism can directly inform the cognitive-behavioural 
model of perfectionism and treatments of perfectionism, whereas the inclusion of a 
multidimensional perfectionism scale would enable comparisons to previous 
findings.  
The main objective of the present study was to investigate the relationship 
between perfectionism, repetitive negative thinking, mental imagery, and 
psychological distress by comparing three models. The first model evaluated the 
indirect effect of perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings on 
psychological distress via repetitive negative thinking. The second model included 
mental imagery as an additional intermediate variable between perfectionistic 
concerns, perfectionistic strivings, and psychological distress.  The third model tested 
whether clinical perfectionism, in addition to perfectionistic concerns and 
perfectionistic strivings, had unique direct and indirect relationships with 
psychological distress via the two intermediate variables. The models were evaluated 
in this sequential way so that findings could be compared to and extend earlier 
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literature that included only a subset of these constructs. Testing the first model 
would allow for a comparison between the present population and previous research 
that only investigated repetitive negative thinking as an intermediate variable. It 
would also allow for the test of the prediction that there is a direct relationship 
between perfectionistic concerns and psychological distress, in addition to an indirect 
relationship through repetitive negative thinking. By establishing the indirect 
relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress through repetitive 
negative thinking and then only adding mental imagery in model 2 would allow for a 
more direct evaluation of the proportion of unique variance explained in 
psychological distress when mental imagery is included as an additional indirect 
pathway. The addition of mental imagery would allow for the test of the prediction 
that there is a direct relationship between perfectionistic concerns and psychological 
distress, and an indirect relationship through mental imagery rather than repetitive 
negative thinking. Finally, the third model included a measure of clinical 
perfectionism to determine the relative contribution it makes to the explanation of the 
relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. To date, the clinical 
perfectionism measure has not been evaluated in a structural equation model with 
repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery as intermediate variables. 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
Kline (2005) recommends 20 participants per free parameter in structural 
equation models. The most complex model (Model 3) has 20 free parameters, 
therefore an adequate sample size was 400 participants. Participants were recruited 
via convenience sampling from the community through flyers placed at a University, 
local newspaper and radios ads, a link placed on a social networking website, and via 
an undergraduate psychology research register with course credit awarded for 
participation.  
There were 456 participants recruited and 397 participants completed all 
essential questionnaires (87.1% completion rate). The sample was predominantly 
female (67.8%), with an average age of 28.09 years (SD = 11.09; range = 17 – 69); 
age did not differ significantly between females (M = 28.52, SD = 11.05) and males 
(M = 27.55, SD = 10.86), F(1, 376) = .60, ns, η² = .001. There were 31.2% of 
participants working full-time, 8.6% working part-time, 7.8% University students, 





5.2.2.1.1. The Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost, Marten, 
et al., 1990). The FMPS is a 35-item questionnaire divided into six subscales. For the 
purposes of this study, only the 9-item Concern over Mistakes (negative reactions to 
mistakes) and 5-items representing pure Personal Standards (setting high standards 
personal standards without it being contingent upon self-worth; DiBartolo, Frost, 
Chang, LaSota, & Grills, 2004) subscales were used as measures of perfectionistic 
concerns and perfectionistic strivings, respectively. Items are rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale according to the degree to which the participant agrees with them. 
Higher scores on Concern over Mistakes or Personal Standards represented higher 
levels of perfectionistic concerns or perfectionistic strivings respectively. The FMPS 
and its subscales have good internal consistency and validity (Bardone-Cone et al., 
2007; Egan, Wade, et al., 2011). Internal consistencies in the present study was good 
for Concern over Mistakes (α = .87) and Personal Standards (α = .80) subscales. 
5.2.2.1.1. The Clinical Perfectionism Questionnaire (Fairburn et al., 2003b). 
The CPQ is a 12-item self-report measure designed to measure clinical 
perfectionism. Participants rate items using a 4-point Likert scale to indicate the 
extent to which each item describes them. Scores range from 12 to 48, with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of clinical perfectionism. The CPQ has demonstrated 
good internal consistency, and has been associated with measures of perfectionistic 
concerns and perfectionistic strivings, and psychological distress which demonstrated 
convergent validity, and predictive validity (Chang & Sanna, 2012; Dickie et al., 
2012; Egan et al., 2016; Steele, O'Shea, et al., 2011). Internal consistency in the 
present study was good (α = .82). 
5.2.2.2. Repetitive Negative Thinking. 
5.2.2.2.1. The Repetitive Negative Thinking - Short scale (RTQ-10; 
Mahoney et al., 2012). The RTQ-10 was adapted from the Repetitive Thinking 
Questionnaire (RTQ; McEvoy et al., 2010). Respondents rate statements about the 
experience on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from “1 = not true at all” to “5 = very 
true”). Higher scores indicate greater engagement in repetitive negative thinking. The 
RTQ-10 contained six items with references to both thoughts and images, so all 
references to images were removed so as to not confound the additional use of 
mental imagery measures in the present study. The RTQ-10 has excellent internal 
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consistency (α = .89), is highly correlated with the full scale (r = .95), and has 
comparable convergent validity to the full scale (Mahoney et al., 2012). Internal 
consistency in the present study was high (α = .88). 
5.2.2.3. Mental imagery. 
5.2.2.3.1. The Impact of Future Events Scale (IFES; Deeprose & Holmes, 
2010). The IFES was included to measure mental imagery related to the future 
(Deeprose & Holmes, 2010). The participants responded to 24 Likert type items on a 
5-point scale, examining prospective mental imagery experience, avoidance, and 
hyper-arousal related to the mental imagery (Deeprose & Holmes, 2010). The 
measure of mental imagery used in the study is both a measure about the mental 
imagery representation of the experience, and emotional impact of the mental 
imagery. The IFES was adapted from the IES-R scale (Weiss & Marmer, 1997) by 
adapting the items to refer to the future rather than the past. Deeprose and Holmes 
(2010) developed an additional two questions that pertained to feeling optimistic and 
feeling energetic as additional aspects of hyperarousal regarding the future. Deeprose 
and Holmes (2010) explained that even positive aspects of hyperarousal (i.e., 
excitation) could become negative when it is associated with a pre-occupation with 
the future and goal pursuit. Higher scores on this scale reflect a greater experience of 
intrusive prospective, personally relevant mental imagery. Results for the IFES 
indicate good test-retest reliability (r = .73) and good reliability (α = .87) (Deeprose 
& Holmes, 2010; Deeprose, Malik, & Holmes, 2011). Internal consistency in the 
present study was high (α = .92).24 
5.2.2.4. Psychological distress. 
5.2.2.4.1. The Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale-21. (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995a). The DASS-21 is a 21-item scale assessing depression, anxiety, 
and stress within the past week. Individuals rate items on a 4-point Likert scale. 
Scores on the subscale items are summed to indicate a range of symptom severity. 
Strong reliability and validity has been demonstrated (Antony, Bieling, et al., 1998). 
For the purpose of this study, the scores from the separate depression, anxiety, and 
stress scales were summed to create a composite score representing psychological 
distress (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). Internal consistency in the present study 




The research was approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (HR88/2012). Each participant provided informed consent before 
completing questionnaires online that included the above measures hosted through 
the online survey site Qualtrics. Participants were informed that their responses were 
confidential as no identifying information was collected and that they could 
withdraw at any time prior to completing the questionnaires. Participants could place 
their name into a draw for a $25 AUD gift voucher, while university participants who 
required research participation for their course were credited participation points for 
completing the survey. Participation took approximately 25 minutes to complete. 
5.2.4. Data analysis 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were first performed with maximum 
likelihood estimation using Mplus version 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998) to test the 
factor structure of each measure and ensure the measurement model optimally 
reflected the latent constructs. Furthermore, Modification Indices (MIs > 20, Hu & 
Bentler, 1999) were examined and theoretically defensible paths were freed. Chi-
square difference tests were used to compare model fit following modifications. 
Goodness-of-fit was assessed using the chi-square statistic and degrees of freedom 
(Chi-square/df; values should be <2.0), Comparative Fit Index (CFI; values should 
be ≥0.95), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; values should be 
≤0.06), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; values should be ≥0.95), Standardised Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR; values should be ≤0.08) (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
After confirmation of adequate fit of the measurement models, structural 
equation modelling was implemented using Mplus to test three models. The 
significance values for both direct and indirect pathways were estimated with a 95% 
confidence interval using a bootstrapping procedure based on 1000 draws from the 
data. The first model tested the direct pathways between perfectionistic concerns, 
perfectionistic strivings, and psychological distress, in addition to the indirect 
relationships via repetitive negative thinking. The second model was the same as the 
first model except that mental imagery was included as an additional intermediate 
variable. The third model was the same as the second model but included clinical 
perfectionism as an additional predictor (see Figure 5). Each model was run with and 
without the control variables of age and gender and the pattern of significant results 
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did not change; therefore results from the most parsimonious models without control 
variables are reported. 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Prior to testing each of the three structural equation models CFA was 
conducted to test the factor structure of each measure and ensure the measurement 
models provided an adequate fit to the data. For perfectionistic strivings, a single 
factor model provided a good fit (χ2[N = 5] = 19.35, p < .001, CFI = .977, RMSEA = 
.085, SRMR = .029), so this model was retained. For perfectionistic concerns, a 
single factor model also provided a good fit (χ2[N = 27] = 113.46, p < .001, CFI = 
.933, RMSEA = .090, SRMR = .045), although the MI (29.31) indicated that items 
25 and 34 were highly related. Both items are about others’ reactions to the 
individual’s mistakes (item 25 “If I do not do as well all the time, people will not 
respect me” and item 34 “The fewer mistakes I make, the more people will like me.”) 
so their covariance was freed, which improved model fit (Δ χ2[N = 1] = 29.21, p < 
.001, CFI = .955, RMSEA = .075, SRMR = .039). 
For repetitive negative thinking, a single factor model from the initial CFA 
revealed good fit so no modifications were considered (χ2[N = 35] = 100.90 p < .001, 
CFI = .972, RMSEA = .069, SRMR = .031). For psychological distress measurement 
model, the three depression, anxiety, and stress scores were used as indicators of the 
psychological distress latent variable. The model was just-identified (i.e., zero 
degrees of freedom), so goodness of fit does not apply. However, the standardised 
indicator loadings were high (.87-.89) with the latent variable explaining between 
76% and 79% of the variance in indicator scores.  
Considering the mental imagery factor, the initial CFA revealed a poor fit 
(χ2[N = 252] = 1483.78, p < .001, CFI = .745, RMSEA = .111, SRMR = .084). Items 
1 (“I believed my thoughts about the future would definitely happen and would 
become real.”) and 23 (“I felt energetic and excitable.”) loaded weakly on the latent 
mental imagery construct (rs = .20 and .06, respectively). Items 2 and 15 were highly 
correlated (MI = 112) with both items assessing sleep (item 2 “I had trouble staying 
asleep.” and item 15 “I had trouble falling asleep.”). Items 1 and 23 were removed 
and items 2 and 15 were allowed to covary before conducting a second CFA, which 
provided better but not ideal fit (χ2[N = 208] = 1003.29, p < .001, CFI = .823, 
RMSEA = .098, SRMR = .068). In this model items 8 and 11 (MI = 60), which both 
 122 
 
measured avoiding the future (item 8 “I stayed away from reminders of the future.” 
and item 11 “I tried not to think about the future.”), and items 11 and 17 (MI = 58), 
which both measured the individual removing thoughts about the future (item 11 “I 
tried not to think about the future.” and item 17 “I tried to remove thoughts of the 
future from my mind.”), were highly correlated, so were allowed to covary before 
conducting a third CFA. A third CFA revealed improved, although still not ideal 
model fit (χ2[N = 206] = 898.72, p < .001, CFI = .846, RMSEA = .092, SRMR = 
.065), but no further modifications were deemed to be theoretically defensible.  
 For clinical perfectionism, the initial CFA revealed a poor model fit (χ2[N = 
54] = 383.47, p < .001, CFI = .722, RMSEA = .124, SRMR = .091), with items 2 and 
8 demonstrating the weakest loadings (r = .035 and .028, respectively). Items 2 
(“Over the past month, have you tended to focus on what you have achieved, rather 
than on what you have not achieved?”) and 8 (“Over the past month, have you done 
just enough to get by?”) are the only reversed scored items and have demonstrated 
poor fit previously (Egan et al., 2016), so they were removed before running a 
second CFA. Fit improved but remained poor (χ2[N = 35] = 233.49, p < .001, CFI = 
.808, RMSEA = .120, SRMR = .074). The modification indices (MI) indicated items 
3 and 10 should be covaried (MI = 60), which can be explained by both items asking 
about others’ opinions of the individual (item 3 “Over the past month, have you been 
told your standards are too high?” and item 10 “Over the past month, do you think 
that other people would have thought of you as a “perfectionist”?”). Item 1 (“Over 
the past month, have you pushed yourself really hard to meet your goals?”) also had 
a weak loading on the clinical perfectionism factor (r = .22) and was removed. A 
third CFA without items 1, 2, and 8, and with items 3 and 10 covaried, demonstrated 
good fit (χ2[N = 26] = 80.64, p < .001, CFI = .940, RMSEA = .073, SRMR = .046). 




















Figure 5. All structural pathways tested between perfectionistic concerns, perfectionistic strivings, clinical perfectionism, repetitive negative 
thinking, mental imagery, and psychological distress. 
Model 1 included all pathways involving perfectionistic striving, perfectionistic concerns, repetitive negative thinking, and psychological distress 






















Table 6. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables of interest. 
























24.52 6.69 10 - 43 10 - 43 -        
2. Perfectionistic 
strivings 
16.98 3.91 6 - 25 6 - 25 .37** -       
3. Clinical 
Perfectionism  
17.51 4.57 15 - 45 15 - 45 .61** .48** -      
4. Repetitive 
Negative Thinking 
30.21 10.42 10 - 50 10 - 50 .39** .10* .49** -     
5. Impact of Future 
Events Scale 
44.59 16.70 2 - 92 2 - 92 .36** .09 .42** .56** -    
6. Depression 
 
10.25 5.58 0 - 23 0 - 23 .40** -.02 .36** .44** .75** -   
7. Anxiety 
 
9.41 4.89 0 - 21 0 - 21 .35** .06 .39** .44** .76** .77** -  
8. Stress 
 
12.97 5.17 0 - 23 0 - 23 .44** .19** .52** .55** .75** .76** .77** - 







5.3.2. Structural Equation Models 
Model 1. In testing the hypothesis that participant’s scores on perfectionistic 
concerns are associated directly with greater psychological distress scores, in 
addition to perfectionistic concerns predicting repetitive negative thinking, which in 
turn predicts psychological distress, first there should be a significant relationship 
between perfectionism and psychological distress. Second, there should be a 
significant relationship between perfectionism and repetitive negative thinking, and 
between repetitive negative thinking and psychological distress.  
To test this the first model included all the measurement models without 
structural pathways, and this model provided a poor fit to the data, χ2(N = 323) = 
1042.72, p < .001, CFI = .872, RMSEA = .075 (90% CI = .070; .080) p < .05, SRMR 
= .193. When the structural pathways were included, a chi-square difference test 
suggested a significantly improved model fit, Δχ2(N = 6) = 308.81, p < .001. The first 
model with structural pathways provided an adequate fit to the data, χ2(N = 317) = 
733.91, p < .001, CFI = .926, RMSEA = .058 (90% CI = .052; .063) p < .001, SRMR 
= .069, and accounted for a statistically significant proportion of variance in 
psychological distress (R2 = .42, p < .001).  
Consistent with the hypotheses, there were statistically significant direct 
positive effects of perfectionistic concerns on repetitive negative thinking (β = .46, p 
< .001, SE = 0.057, 95% CI = .350; .574) and psychological distress (β = .34, p < 
.001, SE = 0.059, 95% CI = .219; .451). There was also a statistically significant 
direct effect of repetitive negative thinking on psychological distress (β = .46, p < 
.001, SE = 0.046, 95% CI = .367; .547), and a significant positive indirect effect of 
perfectionistic concerns on psychological distress through repetitive negative 
thinking (β = .21, p < .001, SE = 0.037, 95% CI = .138; .284). As perfectionistic 
strivings did not have a statistically significant effect on repetitive negative thinking 
(β = -.07, p = ns, SE = 0.063, 95% CI = -.197; .051) or psychological distress (β = -
.09, p = ns, SE = 0.057, 95% CI = -.197; .051) this pathway was removed to yield the 
most parsimonious model.  
Model 1 was reanalysed by looking at the relationship between perfectionistic 
concerns, repetitive negative thinking, and psychological distress without 
perfectionistic strivings. The adjusted model indicated adequate fit, χ2(N = 319) = 
737.54, p < .001, CFI = .925, RMSEA = .057 (90% CI = .049; .062), p < .05, SRMR 




to the model with perfectionistic strivings. The model also continued to account for a 
statistically significant proportion of variance in psychological distress (r2 = .41, p < 
.001). There were statistically significant direct positive effects of perfectionistic 
concerns on repetitive negative thinking (β = .42, p < .001, SE = 0.047, 95% CI = 
.331; .515) and psychological distress (β = .29, p < .001, SE = 0.050, 95% CI = .187; 
.384). There was also a statistically significant direct effect of repetitive negative 
thinking on psychological distress (β = .47, p < .001, SE = 0.046, 95% CI = .156; 
.337). A statistically significant positive indirect effect of perfectionistic concerns on 
psychological distress through repetitive negative thinking was observed (β = .20, p 
< .001, SE = 0.033, 95% CI = .133; .263). See Table 6 for the standardised 




Table 7. Standardised coefficients (95% confidence intervals) for the initial structural model and final modified structural model for model 1 
  (N = 397)  








Component pathways of the indirect effects 
PC → RNT 
PS → RNT 
RNT → Distress 
 
.46 (.350; .574) 
-.07 (-.197; .051) 








   .245 
< .001 
Direct pathway 
PC → Distress 
PS → Distress 
 
 
.34 (.219; .451) 








   .162 
 
Overall indirect effects 
PC → RNT → Distress 
PS → RNT → Distress 
 
.21 (.138; .284) 














Component pathways of the indirect effects 
PC → RNT 
RNT → Distress 
 
.42 (.331; .515) 









PC → Distress 
 
 






Overall indirect effects 
PC → RNT → Distress 
 
 















Model 2. In testing the hypothesis that participant’s scores on perfectionistic 
concerns are associated directly with greater psychological distress scores, in 
addition to perfectionistic concerns predicting mental imagery, which in turn predicts 
psychological distress, first there should be a significant relationship between 
perfectionism and psychological distress. Second, there should be a significant 
relationship between perfectionism and mental imagery, and between mental 
imagery and psychological distress.  
To test this, the second model, which included mental imagery was evaluated 
and indicated poor model fit, χ2(N = 1114) = 2805.83, p < .001, CFI = .847, TLI = 
.839, RMSEA = .062 (90% CI = .059; .065) p < .001, SRMR = .108. However, this 
model did provide a significant improvement over the measurement model without 
the structural pathways, Δχ2(N = 9) = 697.36, p < .001, and the structural model 
accounted for a large and statistically significant proportion of the variance in 
psychological distress (r2 = .82, p < .001).  
There were statistically significant direct positive effects of perfectionistic 
concerns on repetitive negative thinking (β = .52, p < .001, SE = 0.056, 95% CI = 
.410; .630), mental imagery (β = .53, p < .001, SE = 0.056, 95% CI = .416; .636), 
and psychological distress (β = .15, p = .001, SE = 0.045, 95% CI = .057; .233). 
There was also a statistically significant direct effect of mental imagery on 
psychological distress (β = .82, p < .001, SE = 0.028, 95% CI = .776; .886).  
There was a statistically significant positive indirect effect of perfectionistic 
concerns on psychological distress through mental imagery (β = .42, p < .001, SE = 
0.055, 95% CI = .315; .531). As perfectionistic strivings did not have a statistically 
significant effect on mental imagery (β = -.12, p = .052, SE = 0.063, 95% CI = -.247; 
.001), and neither perfectionistic strivings nor repetitive negative thinking had a 
significant effect on psychological distress (β = -.06, p = ns, SE = 0.040, 95% CI = -
.137; .021, and β = .05, p = ns, SE = 0.040, 95% CI = -.026; .132, respectively), these 
constructs were subsequently removed from the model.  
Model 2 was reanalysed by looking at the relationship between perfectionistic 
concerns, mental imagery, and psychological distress without perfectionistic 
strivings or repetitive negative thinking. Compared to the model with perfectionistic 
strivings and repetitive negative thinking, the CFI (.009) and RMSEA (.002) slightly 
improved, but the overall fit was still inadequate, χ2(N = 1116) = 2710.40, p < .001, 




.070. The model continued to account for a large and statistically significant amount 
of variance in psychological distress (r2 = .82, p < .001). Consistent with the 
predictions, there were statistically significant direct positive effects of 
perfectionistic concerns on mental imagery (β = .42, p < .001, SE = 0.046, 95% CI = 
.334; .514) and psychological distress (β = .12, p < .001, SE = 0.035, 95% CI = .052; 
.190). There was also a statistically significant direct effect of mental imagery on 
psychological distress (β = .85, p < .001, SE = 0.023, 95% CI = .803; .893). In terms 
of indirect effects, there was a statistically significant positive indirect effect of 
perfectionistic concerns on psychological distress through mental imagery (β = .36, p 
< .001, SE = 0.046, 95% CI = .270; .450). See Table 7 for the standardised 




Table 8. Standardised coefficients (95% confidence intervals) for the initial structural model and final modified structural model for model 2 
 (N = 397)  











Component pathways of the indirect effects 
PC → RNT 
PS → RNT 
PC → Mental imagery 
PS → Mental imagery  
RNT → Distress 
Mental imagery → Distress 
 
 
.52 (.410; .630) 
-.11 (-.238; .009) 
.53 (.416; .636) 
-.12 (-.247; .001) 
  .05 (-.026; .132) 












   .070 
< .001 
   .052 
   .184 
< .001 
Direct pathway 
PC → Distress 
PS → Distress 
 
 
.15 (.057; .233) 








   .141 
 
Overall indirect effects 
PC → RNT → Distress 
PS → RNT → Distress 
PC → Mental imagery → Distress 
PS → Mental imagery → Distress 
 
 .03 (-.034; .090) 
-.01 (-.020; .008) 
.42 (.315; .531) 








   .255 
   .416 
< .001 







Component pathways of the indirect effects 
PC → Mental imagery 
Mental imagery → Distress 
 
 .42 (.334; .514) 









PC → Distress 
 












Overall indirect effects 
PC → Mental imagery → Distress 
 












Model 3. To test the prediction that clinical perfectionism would explain 
addition variance of psychological distress, beyond what is accounted for by 
perfectionistic concerns, first there should be a significant relationship between 
clinical perfectionism and psychological distress after controlling for the relationship 
between perfectionistic concerns and psychological distress. Second, there should be 
a significant relationship between clinical perfectionism and mental imagery 
thinking, and between mental imagery and psychological distress. 
This third model, which included clinical perfectionism, was initially tested 
and indicated poor fit, χ2 (N = 1575) = 3563.69, p < .001, CFI = .843, TLI = .835, 
RMSEA = .056 (90% CI = .054; .059) p < .001, SRMR = .069. However, this model 
did provide a significant improvement over the measurement model without the 
structural pathways, Δχ2(N = 15) = 1127.00, p < .001, and the structural model 
accounted for a large and statistically significant proportion of the variance in 
psychological distress (r2 = .83, p < .001).  
As predicted there were statistically significant direct positive effects of 
clinical perfectionism on repetitive negative thinking (β = .69, p < .001, SE = 0.095, 
95% CI = .506; .880), and mental imagery (β = .58, p < .001, SE = 0.097, 95% CI = 
.390; .772). There was a statistically significant direct negative effect of 
perfectionistic strivings on repetitive negative thinking (β = -.28, p < .001, SE = 
0.068, 95% CI = -.417; -.149), mental imagery (β = -.26, p < .001, SE = 0.068, 95% 
CI = -.393; -.125), and psychological distress (β = -.10, p = .026, SE = 0.047, 95% CI 
= -.191; -.007). There was also a statistically significant direct effect of mental 
imagery on psychological distress (β = .82, p < .001, SE = 0.035, 95% CI = .746; 
.884). In terms of indirect effects, there was a statistically significant positive indirect 
effect of clinical perfectionism on psychological distress through mental imagery (β 
= .47, p < .001, SE = 0.090, 95% CI = .297; .651). There was also a significant 
negative indirect effect of perfectionistic strivings on psychological distress through 
mental imagery (β = -.21, p < .001, SE = 0.058, 95% CI = -.325; -.097). As neither 
perfectionistic concerns nor repetitive negative thinking had a statistically significant 
relationship with psychological distress or mental imagery these constructs were 
subsequently removed.  
Model 3 was reanalysed by looking at the relationship between clinical 
perfectionism, perfectionistic strivings, mental imagery, and psychological distress 




RMSEA remained unchanged from the initial model, fit overall, χ2(N = 1578) = 
3569.011, p < .001, CFI = .843, TLI = .835, RMSEA = .056 (90% CI = .054; .059) p 
< .001, SRMR = .069, but this more parsimonious model continued to account for a 
large and statistically significant proportion of variance in psychological distress (r2 
= .83, p < .001).  
There were statistically significant direct positive effects of clinical 
perfectionism on mental imagery (β = .69, p < .001, SE = 0.061, 95% CI = .567; 
.807), and psychological distress (β = .20, p < .001, SE = 0.054, 95% CI = .098; 
.310). There was a statistically significant direct negative effect of perfectionistic 
strivings on mental imagery (β = -.27, p < .001, SE = 0.070, 95% CI = -.405; -.129), 
and psychological distress (β = -.10, p = .032, SE = 0.046, 95% CI (-.191; -.007). 
Mental imagery also had a significant direct effect on psychological distress (β = .81, 
p < .001, SE = 0.032, 95% CI = .742; .868). 
 In terms of indirect effects, there was a statistically significant positive 
indirect effect of clinical perfectionism on psychological distress through mental 
imagery (β = .55, p < .001, SE = 0.056, 95% CI = .443; .663). There was also a 
significant negative indirect effect of perfectionistic strivings on psychological 
distress through mental imagery (β = -.22, p < .001, SE = 0.061, 95% CI = -.335; -
.095). See Table 8 for the standardised coefficients of the initial and final structural 




Table 9. Standardised coefficients (95% confidence intervals) for the initial structural model and final modified structural model for model 3 
(N = 397)  













Component pathways of the indirect effects 
PC → RNT 
PS → RNT 
CP → RNT 
PC → Mental imagery 
PS → Mental imagery  
CP → Mental imagery 
RNT → Distress 
Mental imagery → Distress 
 
 
.05 (-.126; .216) 
-.28 (-.417; -.149) 
.69 (.506; .880) 
-.12 (-.296; .050) 
  -.26 (-.393; -.125) 
.58 (.390; .772) 
-.01 (-.101; .075) 













   .602 
   .070 
< .001 
   .178 
< .001    
< .001    
   .770 
< .001 
Direct pathway 
PC → Distress 
PS → Distress 
CP → Distress 
 
 
.10 (-.009; .207) 
-.10 (-.191; -.007) 








   .072 
< .001 
   .104 
 
Overall indirect effects 
PC → RNT → Distress 
PS → RNT → Distress 
CP → RNT → Distress 
PC → Mental imagery → Distress 
PS → Mental imagery → Distress 
CP → Mental imagery → Distress 
 
 
<-.001 (-.014; .009) 
< .004 (-.020; .008) 
-.01 (-.164; .146) 
  .10 (-.213; .011) 
 -.21 (-.325; -.097) 










   .903 
   .795 
   .791 

















PS → Mental imagery 
CP → Mental imagery 
Mental imagery → Distress 
 
 -.27 (-.405; -.129) 
.69 (.567; .807) 









PS → Distress 
CP → Distress 
 
 
-.10 (-.191; -.007) 






   .032 
< .001 
Overall indirect effects 
PS → Mental imagery → Distress 
CP → Mental imagery → Distress 
 
 -.22 (-.335; -.095) 










































Figure 6. Final structural equation model (model 3). Ovals represent latent variables. Only significant pathways coefficients represented. All 









The aim of the present study was to investigate the relative contribution of 
mental imagery and repetitive negative thinking in the relationship between 
perfectionism and psychological distress. When only considering perfectionistic 
strivings, perfectionistic concerns, repetitive negative thinking, and psychological 
distress, perfectionistic strivings did not significantly predict psychological distress 
either directly or indirectly. Rather, perfectionistic concerns predicted psychological 
distress directly, and indirectly via repetitive negative thinking. The indirect 
relationship via repetitive negative thinking is consistent with previous research (Di 
Schiena et al., 2012; Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014; Macedo et al., 2015; Short & 
Mazmanian, 2013) and suggests repetitive negative thinking could be an important 
factor that can explain the relationship between perfectionism and psychological 
distress. Further, the finding that perfectionistic concerns directly predicted 
psychological distress is also in line with evidence that consistently links 
maladaptive facets of perfectionism with a range of symptoms of psychopathology in 
both clinical and non-clinical samples (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Limburg et al., in 
press). The findings that perfectionistic strivings was not related to psychological 
distress is also consistent with past research, at least in non-clinical samples (Egan, 
Wade, et al., 2011; Limburg et al., in press).  
The findings from the present study demonstrated that when mental imagery 
was included in the model the direct relationship between repetitive negative 
thinking and psychological distress became non-significant, mental imagery had a 
stronger relationship with psychological distress than repetitive negative thinking, 
and this model explained twice the variance in psychological distress (R2 = .41 for 
Model 1 vs. .82 for Model 2). The relative dominance of mental imagery over 
repetitive negative thinking in explaining psychological distress is consistent with 
theory and evidence that mental imagery has a more potent impact on emotion than 
verbal-linguistic cognitive activity (e.g., Borkovec et al., 2004; Holmes et al., 2008). 
The finding that mental imagery carries a powerful indirect pathway between 
perfectionism and psychological distress is consistent with Lee et al. (2011) finding 
that individuals with elevated perfectionism experience images that are distressing 
and difficult to dismiss. The findings also serve as evidence for Deeprose and 
Holmes (2010) conclusion that even potentially positive images may be associated 




goal pursuit as is often the focus within perfectionism. The results therefore lend 
weight to the notion that mental imagery has a powerful association with subsequent 
emotional experiences and should be targeted in treatment of perfectionism. It could 
be useful for future research to examine whether imagery-based techniques such as 
imagery rescripting (Egan, Wade, Shafran, & Anthony, 2014), which would 
specifically target distress caused by images, could have a more direct and potent 
influence on emotion compared to techniques designed to modify affect within the 
verbal mode (e.g., cognitive restructuring of verbal thoughts). 
These findings revealed that when the clinical perfectionism was added, the 
indirect relationship between perfectionistic concerns and psychological distress 
through mental imagery became non-significant, while clinical perfectionism directly 
and indirectly predicted psychological distress through mental imagery. Importantly, 
there was a stronger relationship between clinical perfectionism and mental imagery 
relative to that observed between perfectionistic concerns and mental imagery in 
model 2. It is not surprising that clinical perfectionism accounted for the variance 
explained by perfectionistic concerns. Clinical perfectionism was developed from an 
understanding that individuals base their self-worth on striving for, and achievement 
of, personally demanding standards. Conceptually, items on the CPQ is similar to 
items on the concern over mistakes subscale (e.g. item 4 from the CPQ “Over the 
past month, have you felt a failure as a person because you have not succeeded in 
meeting your goals?” and Item 9 from the FMPS: “If I fail at work/school, I am a 
failure as a person”). The finding that perfectionistic concerns was no longer 
significant once clinical perfectionism was included also suggests that clinical 
perfectionism may better capture and explain mental imagery and psychological 
distress. 
The findings from model 3 also revealed that when clinical perfectionism 
accounted for the variance that was explained by perfectionistic concerns, 
perfectionistic strivings had a significant negative relationship with mental imagery, 
even though no such relationship was revealed in the previous models. This 
significant relationship indicated that perfectionistic strivings was associated with 
less mental imagery, which, in turn, was associated with less psychological distress. 
It is unclear why the relationship between perfectionistic strivings and mental 
imagery became significant in model 3, while in previous models no such 




discriminates between pathological and non-pathological aspects of perfectionism 
than perfectionistic concerns, which is based on the FMPS.  If this were the case, it 
would be expected that perfectionistic concerns would capture variance in mental 
imagery explained by perfectionistic strivings, thereby obscuring the relationship 
between perfectionistic strivings and mental imagery. In contrast, when clinical 
perfectionism is included in the model unique relationships between pathological and 
non-pathological aspects of perfectionism would be expected to become more 
apparent. The present results were consistent with this explanation. It appears that 
whilst clinical perfectionism is associated with more intense mental imagery, 
perfectionistic strivings may be adaptive and associated with less mental imagery. 
These findings suggest that a combination of clinical perfectionism and the 
perfectionistic strivings may ideally distinguish between adaptive (i.e., striving for 
high personal standards) and dysfunctional (i.e., achieving high personal standards is 
seen as critical for maintaining self-esteem) aspects of perfectionism, at least in non-
clinical samples. 
Although the present findings suggest perfectionism may have a direct 
relationship with psychological distress, it is important to also consider alternative 
explanations. It is plausible that other indirect pathways not measured in the present 
study would better represent the direct relationship. Specifically, the repetitive 
negative thinking measure used in the present study evaluated the process of 
engagement with repetitive negative thinking rather than specific content. 
Potentially, a measure of specific negative thoughts, such as the Perfectionistic 
Cognitions Inventory (Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, & Gray, 1998), may capture a more 
proximal cognitive variable that could explain additional variance between 
perfectionism and psychological distress. Another intermediate variable that was not 
measured was perfectionistic behaviours and this may explain additional variance in 
psychological distress.  
These findings have implications for increasing our understanding of when 
perfectionism leads to positive and negative outcomes. When an individual is 
striving for a personally demanding standard, yet they are not concerned about 
making mistakes and their self-worth is not dependent on meeting these standards, 
they may be less likely to experience mental imagery about not reaching their 
standards. Previous research in a non-clinical sample by Smith, Saklofske, Yan, and 




perfectionistic strivings were negatively associated with depressive symptoms. 
However, Smith et al. (2015) used composite scores from a range of subscales, 
which included subscales from the HMPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991b), FMPS (Frost, 
Marten, et al., 1990), and EDI (Garner et al., 1983). The use of these various 
subscales to assess perfectionistic concerns and strivings may explain why Smith et 
al. (2015) found that perfectionistic concerns and strivings explained unique variance 
in psychological distress. Stoeber and Otto (2006) argued that there is significant 
overlap between perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings, and that when 
perfectionistic concerns are controlled for there should be a clearer negative 
relationship between perfectionistic strivings and psychological distress. The 
conclusion that researchers can delineate a relationship between perfectionistic 
strivings and psychological distress was demonstrated in two systematic reviews by 
Gotwals, Stoeber, Dunn, and Stoll (2012) and Stoeber (2011a) who demonstrated 
perfectionistic strivings was adaptive after controlling for perfectionistic concerns. 
There are several limitations of the present study that should be considered. 
First, it was not ascertained whether any participants had a psychological disorder, 
and as such we cannot draw conclusions regarding generalisability to a clinical 
sample. It remains to be seen whether the same pattern would emerge, whereby 
mental imagery accounts for all the variance explained by repetitive negative 
thinking, in a clinical sample, and future research should aim to test this possibility. 
Second, the cross-sectional nature of this study precludes conclusions about causality 
or directionality of effects, which are best addressed in experimental and longitudinal 
designs. These are important directions for future research. Third, throughout this 
study the models did not achieve what would be considered good model fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). It is possible that alternative models would produce better model fit. 
Modification indices suggested some item covariances could be freed, specifically 
some items that could cross-load onto other latent variables. Bryne (2012) suggested 
that any changes based on modification indices should be based on statistical and 
theoretical considerations; as such, the suggested modifications were deemed to not 
be theoretically defensible and the original model was retained. As such, the present 
findings should be considered with caution.  
An additional consideration regarding the findings is that the measure of 
repetitive negative thinking captures, at its core, both the process of the thought (i.e., 




(i.e., an ‘I’ statement of the thought). In contrast, the measure of mental imagery used 
in the study is both a measure about the mental imagery representation of the 
experience, and emotional impact of the mental imagery. It may be that the large 
variance accounted for by mental imagery is reflective of the mental imagery 
measure containing questions that relate to emotional impact. This may point to one 
of the difficulties of assessing mental imagery, as mental imagery can be experienced 
in any sensory modality and can come with associated thoughts (Hackmann et al., 
2011). Future research should further investigate the present findings, in particular 
through the presentation of measures of both repetitive negative thinking and mental 
imagery that assesses both the process and emotional impact of each cognitive 
product. At this time there is no available measure that assesses the process of 
repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery separately. Future research could use 
the RTQ-10, which makes reference to both thoughts and images within the original 
questions, and separate it into two individual questionnaires, one for the process of 
repetitive negative thinking, and one for the process of mental imagery. This would 
allow for a more thorough evaluation of the relative role repetitive negative thinking 
and mental imagery have as indirect pathways between perfectionism and 
psychological distress.  
Despite these considerations, the present study has identified a potentially 
important pathway from perfectionism to psychological distress via mental imagery. 
Mental imagery has been shown to influence the emotional experiences of 
individuals more powerfully than verbal-linguistic processes, such as repetitive 
negative thinking (Holmes et al., 2008). Furthermore, Egan, Wade, et al. (2014) 
identified that imagery-based techniques could easily be incorporated within current 
perfectionism treatment protocols, just as imagery-based techniques have enhanced 
treatment protocols for other disorders (Holmes et al., 2009; McEvoy et al., 2015; 
McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014). Future research could investigate whether imagery-
based techniques such as imagery rescripting effectively reduce mental imagery 
related to perfectionism. Furthermore, imagery-based techniques that promote 
positive mental imagery can help increase an individual’s belief of their own 
competence, mastery, and self-compassion (Hackmann et al., 2011), which may be 
of particular benefit for individuals with perfectionism whose self-worth is 





Chapter 6: Thesis discussion 
Major foci for research have been the identification of the transdiagnostic 
nature of perfectionism and the potential for perfectionism to influence therapeutic 
outcomes (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011), but to date there has been limited evaluation of 
the underlying cognitive processes or cognitive products of the cognitive-behavioural 
model of perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002). The overall aim of the thesis was to 
evaluate key hypotheses generated from the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical 
perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002) to improve our understanding of the potential 
cognitive processes and products involved in perfectionism and associated 
psychological distress. The exploration of cognitive processes, attention and 
interpretation biases, and cognitive products, repetitive negative thinking and mental 
imagery, with both experimental and correlational designs addressed important gaps 
within the perfectionism literature. 
The findings from the thesis highlight the presence of an attention bias 
specific to perfectionism (see Chapter 3). There was a moderate to large effect size 
noted for the results that indicated that individuals who score high in perfectionistic 
concerns were more likely to allocate attention to negative information compared to 
positive information when this information was perfectionism–relevant but not when 
information was perfectionism-irrelevant. Additionally, a specific perfectionism-
relevant interpretation bias was examined with an ambiguous passage task (see 
Chapter 4). The results indicated that individuals with higher scores on 
perfectionistic concerns were more likely to impose negative interpretations on 
scenarios regardless of whether the interpretation depicted an affective or event 
outcome. Similar to the findings for perfectionistic concerns, individuals with higher 
scores for perfectionistic strivings were more likely to assign negative interpretations 
on ambiguous scenarios. An important consideration was that, unlike previous 
research, we were able to disentangle whether individuals responded to the affective 
interpretation of perfectionism-relevant scenarios, or whether they responded to their 
event expectations. Taken together, these findings regarding interpretation bias 
suggest that individuals rated that there would be a negative outcome as a result of 
the protagonist not reaching their self-imposed standards. Importantly, the magnitude 
of the difference between the ratings for negatively and positively valenced test 
sentences was greater when individuals considered the affective outcome rather than 




identified that the protagonist would be more likely to experience negative emotions 
(e.g., sadness) than a negative event outcome (e.g., being ridiculed).  
Finally, the relationships between perfectionism, psychological distress, 
repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery were considered (see Chapter 5). 
The results indicated that, consistent with previous research investigating repetitive 
negative thinking alone, perfectionistic concerns predicted repetitive negative 
thinking, which subsequently predicted greater experiences of psychological distress. 
However, this relationship was no longer significant when mental imagery was 
included in the model, which was an important extension to the existing literature. 
When mental imagery was considered the findings indicated, perfectionistic concerns 
may lead to repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery, yet only mental 
imagery continued to predict subsequent psychological distress. Unlike the first 
model, repetitive negative thinking no longer uniquely predicted psychological 
distress in the second model. Another important extension to the literature was the 
inclusion of clinical perfectionism in the model, which resulted in perfectionistic 
concerns no longer predicting psychological distress or mental imagery. In contrast, 
clinical perfectionism predicted psychological distress in addition to predicting 
mental imagery, which was associated with increases in psychological distress. 
Interestingly, in the final model, higher perfectionistic strivings predicted less mental 
imagery, which was unexpected given there was no relationship observed between 
perfectionistic strivings and psychological distress in previous models.  
In summary, these findings indicate that mental imagery, rather than 
repetitive negative thinking, is an important factor to consider in relation to 
psychological distress. Additionally, clinical perfectionism may be a better measure 
to capture psychological distress than perfectionistic concerns measured by the 
FMPS (Frost, Marten, et al., 1990).   
6.1. Theoretical Implications of the Thesis 
There are several theoretical implications of the current body of research. 
Most evidently, the present thesis lends weight to the cognitive-behavioural model of 
clinical perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002; Shafran et al., 2010). The cognitive-
behavioural model of clinical perfectionism predicts that information processing 
biases play an important role in the development and maintenance of perfectionism. 




perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic strivings were associated with two clear 
information processing biases (attention and interpretation).  
The cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism suggests that 
individuals with clinical perfectionism will selectively attend to information that 
indicates failure, while also discounting their own achievements (Shafran et al., 
2002; 2010). The findings demonstrate that perfectionistic concerns are associated 
with biased attention towards negative, perfectionism-relevant stimuli. The 
preferential allocation of attention towards negative, perfectionism-relevant stimuli 
may reflect a plausible mechanism through which individuals may discount their 
success. If individuals preferentially attend to perfectionism-relevant information that 
is indicative of negative outcomes (i.e., failure or mistakes) then this information is 
more likely to be encoded in memory and subsequently recalled (Everaert et al., 
2016; Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 
2013; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006). This attentional bias may therefore lead to 
subsequent interpretation and memory biases about the individuals performance 
(Everaert et al., 2013).  
The findings regarding interpretation bias are also broadly consistent with 
assumptions contained within the cognitive-behavioural model. Based on the 
cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, it was predicted that 
individuals with higher scores of perfectionistic concerns would demonstrate a 
negative interpretation bias when an individual did not achieve their original 
standard, but achieved above what would normally be expected. Based on the 
cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, it is unsurprising to find that 
perfectionistic strivings is associated with negative interpretations as the very 
definition of clinical perfectionism includes both the striving for, and concerns about 
mistakes, in the definition of clinical perfectionism.  
These convergent findings across the two core constructs of perfectionism 
lend further support for the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism, 
which posits that a defining feature of those with clinical perfectionism is an 
increased tendency to formulate negative interpretations when presented with 
scenarios that involve perfectionistic beliefs (Shafran et al., 2002). The present 
results may also provide an explanation for the inconsistent findings observed 
between perfectionistic strivings and psychological distress (Bieling, Israeli, et al., 




strivings becomes a vulnerability factor if an individual also demonstrates an 
interpretation bias towards negative interpretations of scenarios. This explanation is 
plausible given that depression is characterised by biased interpretations of events 
(Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Yiend et al., 2013), 
and thus may help explain why perfectionistic strivings is a vulnerability factor for 
depression (Limburg et al., in press).   
Theoretical accounts help to explain the link between attention and 
interpretation and how biases in these processes may influence other cognitive 
processes (Beck & Clark, 1988, 1997; Shafran et al., 2002). For example, attending 
to negative, perfectionism-relevant information, may result in extensive elaboration 
of the meaning and implications of this information (Shafran et al., 2002). 
Elaboration of the negative, perfectionism-relevant information may lead to biased 
interpretations, whereby individuals expect negative, perfectionism-relevant 
information to be more likely, which may subsequently bias their interpretation of 
outcomes to be consistent with their attentional bias (Maoz et al., 2016; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2002; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Peschard & Philippot, 2016). It is 
plausible that once the information is elaborated, and there are biased interpretations 
of the negative, perfectionism-relevant stimuli originally attended to, this information 
may be easily stored within long-term memory, thus providing a clear reason why 
individuals may exhibit a negative bias in memory (Everaert et al., 2016). However, 
no studies, as far as the author is aware, has evaluated the link between memory 
biases and perfectionism, which should be explored in future research. 
The potential relationships between attention, interpretation, and memory 
biases is particularly plausible when the attention bias findings for perfectionistic 
concerns were considered. It is still possible that the findings for clinical 
perfectionism result in the same process. In this way, if individuals do not attend to 
perfectionism-relevant information that is indicative of positive outcomes (i.e., 
success or achievement) then this information may not be encoded in memory and 
therefore cannot be subsequently elaborated and recalled. Rather, as described in  the 
cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002), 
individuals who are high in clinical perfectionism may then recall occasions when 
the individual did not attain their goals, and subsequently make predictions based on 
these experiences. The present body of research did not aim to test these 




would therefore be informative to explore these predictions in future research to 
investigate the interactions and associations between cognitive processes. 
6.1.1. The implications for combined bias hypothesis. An interesting 
theoretical assumption within the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical 
perfectionism is that preferential allocation of attention towards negative information 
may then influence subsequent interpretations made about any given scenario 
(Shafran et al., 2010). The findings from the present research indicate that 
individuals with higher levels of perfectionism were more likely to interpret 
situations as having negative outcomes regardless of the measure of perfectionism 
used. These findings are consistent with what would be expected from participants 
who also demonstrate a selective attention towards negative, perfectionism-relevant 
stimuli, and a reduced attention bias to positive, perfectionism-relevant stimuli.  
The present thesis was not sufficiently powered to detect interactions between 
attention and interpretation biases. Furthermore, due to the nature of the two tasks 
there were a different number of factors involved with the attention task 
(perfectionism relevant vs. irrelevant; positive vs. negative) and interpretation task 
(affect vs. event outcomes; positive vs. negative; target vs. foil). This meant that 
these tasks could not be explored together in a single GLMM predictive model to 
determine whether perfectionism-relevant attention bias would predict subsequent 
interpretation bias.  
An important first step addressed in this thesis was to identify whether 
attentional and interpretational biases exist in perfectionism and, if so, the nature of 
these biases. It will be important for future perfectionism research to investigate how 
these biases may interact and influence each other to maintain psychological distress. 
The prediction that attention biases may influence subsequent information processes 
is not only based on theoretical accounts, but other studies that have tested the 
interactions between attention and interpretation cognitive processes and found that a 
negative attention bias can result in a congruent negative interpretation bias when 
depressive symptoms are considered (Everaert et al., 2016; Everaert et al., 2012; 
Everaert et al., 2013).  
The true value of the relationship between attentional bias and interpretation 
bias will critically depend on whether these biases make are causally linked to 
clinical perfectionism as suggested by Shafran et al. (2002; 2010). The findings from 




negative perfectionism-relevant information makes to interpretation bias towards 
negative interpretations, or the cognitions related to perfectionism. Future researchers 
should seek to address this issue. One way investigators could evaluate the influence 
of attention bias on interpretation bias is to modify attention bias and measure the 
impact of these modifications on subsequent interpretations to perfectionistic 
scenarios. Equally, given the likely reciprocal nature of these cognitive processes 
future research could experimentally manipulate an interpretive bias and then assess 
for any changes in attention bias. Evaluating the results of these manipulations of 
attention and interpretation, specifically how these manipulations influence other 
cognitive process, would allow experimenters to determine whether these cognitive 
processes influence each other equally or whether the strength of the relationship is 
further moderated by other cognitive processes (e.g., memory bias). Furthermore, the 
evaluation of the interaction of these cognitive processes could have direct 
implications for the causal role of cognitive biases in perfectionism.  
6.1.2. The implications for cognitive products in perfectionism. The 
cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism also predicts that, alongside 
the cognitive processes, individuals may engage with thoughts or experiences in a 
way that may maintain perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002; 2010). The present thesis 
evaluated two cognitive products, repetitive negative thinking and mental imagery, 
due to the potential impact these constructs have on behavioural and emotional 
responses, and their theoretical relationship with clinical perfectionism based on 
cognitive-behavioural conceptualisations of perfectionism (Egan, Wade, et al., 2014; 
Lee et al., 2011; Macedo et al., 2015; Shafran et al., 2010).  
The present findings indicated when someone is concerned about making 
mistakes and subsequent implications of those mistakes (i.e., perfectionistic 
concerns) they are more likely to experience repetitive negative thoughts that may 
result in increased experiences of psychological distress, which is consistent with 
previous research (Di Schiena et al., 2012; Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014; Macedo et 
al., 2015; Short & Mazmanian, 2013). This initial finding lends support for the 
cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2010), which 
posits that individuals may engage with repetitive thoughts about their own 
performance, often scrutinising the same scenario over and over, ultimately leading 
to psychological distress. Additionally, the finding that perfectionistic concerns was 




thoughts is also in line with evidence that consistently links maladaptive facets of 
perfectionism with a range of symptoms of psychopathology in both clinical and 
non-clinical samples (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Limburg et al., in press). 
Importantly for the cognitive-behavioural model, when mental imagery was 
included repetitive negative thinking no longer predicted psychological distress. 
Rather, perfectionistic concerns predicted increases in mental imagery that lead to 
increases in psychological distress. Mental imagery also had a stronger association 
with psychological distress than repetitive negative thinking did. The finding that 
mental imagery was a stronger predictor of psychological distress than repetitive 
negative thinking is consistent with previous theory and evidence (e.g., Borkovec et 
al., 2004; Holmes et al., 2008). Although the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical 
perfectionism identified that those with clinical perfectionism are more likely to 
engage with repetitive negative thinking, engagement with mental imagery has only 
been identified through interviews (e.g., Lee et al., 2011) and observation (Egan, 
Wade, et al., 2014). The finding that mental imagery is a powerful indirect pathway 
between perfectionism and psychological distress is consistent with Lee et al. (2011) 
finding that individuals with elevated perfectionism experience images that are 
distressing and difficult to dismiss. Importantly, this finding extends Lee et al.’s 
study by utilising a larger sample size (N = 397 vs. 59). The present findings extend 
upon previous research, which has not evaluated the relationships between 
perfectionism and psychological distress when both mental imagery and repetitive 
negative thinking were considered in the same model. The strong link between 
perfectionism and psychological distress via mental imagery may be a function of the 
nature of mental imagery. Mental imagery is defined as mental cognitions that 
engage with or contain sensory experiences (Horowitz, 1970), which can be 
experienced as thoughts, mental pictures or images, or physical sensations (Holmes, 
Arntz, et al., 2007). It may be difficult to disentangle the true effects of thoughts and 
mental imagery, when mental imagery is conceptualised as a broad multisensory 
experience that comprises visual, tactile, gustatory, auditory, and olfactory elements, 
and even verbal-linguistic elements. Nonetheless, the findings from this thesis 
strongly suggest that perfectionism is more strongly associated with multisensory 
mental imagery than repetitive negative thinking per se, and that multisensory mental 




The present thesis has implications for increasing our understanding about 
how clinical perfectionism may lead to negative outcomes. When individuals strive 
for a personally demanding standard and their self-worth is dependent on meeting 
their standard (i.e., clinical perfectionism), they are more likely to experience mental 
imagery. Interestingly, the findings indicated that when an individual strives for a 
personally demanding standard, and they did not base their self-worth on the 
attainment of these standards (i.e., personal strivings), they may be less likely to 
experience images.  
6.2. Strengths of the Present Thesis  
When considering the present thesis, several methodological strengths of the 
studies increase confidence in the reliability of the findings. With regards to the 
attention bias task, attention was measured through a modified dot-probe task, which 
provided an objective performance indicator (i.e., reaction time) that was not 
compromised by the demands or expectancy effects typically observed with self-
report (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Another strength of the attention bias study 
(presented in Chapter 3) was that the word stimuli presented across the attentional 
probe task were rated on the qualities of the stimuli (e.g., perfectionism-relevance 
and valence), by individuals who were not involved in the development of the task or 
generation of the word stimuli, from a larger pool of candidate words. Adopting this 
rating approach to stimuli development and subsequent use in the attention bias task 
ensured that the word stimuli used met the criteria required to achieve the study’s 
aims.  
The use of a modified dot-probe task also addresses limitations of previous 
research that used the emotional Stroop task. The emotional Stroop task assumes that 
a slowed reaction to colour naming is the result of biased attention towards the 
semantic meaning of the word (Algom et al., 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, 
the emotional Stroop task cannot distinguish between general behavioural freezing in 
response to stimuli, or attentional avoidance of the stimuli. The modified dot-probe 
paradigm used within the present thesis required participants to respond to a neutral 
probe (a sloping line to the left or right), which reduced concern that there may be 
slowed responding as a result of a response bias or general arousal (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). 
With regards to the interpretation bias task, interpretation was measured 




the interpretation bias study was the approach used to develop the task stimuli. 
Scenarios and interpretations were initially rated by the research team to determine 
the relevance to perfectionism. Only scenarios and interpretations judged to be 
highly relevant to perfectionism were used for subsequent rating procedures. The 
interpretations for each scenario were subsequently rated by individuals who were 
not involved in the development of the task or generation of the word stimuli to 
ensure that each interpretation met the critical criteria required to achieve the aims of 
the interpretation task (i.e., target vs. foil, negative vs. positive, affect vs. event).  
There are other methodological strengths for the interpretation bias task that 
required participant to later rate the similarity in meaning or likelihood of the 
scenario (Hirsch et al., 2016). Participants were required to rate both target and foil 
interpretations, which allowed for the evaluation of a general response bias (Hirsch et 
al., 2016). As the target and foil interpretations were rated equally across the 
different domains (negative vs. positive, affect vs. event), there can be confidence 
that the disproportionately greater responses on target test sentences relative to foil 
test sentences reflected specific perfectionism-related differences in interpretative 
processing, rather than a general perfectionism-related response bias. Furthermore, 
each participant was required to rate all test sentences independently rather than rank 
order the likelihood of one interpretation occurring over another. By removing the 
rank ordering of the interpretations, there are reduced demand, selection, and 
response bias effects as observed in other interpretation tasks, such as generating 
interpretations to open ended questions, sentence completion tasks, and scrambled 
sentence tasks (Hirsch et al., 2016).  
With regards to the evaluation of the relationship between perfectionism and 
psychological distress and whether it is explained, in part, by repetitive negative 
thinking and mental imagery, a strength was the use of structural equation modelling 
(Tomarken & Waller, 2005). The advantages of a structural equation model, over 
other methodologies such as standard or hierarchical regression models, is that it was 
able to specify the latent variables used from item level data, which allowed for 
modelling of measurement error not accounted for in other regression models. Not 
only were measurement models tested, but also the relationships between the 
constructs (MacCallum & Austin, 2000; Tomarken & Waller, 2005). Furthermore, 
given the larger sample size, the study was able to address a range of previously 




psychological distress have typically only focused on repetitive negative thinking 
(Egan, Hattaway, et al., 2014; Macedo et al., 2014; Macedo et al., 2015; O'Connor et 
al., 2007; Olson & Kwon, 2007), whilst no prior research has evaluated mental 
imagery as an indirect pathway between perfectionism and psychological distress. 
Furthermore, no prior study has evaluated the relative contribution of both repetitive 
negative thinking and mental imagery together as intermediate variables between 
perfectionism and psychological distress. 
Another strength of the present thesis is that previous research has not 
evaluated the relative contribution that different definitions of perfectionism have on 
the relationship between perfectionism and psychological distress. The present 
research considered the similarities between the overarching conceptualisation of 
multidimensional perfectionism and how perfectionistic concerns and perfectionistic 
strivings align with two fundamental features of the clinical perfectionism definition 
provided by Shafran et al. (2002). Although the conceptualisations aligned, the 
present thesis used a measure of perfectionistic concerns, perfectionistic strivings, 
and clinical perfectionism to determine which measure best accounted for 
psychological distress.  
6.3. Limitations of the Thesis  
Despite the strengths of the thesis, it is important to consider the findings 
within the context of its limitations. Participants were not recruited based on a 
clinical diagnosis, nor were any diagnostic interviews conducted. The aim for the 
present research was to provide an initial investigation of the cognitive processes 
involved in perfectionism, which have not been previously investigated.  As such the 
present findings may not generalise to clinical samples, yet future research should 
replicate these studies in clinical samples to answer these questions.  
The results indicated that there were perfectionism-relevant attention and 
interpretation biases, which were not due to a general response bias to emotional 
valence. It would be informative to know whether these perfectionism-relevant 
biases are distinguishable from attention and interpretation biases observed in 
clinical disorders such as, but not limited to, depression (Yiend, 2010; Yiend et al., 
2013), generalised anxiety (Amir, Beard, et al., 2009), social anxiety (Amir, Bomyea, 
& Beard, 2010; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998), and OCD (Amir, Najmi, & Morrison, 
2009; Williams & Grisham, 2013). If there are distinct perfectionism-relevant biases 




conceptualisation of clinical perfectionism as a plausible maintenance factor that 
may impede the treatment for these disorders. Another consideration for future 
research is given perfectionism is elevated and present in so many disorders, whether 
the construct has enough specificity to be discriminatory. It would also be 
informative, for future research to consider whether there were any overall 
differences in reaction time between those with higher levels of perfectionism and 
lower levels of perfectionism for both attention bias tasks, in addition to the reaction 
time to rate an interpretation in the interpretation bias tasks. Such information may 
also improve our understanding as to how quickly, on average, perfectionism is 
associated with a greater, or lower, response time to specific stimuli. 
Another consideration is that the cross-sectional nature of the studies 
included in this thesis precludes conclusions about causality or directionality of 
effects, which are better addressed in experimental and longitudinal designs. The 
causal relationships of attention and interpretation biases with clinical perfectionism 
were not able to be determined as there was no manipulation of either bias within this 
research. The manipulation of  perfectionism-relevant attention or interpretation 
biases, and the assessment of whether there is a subsequent attenuation of an 
individuals’ perfectionism, would not only confirm that attention and interpretation 
biases causally contribute to clinical perfectionism, but would also provide further 
evidence for the use of bias modification techniques as an alternative or potential 
adjunct to CBT for perfectionism. Additionally, the causal relationship of 
perfectionism leading to experiences of repetitive negative thinking or mental 
imagery, which subsequently lead to psychological distress, should be investigated in 
future prospective studies. 
The directionality of the relationship between attention and interpretation 
biases within clinical perfectionism was not able to be determined. Based on the 
information processing model (Beck & Clark, 1988, 1997) and the cognitive-
behavioural model of clinical perfectionism (Shafran et al., 2002), it is plausible that 
there are reciprocal interactions between the various attention and interpretation 
biases and subsequent cognitive products such as repetitive negative thinking and 
mental imagery. For example, negative interpretation of a conversation (e.g., critical 
evaluation of one’s work) with your boss may lead to preferential allocation of 
attention towards threatening information (e.g., focus on other signs of disapproval), 




repetitive negative thoughts (e.g., repetitive thoughts about failure). The repetitive 
images or thoughts may then drive the individual to attend to negative information 
that confirms the content of their thoughts, which ultimately lead to stronger, 
negative interpretations of potentially ambiguous information (e.g., being called into 
the boss’s office). 
While the reciprocal nature of cognitive biases is credible and many cognitive 
models assume that there is a link between various processes (c.f. Everaert et al., 
2012), there may also be other competing explanations that warrant consideration. 
For example, it could be that each cognitive process and product works in a 
unidirectional way, whereby each process or product influences the other in a single 
direction. In this sequence, initial attention preferences to threat, but not neutral or 
positive information, may impact on the subsequent interpretation of events, which 
consequently results in the development of distorted images. It is also possible that 
the biases operate concurrently, yet are independent from one another and are 
moderated by another variable. For example, attention and interpretation bias, and 
repetitive negative thinking or mental imagery may operate independently from one 
another, whilst a separate construct (e.g., perfectionism) moderates an attention bias 
to threat, negative interpretations and repetitive negative thoughts or mental imagery. 
For instance, an individual with higher clinical perfectionism may also demonstrate a 
stronger perfectionism-relevant attention and interpretation bias, and repetitive 
negative thinking or mental imagery, whereas an individual with lower clinical 
perfectionism may demonstrate a weaker perfectionism-relevant attention and 
interpretation bias, and repetitive negative thinking or mental imagery. The nature of 
how various cognitive processes and products collectively influence the development 
and maintenance of various psychological disorders or constructs should be 
investigated in future experimental studies (Everaert et al., 2016; Everaert et al., 
2012; Hirsch et al., 2006). 
A final consideration is the use of the same sample of participants across the 
studies concerning attention and interpretation biases. One advantage of adopting this 
approach is that attention and interpretation biases could be investigated without 
concern that there may be sampling differences that contributed towards differential 
effects. The use of the same sample allows for the control of systematic sampling 
differences across studies investigating these differences. However, a limitation of 




is unclear. It is important therefore to determine whether the effects observed in the 
present thesis can be replicated in other samples. 
6.4. Future Directions and Clinical Implications 
Future research evaluating the relationships between perfectionism, cognitive 
processes, cognitive products, and psychological distress, could not only improve 
theoretical understanding of perfectionism but could also be used to further develop 
interventions specific for perfectionism. The importance of improving our 
understanding of perfectionism in this context is clear when considering the relative 
impact that perfectionism has on disorder symptomatology and attenuation of 
treatment outcomes (Egan, Wade, et al., 2012). The main aim of CBT for 
perfectionism is to reduce an individual’s self-worth being contingent on the 
attainment of high personal standards, and to modify a range of associated 
maladaptive cognitions and behaviours (Shafran et al., 2010). It is important to note 
that the treatment itself does not specifically aim to reduce an individual’s standards. 
Additionally, CBT for perfectionism targets cognitive biases, such as attention bias, 
at the elaborative level of cognition (Egan, Wade, et al., 2014; Shafran et al., 2010) 
rather than earlier levels of processing. Future research could look at whether, as an 
adjunct to CBT for perfectionism, novel techniques such as CBM could facilitate 
changes at the elaborative level of cognition (Egan, Wade, et al., 2014; Shafran et al., 
2010).  
6.4.1. Cognitive bias modification. With attention and interpretative biases 
potentially operating to maintain perfectionism and associated psychological distress, 
and the significant impact they both have on subsequent emotional experiences, 
CBM techniques may be useful for reducing attentional and interpretation distortions 
as a stand-alone intervention, or to augment CBT for perfectionism. CBT has long 
aimed to reduce cognitive biases through a variety of techniques such as automatic 
thought disputation (Beck, 2011) or behavioural experiments (Bennett-Levy et al., 
2004), and CBM techniques may offer a viable alternative approach for targeting 
these processes. 
Studies have yielded promising results for attention CBM interventions for 
both GAD (Amir, Beard, et al., 2009) and social anxiety disorder (Schmidt, Richey, 
Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). Multi-session CBM treatment has yielded significant 
reductions in participants meeting diagnostic criteria compared to controls (see Amir, 




treatment and maintained at a 4-month follow-up (Schmidt et al., 2009). However, 
further research into whether CBM can be used therapeutically needs to be 
completed (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). 
The studies by Amir, Beard et al. (2009) and Schmidt et al. (2009) yielded 
moderate to large effect sizes that are comparable to CBT and pharmacological 
treatments, which is promising given the short duration of the interventions 
(generally four weeks), the limited time required to complete the computer tasks, and 
the absence of clinician contact (Amir, Beard, et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2009). The 
use of computerised interventions could be increasingly important to consider as a 
supplementary option due to the limited number of therapists available to offer 
treatments. Another benefit of CBM is that the treatment is easy to deliver via a 
computer-based interface and could reach clients who do not have access to face-to-
face therapy. However, the maintenance of therapeutic effects following CBM needs 
further research over a longer time period as research has typically only conducted a 
follow-up for a few months post-intervention (Amir, Beard, et al., 2009; Schmidt et 
al., 2009).  
Recently, research has started to explore multi-session interpretation bias 
modification treatments (Hoppitt et al., 2013; Lester, Mathews, Davison, Burgess, & 
Yiend, 2011; MacDonald, Koerner, & Antony, 2013; Micco, Henin, & Hirshfeld-
Becker, 2013; Salemink et al., 2014; Yiend et al., 2013). Early results are still mixed 
on the efficacy in creating change within depression (Micco et al., 2013; Yiend et al., 
2013), and anxiety disorders (Hayes et al., 2010; Salemink et al., 2014), in particular 
social anxiety (Hoppitt et al., 2013; Lester et al., 2011; MacDonald et al., 2013). 
These results suggest groups trained to interpret scenarios as benign or positive 
subsequently have more positive/neutral interpretations than respective control 
groups (Hayes et al., 2010; Salemink et al., 2014; Yiend et al., 2013). There have 
been inconsistent results regarding the benefit of CBM, with some studies indicating 
there is no significant difference between training and control groups (Micco et al., 
2013; Salemink et al., 2014; Yiend et al., 2013), and others finding significant 
benefits for those receiving active interpretation bias modification (Hoppitt et al., 
2013; MacDonald et al., 2013). The differences in findings are proposed to be a 
function of the time participants spend with the CBM and number of sessions, rather 
than the efficacy of various CBM techniques (Yiend et al., 2013), indicating further 




As cognitive theories highlight that these cognitive processes do not operate 
in isolation, Beard, Weisberg, and Amir (2011) explored a 4-week intervention that 
compared a combined CBM approach that modified both interpretation and attention 
biases to a placebo group. Effect sizes for the combined CBM approach were 
comparable to other CBT and pharmacological treatments for social anxiety. This 
particular study highlights an issue previously identified in a meta-analysis of CBM 
for anxiety and depression (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Hallion and Ruscio (2011) 
explained that many CBM paradigms only target one cognitive bias (i.e., attention or 
interpretation bias), even with evidence to suggest that there are a range of cognitive 
biases that may interact and amplify symptoms (Everaert et al., 2012; Everaert et al., 
2013; Hirsch et al., 2006). 
Despite the potential for CBM to provide a treatment that is easy to 
administer (Amir, Beard, et al., 2009; Amir et al., 2010), several studies have 
delivered CBM tasks that have not successfully achieved changes in biased attention 
or disordered symptomatology (Boettcher et al., 2013; Carlbring et al., 2012; 
Neubauer et al., 2013; Schoorl, Putman, & Van Der Does, 2013), and initial reviews 
suggested that CBM should not be further pursued (Emmelkamp, 2012). Clarke, 
Notebaert, and MacLeod (2014) however was critical of such disparate findings 
regarding CBM, in particular attention bias modification protocols. Clarke et al. 
(2014) reported that the studies finding that CBM did not observe changes in clinical 
symptomatology or significant differences in biased attention did not successfully 
alter the attention bias. Clarke et al. stated that “Without such a change in attention, a 
change in emotion therefore cannot be expected.” (p. 3). They concluded that the 
difficulty for studies to successfully achieve a modification of cognitive biases 
highlights variability within the field of research and, as such, CBM is not ready to 
be used as an adjunct treatment alongside CBT (Clarke et al., 2014).  
It is important to remember that the research into CBM as an adjunct 
treatment, although promising, is still in its infancy (Clarke et al., 2014; Hirsch et al., 
2016). There are CBM treatment studies that provide evidence that CBM may be a 
useful adjunct to CBT (Kuckertz et al., 2014; Riemann, Kuckertz, Rozenman, 
Weersing, & Amir, 2013; Shechner et al., 2014), while other studies suggest that 
CBM may not provide any additional benefit as an adjunctive treatment beyond the 
benefits CBT alone (Boettcher, Hasselrot, Sund, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2014; 




and interpretation biases, and therefore individuals who receive CBT may reach a 
ceiling effect that restricts the augmentation of therapeutic gains from CBM (Rapee 
et al., 2013).  
Given the potential benefits from CBM, it would be useful for future research 
to continue to evaluate the utility of CBM techniques. In particular, whether CBM 
techniques are able to independently reduce cognitive biases, or whether CBM 
techniques overlap with other standard cognitive-behavioural techniques such as 
exposure. Exposure is well established as a treatment for reducing threat appraisals 
for feared stimuli (Beck, 2011; Bennett-Levy et al., 2004). It is possible that the 
repeated exposure to threatening stimuli in CBM tasks serves as another form of 
exposure that may contribute to anxiety reduction (Kuckertz et al., 2014; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2016; Shechner et al., 2014). This may also highlight why CBM does not 
always augment the therapeutic gains of CBT (Boettcher et al., 2014; Rapee et al., 
2013; Waters et al., 2014). Hirsch et al. (2016) argued that although CBM and CBT 
may not result in better therapeutic gain, further investigation into CBM techniques 
could be useful, in particular at the beginning of psychotherapy. This is because at 
the beginning of psychotherapy, cognitive biases are often ingrained (Beck & Clark, 
1997; Beck, 2011), and CBT techniques are often effortful and taxing on an 
individual’s ability to remain focused on the task at hand (Hirsch et al., 2016). Hirsch 
et al. suggested that CBM, in particular CBM for interpretation, may be beneficial to 
promote more positive biases early in psychotherapy with less effort.  
Despite this evidence, the direct implications for CBM in perfectionism are 
less clear. Prior to the implementation of CBM protocols in perfectionism there are 
two fundamental questions that need to be answered, 1) does a change in attention 
bias (or interpretation bias) lead to changes in perfectionistic behaviours, and 2) can 
a change in attention bias (or interpretation bias) yield clinical benefits as an adjunct 
to treatment.  
Research into CBM has not yet been explored in perfectionism. If an 
evidence base for these underlying processes in perfectionism is developed, research 
could test whether the inclusion of CBM as an adjunct to CBT for perfectionism 
improves the efficacy of treatment. One way through which CBM may prove to be 
beneficial in a clinical setting would be to reduce the interference perfectionism has 
with treatment engagement (Pinto et al., 2017). Within a treatment setting, 




experiments or exposure to anxiety provoking situations (Pinto et al., 2017). 
Behavioural experiments and exposure is well established as a treatment for reducing 
threat appraisals for feared stimuli (Beck, 2011; Bennett-Levy et al., 2004). 
Providing an individual with the opportunity to use CBM to modify ingrained 
cognitive biases specific to perfectionism may reduce the barriers that perfectionism 
pose in therapeutic settings.  
Understanding the relative impact of CBM for biased attention or 
interpretation in perfectionism would also assist in the theoretical understanding of 
the maintaining factors within perfectionism and whether these can be addressed in 
treatment. With comparable effect sizes for CBM to more time-consuming and costly 
evidence-based treatments such as CBT, future research should evaluate CBM as a 
stand-alone treatment compared to CBT for perfectionism (Amir et al., 2010; Amir 
& Taylor, 2012; Hirsch et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2015). One consideration is that 
CBM is a relatively inexpensive, easy to administer therapeutic tool that may reduce 
emotional disturbance and dysfunctional attentional processes that maintain clinical 
perfectionism and other disorders. It is also important to consider that CBM does not 
require the same level of clinical training as CBT, which may prove useful for those 
who require a minimal support within a stepped care setting. Through exploring 
techniques that could be implemented easily in therapy for perfectionism, further 
gains may be observed in improving the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
perfectionism treatment. Thus, there is potential to significantly reduce a salient 
predisposing and maintaining factor of multiple disorders (Egan, Wade, et al., 2011).  
6.4.2. Mental imagery treatment.It is also possible that incorporating 
techniques that target mental imagery, such as imagery rescripting, could improve 
the efficacy of CBT for perfectionism (Egan, Wade, et al., 2014). The potential for 
mental imagery-based techniques to be a powerful tool in treatment is linked to the 
greater impact mental imagery has on emotional states than verbal processing 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Treatment for disorders using mental imagery is not a 
new concept. Aaron Beck’s description of cognition included mental imagery (Beck, 
2005; Beck, 2011; Edwards, 2007), and mental imagery has been used in treatment 
for PTSD and for exposure purposes in social anxiety disorder and OCD (Hackmann 
et al., 2011). Mental imagery rescripting helps individuals experience, process, and 
then manipulate negative emotions typically associated with distressing memories or 




disorders including PTSD, OCD, social anxiety disorder, eating disorders, and 
depression (Cooper et al., 2007; Holmes, Arntz, et al., 2007; McEvoy et al., 2015; 
McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014; Nilsson et al., 2012; Wheatley et al., 2007; Wild et al., 
2007). Mental imagery rescripting can reduce an individual’s perception of 
helplessness or victimisation, and can encourage positive mental imagery 
(Hackmann et al., 2011). Positive mental imagery can promote an individual’s sense 
of mastery, competence, and compassion (Hackmann et al., 2011). These 
improvements have been observed during 1-week, 1-month, 3-month and 12-month 
follow-ups (Wheatley et al., 2007; Wild et al., 2008).  
To date, no research has explored the efficacy of mental imagery treatment 
within perfectionism, which is important to consider given the impact mental 
imagery has on emotions and information processing (Egan, Wade, et al., 2014). It is 
possible that the integration of imagery-based techniques, such as mental imagery 
rescripting, into existing perfectionism treatments may reduce the negative and 
overwhelming experiences of individuals with clinical perfectionism (Lee et al., 
2011). There is evidence that imagery-based techniques could produce better 
outcomes when compared to verbal-based treatment that focused on the same key 
mechanisms such as, but not limited to, negative self-images, safety behaviours, and 
negative core beliefs (see McEvoy et al., 2015). However further evidence, such as 
that obtained from randomised controlled trials, on the efficacy of imagery-based 
techniques is required to better understand the clinical utility of incorporating mental 
imagery into CBT protocols (McEvoy et al., 2015; Nilsson et al., 2012; Wild & 
Clark, 2011; Wild et al., 2008).  
There have been many approaches to mental imagery techniques. Mental 
imagery has already been incorporated in group CBT programs for social anxiety 
with encouraging results. As such, mental imagery-based techniques could easily be 
transferred into the treatment of perfectionism (McEvoy et al., 2015; McEvoy & 
Saulsman, 2014). This is an area for future research highlighted by Egan, Wade, et 
al. (2014), yet it has not been evaluated and has received scant attention in the CBT 
for perfectionism treatment protocols to date. When perfectionism is considered, an 
individual may have previous experiences that give rise to the stringent standards 
they place upon themselves. For example, an individual may have been criticised by 
their family members on performances, pressured to succeed from loved ones or role 




(Egan, Wade, et al., 2014; Frost, Marten, et al., 1990; Shafran et al., 2002; Stoeber & 
Otto, 2006). These experiences may lead to images about what could happen if the 
individual did not achieve their standard. Mental imagery rescripting could be used 
to reinterpret a past experience that contributes to their current distress. During this 
process, an individual may initially imagine a memory where they were criticised 
(e.g., I was singled out by my teacher at the front of a class for getting a question 
wrong) and recount the image in the present tense as if it were happening now. 
Individuals may then be instructed to imagine the same scene, but this time as a 
bystander, and to discuss the scene and their reactions and thoughts from the 
perspective of their present self. From the bystander perspective, they could provide 
suggestions or intervene in a way that would make them feel comfortable and safe 
(e.g., I would tell myself that the teacher was wrong to do that, it was fine to make a 
mistake, or I would stop the teacher from picking on a young kid). After the 
individual intervenes in their image, the individual would then recount the 
experience from the eyes of their younger self (e.g., My teacher is starting to criticise 
me, but my adult self has comforted me and told my teacher off). Even if the image 
is not directly associated with a memory, it is still possible to rescript the image but 
perhaps without transitions through to a younger self. Throughout this process the 
therapist is attempting to help the client replace their distressing mental imagery with 
mental imagery that promotes mastery over, or coping with, the situation, or the 
client generates an image that is more compassion-based and promotes self-soothing.  
The clinical implications for both CBM and mental imagery methods move 
beyond improving CBT for perfectionism and also provide an avenue for therapists 
to target comorbid disorders. It is unusual for clinicians to observe clients without 
some level of comorbidity, which often leads to complex conceptualisations and 
difficulty implementing disorder-specific CBT programs (McHugh et al., 2009; 
Shafran et al., 2009). Comorbidity typically forces clinicians to face the dilemma of 
choosing one evidence-based practice over another, with the realisation that it may 
treat one condition (e.g., depression) yet have little impact on the comorbid 
conditions (e.g., OCD) (Craske, 2012). Complicating matters is that clinicians often 
have limited time, and are therefore unable to facilitate multiple interventions (Egan, 
Wade, et al., 2012). A transdiagnostic CBT intervention may provide a flexible 
treatment option for clinicians that can be used as a cost-effective treatment that can 




The importance of a transdiagnostic CBT intervention for perfectionism is 
highlighted when the way in which perfectionism can potentially impede the 
treatment of a disorder is considered. This may take the form of individuals 
experiencing difficulty completing a behavioural experiment as it may not be 
perceived to be of any value when it is not related to productivity or reaching their 
high standards. Treating perfectionism may help to reduce these barriers (Egan, 
Wade, et al., 2012; Egan, Wade, et al., 2014). As perfectionism is formulated to 
contribute to the development and maintenance of comorbid disorders, treatment 
may help reduce comorbidity through a targeted treatment of a shared maintaining 
factor (Egan, Wade, et al., 2012; Egan, Wade, et al., 2014). Perfectionism-targeted 
CBT has the potential to be an important transdiagnostic treatment target that could 
complement the emerging literature on other transdiagnostic approaches to treating 
comorbid emotional disorders (Andersen, Toner, Bland, & McMillan, 2016; Craske, 
2012; Egan, Wade, et al., 2011, 2012; Egan, Wade, et al., 2014; Farchione et al., 
2012; McEvoy et al., 2009; Norton et al., 2013; Reinholt & Krogh, 2014; Titov et al., 
2015).  
6.5. Conclusion 
Previous research has focused on the transdiagnostic nature of perfectionism 
and whether perfectionism specific treatments could reduce associated 
psychopathology. Despite the potential importance of perfectionism, the underlying 
assumptions of the cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism had not 
been tested. The overall aim of the thesis was to evaluate the relationship between 
perfectionism and two cognitive processes and cognitive products. Two key findings 
emerged from the thesis: (1) that clinical perfectionism is characterised by attention 
and interpretation biases, and (2) that clinical perfectionism is associated with 
repetitive negative thinking, and to a greater degree mental imagery, which 
subsequently can lead to greater psychological distress.  
The present thesis has increased our understanding of the information 
processing biases that operate within the construct of perfectionism. These findings 
provide support for the validity of Shafran et al.’s (2002) cognitive-behavioural 
model of clinical perfectionism and some of the underlying assumptions within the 
model. The findings also highlight the utility of further examination of these 
cognitive constructs within clinical populations and in perfectionism treatments. For 




interventions that focus on mental imagery in perfectionism rather than verbal-
linguistic processing, warrant further consideration. If there can be improvements in 
the way perfectionism is understood from an information processing perspective, 
there could be further refinement of the CBT techniques designed to improve biased 
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Positive and negative valence
Perfectionism relevance
a b s t r a c t
Background and objectives: Maladaptive perfectionism has been identified as a predisposing and
perpetuating factor for a range of disorders, including eating, anxiety, and mood disorders. An influential
model of perfectionism, put forward by Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002), proposes that high
perfectionism reflects an attentional bias that operates to afford greater attention to negative informa-
tion than to positive information, when this information is perfectionism-relevant. The present study is
the first to experimentally test this hypothesis..
Method: The present study assessed the type of stimuli that high perfectionists (n ¼ 31) preferentially
attend to compared to low perfectionists (n ¼ 25) within a non-clinical population. Using an attentional
probe task, we compared high and low perfectionist attentional responding to stimulus words that
differed in terms of their emotional valence (positive vs. negative) and perfectionism-relevance
(perfectionism-relevant vs. eirrelevant).
Results: Analysis revealed that, unlike low perfectionists, high perfectionists displayed greater atten-
tional preference to negative than to positive information, but only for perfectionism-relevant stimuli..
Limitations: The implications must be considered within the limitations of the present study. The present
study did not assess clinical participants, as such conclusions cannot be made regarding attentional bias
that characterize clinical disorders in which perfectionism is identified as a predisposing and perpetu-
ating factor.
Conclusions: Theoretically, the attentional dot-probe task lends weight to the cognitive-behavioral model
of clinical perfectionism, which proposed a biased attentional processing of negative perfectionism
relevant stimuli within perfectionism. This conclusion was previously based on clinical impressions,
whereas the present study used an objective performance measure. Clinically, therapists should take this
attentional bias into account when planning treatments that involve targeting perfectionism..
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Clinical perfectionism has been defined as the pursuit of
perfection and basing self-worth on achievement, despite adverse
consequences (Shafran, Cooper, & Fairburn, 2002). This definition
of perfectionism has been central to the development of cognitive-
behavioral treatments (CBT) for perfectionism, which have been
found to be effective in reducing perfectionism, anxiety and
depression (for a review see Lloyd, Schmidt, Khondoker, &
Tchanturia, 2015). Perfectionism has been identified as a predis-
posing and perpetuating factor for eating, anxiety, and mood dis-
orders and is associated with poorer treatment outcomes for these
disorders (Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011). Perfectionism has been
proposed to be a transdiagnostic process that underpins numerous
psychological disorders (Egan et al., 2011) and this transdiagnostic
nature of perfectionism may contribute to the high rates of co-
morbidity among psychological disorders (Bieling, Summerfeldt,
Israeli, & Antony, 2004; Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2012).
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Consequently, targeting perfectionism may be an efficient way of
treating multiple psychological disorders (Egan et al., 2011). This
study aims to evaluate the hypothesis that selective attention,
which is a type of attentional bias, is a maintaining mechanism of
clinical perfectionism. A focus on changing unhelpful patterns of
selective attention is already a component of cognitive behavior
therapy (CBT) for perfectionism (e.g., Egan, Wade, Shafran, &
Antony, 2014), yet little research has examined the role of selec-
tive attention in perfectionism. Examining the role of selective
attention in perfectionism in an experimental study may be helpful
in confirming the need to target selective attention in CBT for
perfectionism. Furthermore, this may help determine if additional
approaches that can change selective attention, such as attention
bias modification (ABM), may be a useful adjunct to CBT for
perfectionism in the future.
A cognitive-behavioral model of clinical perfectionism was first
proposed by Shafran et al. (2002), and later updated by Shafran,
Egan, and Wade (2010). Shafran et al. (2002) postulated that in-
dividuals high in clinical perfectionism set excessively high stan-
dards for themselves, and base their self-worth on meeting these
standards. Shafran et al. (2002) put forward the hypothesis, based
on clinical observation, that perfectionism that is clinically relevant
is maintained in part by a particular form of attentional bias.
Attentional bias can be broadly defined as a systematic tendency to
preferentially allocate attention towards specific types of infor-
mation (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, &
Van, 2007). Information can be considered perfectionism-relevant
when it concerns the evaluation of performance, and
perfectionism-irrelevant when it bears no relationship to perfor-
mance standards. Such information can be further subdivided ac-
cording to whether it is negative in emotional tone or positive in
emotional tone. Thus, negative perfectionism-relevant information
would concern failure and criticism, whereas positive
perfectionism-relevant information would concern success and
praise. Shafran et al. (2002) proposed that people with high levels
of clinical perfectionism, but not those with low levels of clinical
perfectionism, allocate greater attention to negative perfectionism-
relevant information than to positive perfectionism-relevant in-
formation. Shafran et al.’s proposition is consistent with early
clinical impressions of perfectionism, such as that put forward by
Hollander (1965), who stated that the perfectionist “looks so
intently for defects or flaws that he lives his life as though he were
an inspector at the end of a production line.” (p. 95). According to
Shafran and colleagues, because this attentional bias increases the
processing of negative perfectionism-relevant information, relative
to positive perfectionism-relevant, it gives rise to cognitive distor-
tions such as overgeneralizing failure, and discounting of success
(Egan et al., 2011; Shafran et al., 2010).
Shafran et al.’s (2002) proposal has guided the development of
therapeutic interventions for perfectionism. CBT for perfectionism
includes treatment components that are specifically designed to
alter patterns of biased attentional responding to negative
perfectionism-relevant information (Egan, Wade, et al., 2014). To
date, however, no study has directly tested the key prediction
generated by Shafran et al.’s theoretical position that individuals
high in clinical perfectionism, but not those low in perfectionism,
will display an attentional bias towards negative perfectionism-
relevant information compared to positive perfectionism-relevant
information. Importantly, if the prediction regarding selective
attention were to be confirmed, then this would support the ther-
apeutic value of including such components in CBT for perfec-
tionism. Alternatively, if this prediction were not to be confirmed,
then this would suggest that future research would be useful to
determine the most effective components of CBT for perfectionism
through examining alternative mechanisms of change.
Only one study to date has compared attentional bias in people
who score high and low in perfectionism, and while the results of
this study are encouraging, interpretation of its findings is con-
strained by limitations associated with the adopted methodology.
Specifically, in this study, Kobori and Tanno (2012) screened 243
undergraduate students on the self-oriented perfectionism sub-
scale of the Hewitt and Flett Multidimensional Perfectionism scale
(HMPS; Hewitt & Flett, 1991). They compared the performance of
those who scored in the top 25% (high perfectionism) and who
scored those in the bottom 25% (low perfectionism) on an
emotional Stroop task that required them to color name negative
perfectionism-relevant words (e.g., failure, flaw, imperfection) and
neutral words unrelated to perfectionism (e.g., air, temperature,
printer). Kobori and Tanno assumed that when participants'
attentionwas captured by word content, then their color naming of
these words would be slowed. The high perfectionism group took
significantly longer than the low perfectionism group to color name
the negative perfectionism-relevant words, whereas the groups did
not differ in their color naming latencies for the neutral
perfectionism-irrelevant words. Although Kobori and Tanno's
findings are consistent with the possibility that people high in
perfectionism may attend disproportionately to negative
perfectionism-relevant information, two limitations prevent the
study from adequately testing Shafran et al.'s (2002) hypothesis.
The first limitation concerns Kobori and Tanno's use of the
emotional Stroop task to assess attentional bias, while the second
limitation concerns the nature of the stimulus words used in their
study. Each limitation will be considered in turn.
There has been compelling criticism of the assumption that
slowing to color name particular words on the emotional Stroop
task permits the conclusion that attention is being drawn to the
content of such words (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Bar-Haim et al.,
2007; Macleod, Mathews,& Tata, 1986). As critics have pointed out,
some participants may display general response slowing in the
presence of certain information, reflecting behavioral freezing,
without this involving greater attention to the content of that in-
formation. Moreover, critics also have noted that, even if an
attentional bias is implicated in slowing to color name certain
words, this could just as readily involve attentional avoidance of
these particular colored word as attentional vigilance to the se-
mantic content of these words (Lavy & van den Hout, 1994). Such
concerns have led researchers to advocate the use of attentional
assessment tasks that more clearly index the distribution of se-
lective attention between the differing information of interest. The
most widely used approach for achieving this is the attentional
probe task, in which pairs of words, with their members differing
on the dimension of interest, are briefly exposed on a computer
screen, and participants must discriminate small probe stimuli that
then appear in the locus where either word was shown. Degree of
speeding to discriminate probes that appear in the locus of one
category of words, relative to those that appear in the locus of the
other category of words, indicates that attention was preferentially
allocated to the former type of words compared to the latter
(Grafton & Macleod, 2014; Grafton, Watkins, & MacLeod, 2012;
Macleod et al., 1986). The use of this attentional probe methodol-
ogy would permit more rigorous testing of the hypothesis that high
perfectionism, unlike low perfectionism, is characterized by greater
selective attention to failure related than success related informa-
tion. This will be the attentional assessment approach adopted in
the present study.
The second limitation of Kobori and Tanno (2012) study is that it
compared only negative perfectionism-relevant words and neutral
perfectionism-irrelevant words. The restriction of consideration to
these two categories of stimulus words precludes conclusions
concerning whether high perfectionism, but not low perfectionism,
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is characterized by greater attention to negative perfectionism-
relevant information than to positive perfectionism-relevant in-
formation. Kobori and Tanno claim to have shown that high per-
fectionists attend more than do low perfectionists to negative
perfectionism-relevant information, whereas this is not the case
for neutral perfectionism-irrelevant information. However, this
effect could result from high perfectionists showing an attentional
bias shown to all negative information, regardless of whether or not
this information is related to perfectionism. The effect may also
result from high perfectionists showing an attentional bias to all
perfectionism-relevant information regardless of whether or not
this information is negative in emotional valence. To adequately
test the hypothesis that elevated perfectionism is characterized by
greater attention to negative perfectionism-relevant information
than to positive perfectionism-relevant information, it is vitally
important to include negative and positive words, some of which
are perfectionism-relevant (e.g., inept/exceptional) and some of
which are perfectionism irrelevant (e.g., attack/fun), when assess-
ing the patterns of attentional bias that characterize heightened
perfectionism.
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate the nature
of attentional bias in perfectionism while addressing the limita-
tions of previous research. The attentional probe approach was
employed to compare the patterns of attentional selectivity
exhibited by high and low perfectionists. The physical and temporal
parameters we adopted in our current probe task were based on
those employed in studies that have used this approach to inves-
tigate the attentional basis of anxiety vulnerability (c.f. Bar-Haim
et al., 2007). Importantly, our stimulus material included both
emotionally negative and emotionally positive words, with half of
the words of each emotional category being perfectionism-relevant
and the other half being perfectionism-irrelevant. Using such a
design enabled us to test the critical prediction based on Shafran
et al.’s (2002) model of perfectionism that participants high in
perfectionism, but not those low in perfectionism, will exhibit
greater attention to negative than to positive information, but only
when this information is perfectionism-relevant. The rationale for
the study is that if selective attention is shown to be related to
perfectionism then this would support its role as a maintaining
factor as proposed by Shafran et al. (2002), support the focus on
selective attention in CBT for perfectionism, and suggest that future
research may examine if it is useful to modify selective attention
through paradigms such as ABM in addition to existing methods
used in CBT for perfectionism.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Groups of participants who were high and low in perfectionism
were required. Previous research investigating the association be-
tween biased patterns of attentional selectivity and individual
difference dimensions, such as anxiety and depression, have re-
ported effect sizes in the moderate-large range (c.f. Bar-Haim et al.,
2007; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Assuming an effect size of
a similar magnitude in the present study, an a priori-power analysis
using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed
that approximately 50 participants (25 in each perfectionism
group) would be required to detect a such an effect (power ¼ .8,
two-tailed alpha ¼ .05).
Our criteria for classifying individuals as high in perfectionism
were guided by prior CBT treatment studies that included a cut off
for elevated perfectionism of 24.7 on the Concern over Mistakes
(CM) subscale of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale
(FMPS; Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990) (e.g., Egan, van
Noort et al., 2014; Handley, Egan, Kane, & Rees, 2015). This score
was based on the average CM score of anxiety disorder samples
included in a review by Egan et al. (2011). Low perfectionists were
defined as a cut-off of 18.5 on CM, which was the average CM
score of control participants in the Egan et al. (2011) review.
Seventy-six participants were recruited from the community
through flyers placed at a University, and local newspaper and ra-
dios ads, were screened. A total of 25 (17 males, 8 females) and 31
(11 males, 20 females) met criteria for the low and high perfec-
tionism groups, respectively and took part in the study (see
Table 1). A chi-square test of goodness of fit (a ¼ .05) revealed that
gender did not differ between the groups, c2 (3, N ¼ 56) ¼ 6.43,
p ¼ .09, F ¼ .006. As can be seen in Table 1, the two groups did not
differ in age, depression, anxiety, and stress scores. Participants in
the high perfectionism group had significant higher scores
perfectionism than the low perfectionism group.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Questionnaires
2.2.1.1. Concern over mistakes (Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism
Scale). (CM; Frost et al., 1990). Concern over Mistakes (CM) is seen
as a core component of clinical perfectionism and is highly corre-
lated with a measure of clinical perfectionism (Egan, Shafran, et al.,
2014); hence, it was chosen to measure perfectionism in the pre-
sent study. The CM subscale of the FMPS consists of nine items
assessing concern about making errors. Individuals respond using a
5-point Likert-type scale with higher scores indicating higher
perfectionism. The CM subscale has good test-retest reliability, and
construct validity (Egan et al., 2011). Internal consistency in this
study was high (a ¼ .85).
2.2.1.2. Depression, anxiety and stress Scale-21. (DASS-21; Lovibond
& Lovibond, 1995). This 21-item scale was administered to check
whether high- and low-perfectionism groups differed in anxiety,
depression or stress, and if so control for this potential confound as
attentional responding to emotional information differs as a func-
tion of anxiety and depression (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Harvey,
Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). Respondents rate items
describing emotional symptoms over the past week on a 4-point
Likert type scale. The DASS-21 has strong concurrent and
discriminant validity (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998).
Internal consistencies for were high in this study for depression
(a ¼ .87), anxiety (a ¼ .77), and stress (a ¼ .79).
2.2.2. Stimulus words
The attentional probe task allowed for the assessment of
attentional preferences for the word members of a word/non-word
pair, which was determined by comparing speeding to discriminate
probes presented in the locus of the word, compared to probes
presented in the locus of the non-word. We were interested in the
degree to which attentional preference to words differed across the
following four categories of experimental words: 1) negatively
valenced and perfectionist-irrelevant (e.g., attack, intimidated,
lonely), 2) negatively valenced and perfectionist-relevant (e.g.,
failure, inept, insufficient), 3) positively valenced and perfectionist-
irrelevant (e.g., gregarious, fearless, fun), 4) positively valenced and
perfectionist-relevant (e.g., excel, success, exceptional). To select
these words, we first created a pool of 200 candidate stimulus
words, and had these rated by 6 psychology graduates on two di-
mensions. Raters assessed the degree to which each word was
perfectionism-relevant using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging
from 3 (extremely perfectionist-relevant) to þ3 (extremely
perfectionist-irrelevant). To help guide these judgments, the raters
were provided Shafran et al. (2002) definition of perfectionism i.e.,
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“the over dependence of self-evaluation on the determined pursuit
(and achievement) of self-imposed personally demanding, stan-
dards of performance in at least one salient domain, despite the
occurrence of adverse consequences” (p. 773). The raters also
assessed the emotional valence of each word using a 7-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 3 (extremely negative) to þ3 (extremely
positive), where the mid-point (0) was identified as emotionally
neutral.
Using these ratings we selected 16 words in each of the four
categories listed above. Thus, half of the 64wordswere emotionally
negative and half were emotionally positive, giving rise to a Stim-
ulus Emotional Valence factor. Half of each emotional subtype were
perfectionism-relevant while half were perfectionism-irrelevant,
giving rise to a Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance factor. A two-
way ANOVA, considering the Stimulus Emotional Valence factor
and the Stimulus Perfectionism-Relevance factor, was carried out
on the emotional valence ratings given to the selected words by the
independent raters. There was a significant main effect of the
Stimulus Emotional Valence factor, reflecting as required more
negative valence ratings for words in the negative subset than for
words in the positive subset; F(1,60) ¼ 1470.00, p < .01, ƞ2 ¼ .961
(negative valenced stimuli M ¼ 2.47, SD ¼ .51; positive valenced
stimuli M ¼ 2.34, SD ¼ .48). There was no significant main effect of
the Stimulus Perfectionism-Relevance factor, F(1,60) ¼ .001, ns,
ƞ2 < .001, and no interaction between the two factors,
F(1,60) ¼ .248, ns, ƞ2 ¼ .004. Thus, the selected perfectionism-
relevant and perfectionism-irrelevant words did not differ in
terms of average of emotional valence. When an equivalent ANOVA
was carried out on the perfectionism-relevance ratings this
revealed the required significant main effect of the Stimulus
Perfectionism-Relevance factor, reflecting higher perfectionism-
relevance ratings for words in the perfectionism-relevant subset
than for words in the perfectionism-irrelevant subset;
F(1,60)¼ 1069.36, p < .01, ƞ2 ¼ .947 (perfectionism-relevant stimuli
M ¼ 2.34, SD ¼ .48; perfectionism-irrelevant stimuli M ¼ 2.50,
SD ¼ .67). There was no significant main effect of the Stimulus
Emotional Valence factor, F(1,60) ¼ .045, ns, ƞ2 ¼ .001, and no
interaction between the two factors, F(1,60) ¼ .401, ns, ƞ2 ¼ .007.
Thus, negative and positive words did not differ in terms of average
perfectionism-relevance.
Additional ANOVAs were carried out on word length (expressed
as numbers of letters per word), and frequency (according to the
norms of Brysbaert & New, 2009). No significant effects emerged
from either ANOVA (all F < 3.40, p > .05), indicating that word
length and frequency did not differ as a function of emotional
valence or perfectionism-relevance.
Finally, 32 emotionally neutral perfectionism irrelevant words
were selected for use in baseline trials. The emotional valence
ratings for these 32 words ranged from 1 to 1 with a mean of .03,
which did not differ significantly from the emotionally neutral
midpoint of zero, t(1, 31) ¼ .37, p ¼ .71, d ¼ .10. The perfectionism
relevance ratings of thesewords ranged from1 to3with amean
of 2.53, which did not differ significantly from the mean rating
given to the perfectionism-irrelevant stimuli in the main set of 64
emotional words, t(1,31) ¼ .23, p ¼ .81, d ¼ .06.
2.2.3. Apparatus
A Dell Latitude E6530 laptop with a 17-inch color monitor, and a
standard two-button mouse, was employed to present stimuli and
to record participant responses, and the attentional assessment
task was presented in E-Prime v2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, &
Zuccolotto, 2012).
2.3. Experimental task
2.3.1. Attention probe task
The attentional probe task used to assess selective attention
delivered 384 trials, across which each stimulus word was exposed
a total of 4 times, with presentation order randomized. Each trial
beganwith a fixation display, followed 1150 ms later by the 500 ms
exposure of one of the stimulus letter string pairs. One of the letter
strings appeared just above and one just below the center of the
screen, with the two letter strings separated vertically by 3 cm. The
word member of the pair appeared in the upper or lower screen
location with equal frequency across trials. Immediately after the
letter strings disappeared, a small visual probe appeared in either
one of the two screen positions where a letter string had just been
shown. This probe appeared equally often in the upper and lower
screen location. Thus, on 50% of trials the probe appeared where
theword had just been presented, while on 50% of trials it appeared
where the nonword had just been presented. The probewas a small
gray line that sloped upwards either right or left. Participants were
required to make a discriminative response based on the direction
of this slope, as soon as they processed the probe. The participant's
latency to accurately make this probe discrimination response was
the dependent variable of interest.
Speeding to discriminate those probes that appeared in the lo-
cus of thewords, relative to probes that appeared in the locus of the
nonwords, indicated degree of increased attention to the word
member of each pair. Using the equation below, we computed for
each participant an index of the degree to which greater attention
was paid to each of the four experimentally critical word types (i.e.
emotionally negative perfectionism-relevant, emotionally negative
perfectionism irrelevant, emotionally positive perfectionism-
relevant, emotionally positive perfectionism-irrelevant),
compared to the baseline words. A higher index score reflects
greater attentional preference for that target word subtype.
Attentional Preference for Target Word Subtype
X¼ (discrimination latency for probes in locus of nonword paired
with target word subtype X e discrimination latency for probes in
locus of target word subtype X) e (discrimination latency probes in
locus of nonword paired with baseline word e discrimination la-
tency for probes in locus of baseline word).
2.4. Procedure
The research was approved by the Curtin University Human
Research Ethics Committee (approval number HR88/2012). Partic-
ipants were tested individually and provided informed consent
before completing the FMPS and DASS-21. The participant was
seated approximately 60 cm from the computer screen, and the
Table 1
Participant characteristics (means, with standard deviations in parentheses).
Low perfectionism (n ¼ 25) High perfectionism (n ¼ 31) Group difference t(1, 54) p Effect size (Cohen's d)
Age 26.08 (11.23) 28.48 (10.25) .80 .43 .22
CM subscale 15.92 (1.77) 28.86 (3.46) 18.21 <.001 4.71
DASS-21 (depression) 1.48 (1.71) 1.81 (1.14) .85 .40 .23
DASS-21 (anxiety) 2.80 (2.90) 2.97 (3.124) .18 .86 .06
DASS-21 (stress) 5.60 (4.03) 6.08 (3.12) .61 .74 .13
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requirements of the probe task were provided in verbal andwritten
form. The instructions emphasized the need to discriminate the
probe slope as quickly as possible, and to respond without delay as
soon as probe slope was accurately identified. A brief practice
period (16 trials) was completed using a separate set of neutral
stimuli. Participants then completed the attentional probe task,
before being debriefed about the purpose of the study.
3. Results
Participants displayed a high level of accuracy on the probe task,
averaging less than 7% errors. Accuracy rates did not differ between
the two perfectionism groups, F(1, 58) 1.65, p ¼ .20, ƞ2 ¼ .02, (High
perfectionism group, M ¼ 93.27, SD ¼ 6.44; low perfectionism
group, M ¼ 95.04, SD ¼ 2.88). Prior to computing the attentional
preference indexes, outlier probe discrimination latency scores
(defined as those falling > 2.58 SD from each participant's mean
probe discrimination latency) were removed. This resulted in
exclusion of 5.32% of latencies. Attentional preference index scores
were then computed as shown in Table 2.
These attention preference index scores were subjected to a
Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM), that included partici-
pants as a random factor, and the following three fixed factors:
Perfectionism Group (high perfectionism vs. low perfectionism);
Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance (perfectionist-relevant vs.
perfectionistic-irrelevant words); and Stimulus Emotional Valence
(negative words vs. positive words). Perfectionism Group was a
between-groups factor while Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance,
and Stimulus Emotional Valence were within-groups factors.
GLMM was used in preference to the traditional ANOVA approach
because it better accommodates violations concerning normality,
linearity, and homogeneity of variance (Stroup, 2012). The findings
obtained using GLMM were equivalent to those found using
ANOVA.
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Stimulus
Emotional Valence, reflecting higher attentional preference index
scores for emotionally negative words (M ¼ 33.95, SD ¼ 159.49)
than for emotionally positive words (M ¼ 9.59, SD ¼ 170.83),
F(1,455) ¼ 11.34, p ¼ .001, ƞ2 ¼ .024. However, importantly, this
main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction be-
tween Stimulus Perfectionism Relevance Stimulus Emotional
Valence, F(1,455) ¼ 4.50, p ¼ .034, ƞ2 ¼ .009, which was further
subsumed within a higher order interaction involving all three
factors, F(1,455) ¼ 9.43, p < .01, ƞ2 ¼ .020. The presence of this
three-way interaction indicates that the relative impact of perfec-
tionism group on attentional preference for negative information
compared to attentional preference for positive information
differed depending on the relevance of such information to
perfectionism. Hence, we sought to determine whether the specific
nature of this higher order interaction was in line with our exper-
imental predictions.
Specifically, we computed the significance of the component
simple two-way interactions of Perfectionism Group Stimulus
Emotional Valence was calculated at each level of the Stimulus
Perfectionism Relevance factor. Consistent with the hypothesis
under test, the simple interaction was not significant when stimuli
were perfectionism-irrelevant, F (1,228) ¼ 2.98, p ¼ .09, ƞ2 ¼ .013,
but was significant when stimuli were perfectionism relevant, F
(1,228) ¼ 5.96, p ¼ .015, ƞ2 ¼ .025.
Fig. 1 illustrates the two way interaction of Perfectionism
Group Stimulus Emotional Valence, observed for perfectionism
relevant stimulus materials alone. As can be seen in Fig. 1, the na-
ture of this simple two-way interaction was completely consistent
with predictions. Specifically, for these perfectionism-relevant
stimuli alone, participants with high perfectionism displayed
higher significantly higher attentional preference scores for nega-
tive words than for positive words (M ¼ 62.45, SD ¼ 142.78 vs
M ¼ 38.47, SD ¼ 181.70, respectively), t(1,228) ¼ 3.76, p < .001,
95% CI [48.08, 153.76], d ¼ .62, while those with low perfectionism
did not (M ¼ .51, SD ¼ 137.43 vs M ¼ 20.85, SD ¼ 155.85, respec-
tively), t(1,228) ¼ 1.06, p ¼ .29, 95% CI [-17.61, 58.29], d ¼ .13. Thus,
unlike participants with low perfectionism, those with high
perfectionism exhibited greater attention to negative than to pos-
itive information, but only when this information was perfec-
tionism-relevant.
4. Discussion
This study is the first to test the prediction, generated by Shafran
et al.’s (2002) model of clinical perfectionism, that peoplewith high
levels of perfectionism, unlike those with low levels of perfec-
tionism, preferentially allocate greater attention to negative infor-
mation compared to positive information, but only when this
information is perfectionism-relevant. Consistent with this hy-
pothesis, our findings indicate that only participants who scored
high in perfectionism exhibited greater attention to negative than
to positive information, and this pattern of attentional selectivity
was evident only when this information was perfectionism-
relevant.
The present demonstration of a perfectionism-linked atten-
tional bias has an important theoretical implication. Most obvi-
ously, it lends weight to the cognitive-behavioral model of clinical
perfectionism, which proposes that biased attentional processing
of negative perfectionism-relevant information plays an important
role in the development and perpetuation of perfectionism
(Shafran et al., 2002, 2010). This contention has been based only on
the clinical impressions of therapists concerning the patterns of
selective attention they infer from clinical interactions with in-
dividuals identified as perfectionists, and on patient self-reports
concerning their attentional processing (Glover, Brown, Fairburn,
& Shafran, 2007). As pointed out elsewhere, self-report measures
of cognitive processes are notoriously inaccurate, and so cannot
permit confident conclusions concerning such processes (MacLeod,
1993; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In the present study we used an
objective performance measure, rather than subjective self-report
measures, to infer attentional bias. Thus, our approach can
Table 2
Mean attentional bias index scores (and SD) obtained on attentional probe task.
Perfectionism Group Stimulus Perfectionism-Relevance
Perfectionism-irrelevant Perfectionism-relevant
Stimulus Emotional Valence
Positive words Negative words Positive words Negative words
High Perfectionist 26.101 (175.67) 16.701 (130.31) 38.47 (181.70) 62.45 (142.78)
Low Perfectionist 3.614 (118.28) 44.11 (141.49) 00.51 (137.43) 20.85 (155.85)
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provide greater confidence in the veracity of the prediction,
generated by Shafran and colleagues' cognitive-behavioral model of
clinical perfectionism, that high levels of perfectionism are char-
acterized by greater attention to negative than to positive infor-
mation, when perfectionism-relevant.
Our findings also have applied importance. In recent years,
novel cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) interventions for perfec-
tionism have been developed. CBT for perfectionism involves
treatment components specifically designed to alter biased pat-
terns of selective attention to negative perfectionism-relevant in-
formation and this has been found to be effective in reducing
perfectionism, anxiety, depression and eating disorders (e.g., Egan
& Hine, 2008; Egan, van Noort et al., 2014; Glover et al., 2007;
Handley et al., 2015; Riley, Lee, Cooper, Fairburn, & Shafran, 2007;
Shafran et al., 2010; Steele & Wade, 2008; Steele et al., 2013).
Attention broadening techniques have been used to reduce selec-
tive attention in clinical perfectionism. For example, Shafran et al.
(2010) described a client who had selective attention to flaws in a
cake she produced for a dinner party and thought the whole night
was ruined and that she was a failure. The client was encouraged to
broaden her attention and consider evidence that others com-
mented the food was excellent, and to shift her attention to
external factors such as engaging in conversation, and noticing the
details of a friend's shirt color. Egan, Wade, et al. (2014) also pro-
vided the example of asking a client how itchy their scalp is and
then asking them to rate it, then asking the client to concentrate on
the itchiness of their head and to close their eyes and focus on their
scalp, and then re-rate the itchiness, resulting in a higher rating and
thus a demonstration of how powerful selective attention can be.
Behavioral experiments are idiosyncratic to the individual, for
example if a student had selective attention to long pauses or
saying ‘um’ too much in public speaking, they could engage in a
behavioral experiment where they compare their results in class
presentations and the degree of engagement of classmates in the
presentation after purposely making more perceived flaws through
pauses and saying ‘um’ more often.
Ultimately, however, the therapeutic value of these components
in CBT will critically depend upon whether this attentional bias
makes a causal contribution to clinically relevant perfectionism, as
argued by Shafran et al. (2002; 2010). The results of the current
study cannot determine whether the attentional bias to negative
perfectionism-relevant information makes a functional contribu-
tion to the symptoms of perfectionism. Future researchers should
seek to address this issue. One way in which investigators could
appraise the causal role of such attentional bias in contributing to
heightened perfectionism would be to assess attentional bias to
negative perfectionism-relevant information immediately before,
and immediately after, CBT treatment for perfectionism. Of course,
such attentional bias may be a consequence of heightened perfec-
tionism, inwhich case reductions in perfectionism produced by CBT
would be expected to mediate reductions of this attentional bias
over the course of treatment. However, if attentional bias to
negative perfectionism-relevant information plays a causal role in
perfectionism, then the reduction of this attentional bias over the
course of treatment would instead be expected to mediate the
attenuation of perfectionism.
Another way in which investigators could interrogate the causal
involvement of this attentional bias in perfectionism would be to
employ appropriately designed variants of ABM procedures. The
ABM approach involves exposing participants to training versions
of the present attentional probe procedure, configured in a manner
designed to implicitly alter attentional bias. Thus, for example, to
increase or reduce attentional bias to a given category of informa-
tion, probes are consistently presented either proximally or distally
to such information, across many hundreds of trials. Such pro-
cedures have proven effective in experimentally manipulating se-
lective attentional responding to target types of information (c.f.
MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). It remains to be seen whether the
Fig. 1. Significant simple two way interaction between Perfectionism Group Stimulus Emotional Valence shown on Perfectionism Relevant Words alone.
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use of this ABM approach, to directly reduce attention to
emotionally negative perfectionism-relevant information in people
with heightened perfectionism, would contribute to the attenua-
tion of their perfectionism. Such a finding would not only confirm
that this attentional bias does make a causal contribution to the
expression of perfectionist symptomatology, but also would open
the door to the development of ABM based therapeutic in-
terventions for clinical perfectionism. Despite limited evidence that
perfectionism is associated with a specific attentional bias, CBT for
perfectionism (e.g., Egan, Wade et al., 2014) includes a range of
techniques designed to correct attentional biases and increase
attentional flexibility, such as attending to competing information
indicative of success. If a specific attentional bias is found to caus-
ally contribute to perfectionism, then future research should
determine whether adjunctive ABM offers additive benefits to CBT
in terms of treatment outcomes. Furthermore, it would be useful
for future research to determine if selective attention mediates
reductions in perfectionism during CBT for perfectionism. If selec-
tive attention is identified as a mediator then, following the rec-
ommendations of Kraemer, Wilson, Fairburn, and Agras (2002) on
establishing mechanisms of change, trials using protocols
enhanced with techniques to address selective attention may help
to determine if it is a mechanism of change. This would have
important clinical implications with regard to whether or not
changing selective attention should be a treatment focus for
perfectionism.
Though our findings may yield some interesting theoretical and
clinical implications, it is appropriate to acknowledge some limi-
tations of the current study. As we did not assess clinically diag-
nosed participants, we cannot draw conclusions regarding the
patterns of attentional selectivity that characterize clinical disor-
ders in which high perfectionism has been identified as a predis-
posing and perpetuating factor (e.g., eating, anxiety and mood
disorders). Future research should directly examine the patterns of
attentional bias to negative perfectionism-relevant information
that characterize such clinical conditions. We also recognize that
the attentional probe assessment procedure used in the present
study provides only a snapshot of selective attention at the specific
point in time when the probes appeared. A more continuous
measure of attention, such as that which can be obtained using eye-
movement technology, could illuminate the temporal dynamics of
the pattern of selective attention that characterizes heightened
perfectionism. If the use of eye movement assessment approaches
in future research yields similar results to those we have presently
obtained using the attentional probe task, then this would repre-
sent powerful converging support for our current conclusion, that
heightened perfectionism involves an attentional bias that favors
negative information over positive information, when this is
related to perfectionism-relevant concerns.
In the current study, the word stimuli presented in our atten-
tional probe task were selected from a larger pool of candidate
words that had previously been judged in terms of their relevance
to perfectionism by a panel of independent raters. An advantage of
adopting this common approach to stimulus development is that it
helped ensure that the word stimuli ultimately selected for use, in
general, were perfectionism relevant or irrelevant. A potential
downside to this approach, however, is that not all of the word
stimuli presented necessarily will have been perfectionism-
relevant or eirrelevant for every participant. For example, the
words ‘lonely’ and ‘intimidated’ would likely be perfectionism-
relevant for an individual with high perfectionism who is con-
cerned about their social performance, but not for an individual
who is concerned about their performance at work. While our
current approach revealed perfectionism-linked biases in atten-
tional responding to information that, in general, can be classed as
perfectionism-relevant, future researchers could consider max-
imising personal relevance of all stimulus words by selecting
stimulus materials for each participant based on that individual's
ratings. If each participant were to rate the candidate stimulus
words, prior to completing the probe task, then it would be possible
to use only those words judged by that participant to be
perfectionism-relevant as the perfectionism-relevant stimuli pre-
sented in the probe task (e.g., Amir, Najmi, & Morrison, 2009). The
use of such idiosyncratic word stimuli may enable an even more
sensitive assessment of the patterns of attentional bias that char-
acterize perfectionists.
To assess individual differences in perfectionism in the present
researchwe employed thewidely used Concern overMistakes (CM)
subscale of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS;
Frost et al., 1990). The FMPS has undergone extensive psychometric
analysis, which has consistently revealed that it has very good
reliability and validity (e.g. Egan et al., 2011; Frost, Heimberg, Holt,
Mattia, & Neubauer, 1993; Frost et al., 1990), providing high confi-
dence in the scores obtained. However, some investigators have
argued that other more recently developed questionnaire mea-
sures, such as the Clinical Perfectionism Questionnaire (CPQ;
Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 2003), include items that are more
tightly aligned with Shafran et al.’s the definition of perfectionism,
and so may better capture individual differences in this dimension
(Dickie, Surgenor, Wilson, & McDowall, 2012). Although the CM
subscale is highly correlated with the Clinical Perfectionism Ques-
tionnaire (Egan, Shafran, et al., 2014), and the psychometric prop-
erties of the CPQ are relatively less well established (Dickie et al.,
2012; Egan, Shafran, et al., 2014), future researchers should
deliver our current attentional probe task, and employ the CPQ to
assess individual differences in perfectionism. Work of this type
could provide important converging evidence for our presently
observed findings.
Future research should also consider recruiting participants
from across the full distribution of perfectionism scores, irre-
spective of whether perfectionism is assessed by the CM subscale of
the FMPS, the CPQ, or any other measure of perfectionism. In the
present study, we adopted the commonly used extreme group
approach (EGA) to recruit participants, whereby individuals were
invited to take part in the study only if theymet our criteria for high
vs. low levels of perfectionism, which we based on established cut-
offs reflecting perfectionism scores obtained by individuals with vs.
without a diagnosis of clinical pathology, respectively. However,
some investigators have pointed out that the EGA approach may
obscure the detection of non-linear relationships between the
variables of interest (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander,
2005). Thus, we suggest that future researchers should recruit
participants from across the entire distribution of perfectionism
scores, as such work could potentially extend understanding of the
attentional basis of heightened perfectionism, which we have
shown in the current study to be characterized by an attentional
bias that favors negative information over positive information, but
only when this is related to perfectionism-relevant concerns.
The present study has demonstrated that heightened perfec-
tionism is characterized an attentional bias towards negative
perfectionism relevant information. Heightened perfectionism has
been shown elsewhere to be characterized by an increased ten-
dency to impose negative interpretations on situations that are
perfectionism relevant (Yiend, Savulich, Coughtrey, & Shafran,
2011), and also by an increased tendency to forgo efficient task
completion in order to achieve high levels of task performance
(Stoeber, 2011). It could be informative for future research to
investigate whether or not these different cognitive anomalies
represent independent characteristics of high perfectionism. An
intriguing possibility is that this attentional bias to negative
J.A. Howell et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 51 (2016) 100e108106
perfectionism-relevant information may be the primary cognitive
distortion that gives rise to these other anomalies. Future re-
searchers equipped with the capacity to directly manipulate this
attentional bias would be well positioned to test this hypothesis by
examining the impact of this attentional manipulation on these
other anomalies.
It can be concluded that heightened levels of perfectionism,
unlike low levels of perfectionism, are characterized by a bias that
involves greater attention to negative than to positive information,
but only when this information is perfectionism-relevant. We hope
that this research serves to stimulate further research into the
attentional basis of perfectionism, given the pervasive role that
heightened perfectionism appears to play across a wide range of
psychological disorders.
Acknowledgments
All authors declare that they do not have any interests that may
be interpreted as influencing the research. All APA ethical standards
were upheld and followed in the conduct of the study. The manu-
script has not been submitted for publication or published in its
current form elsewhere.
Preparation of this work was partly supported by Australian
Research Council Grants DP140104448 and DP140103713, and by a
grant from the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research,
CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PNII-ID-PCCE-2011-2-0045 awar-
ded to CM. These funding bodies did not exert any influence over
the development, writing, or submission of this article.
References
Algom, D., Chajut, E., & Lev, S. (2004). A rational look at the emotional stroop
phenomenon: a generic slowdown, not a stroop effect. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 133(3), 323e338. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-
3445.133.3.323.
Amir, N., Najmi, S., & Morrison, A. S. (2009). Attenuation of attention bias in
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(2), 153e157.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2008.10.020.
Antony, M., Bieling, P., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). Psychometric
properties of the 42-Item and 21-Item versions of the depression anxiety stress
scales in clinical groups and a community sample. Psychological Assessment,
10(2), 1143e1154. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.10.2.176.
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & Van, I. M. H.
(2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a
meta-analytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 1e24. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1.
Bieling, P., Summerfeldt, L., Israeli, A., & Antony, M. (2004). Perfectionism as an
explanatory construct in co-morbidity of axis 1 disorders. Journal of Psychopa-
thology and Behavioural Assessment, 26(3), 193e201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/
B: JOBA.0000022112.27186.98.
Brysbaert, M., & New, B. (2009). Moving beyond Kucera and Francis: a critical
evaluation of current word frequency norms and the introduction of a new and
improved word frequency measure for American English. Behavior Research
Methods, 41(4), 977e990. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.977.
Dickie, L., Surgenor, L. J., Wilson, M., & McDowall, J. (2012). The structure and
reliability of the clinical perfectionism questionnaire. Personality and Individual
Differences, 52(8), 865e869. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.02.003.
Egan, S. J., & Hine, P. (2008). Cognitive behavioural treatment of perfectionism: a
single case experimental design series. Behaviour Change, 25(4), 245e258.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/bech.25.4.245.
Egan, S. J., Shafran, R., Lee, M., Fairburn, C., Cooper, Z., Doll, H. A., et al. (2014a). The
reliability and validity of the clinical perfectionism questionnaire in eating
disorder and community samples. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy,
1e13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352465814000629.
Egan, S. J., van Noort, E., Chee, A., Kane, R. T., Hoiles, K. J., Shafran, R., et al. (2014b).
A randomised controlled trial of face to face versus pure online self-help
cognitive behavioural treatment for perfectionism. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 63, 107e113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2014.09.009.
Egan, S. J., Wade, T. D., & Shafran, R. (2011). Perfectionism as a transdiagnostic
process: a clinical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(2), 203e212. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.04.009.
Egan, S. J., Wade, T. D., & Shafran, R. (2012). The transdiagnostic process of
perfectionism. Revista de Psicopatología y Psicología Clínica (Spanish Journal of
Clinical Psychology), 17(3), 279e294.
Egan, S. J., Wade, T. D., Shafran, R., & Anthony, M. (2014). Cognitive-behavioral
treatment of perfectionism. United States: Guilford Press.
Fairburn, C. G., Cooper, Z., & Shafran, R. (2003). Cognitive behaviour therapy for
eating disorders: a “transdiagnostic” theory and treatment. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 41(5), 509e528. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0005-7967(02)00088-
8.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: a flexible sta-
tistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sci-
ences. Behavior Research Methods, 39(2), 175e191. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/
BF03193146.
Frost, R. O., Heimberg, R. G., Holt, C. S., Mattia, J. L., & Neubauer, A. L. (1993). A
comparison of two measures of perfectionism. Personality and Individual Dif-
ferences., 14(1), 119e126. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(93)90181-2.
Frost, R. O., Marten, P., Lahart, C., & Rosenblate, R. (1990). The dimensions of
perfectionism. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14(5), 449e468. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01172967.
Glover, D. S., Brown, G. P., Fairburn, C. G., & Shafran, R. (2007). A preliminary
evaluation of cognitive-behaviour therapy for clinical perfectionism: a case
series. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46(1), 85e94. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1348/014466506x117388.
Grafton, B., & Macleod, C. (2014). Enhanced probing of attentional bias: the inde-
pendence of anxiety-linked selectivity in attentional engagement with and
disengagement from negative information. Cognition & Emotion, 28(7),
1287e1302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2014.881326.
Grafton, B., Watkins, E., & MacLeod, C. (2012). The ups and downs of cognitive bias:
dissociating the attentional characteristics of positive and negative affectivity.
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 24(1), 33e53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
20445911.2011.578066.
Handley, A. K., Egan, S. J., Kane, R. T., & Rees, C. S. (2015). A randomised controlled
trial of group cognitive behavioural therapy for perfectionism. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 68, 37e47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2015.02.006.
Harvey, A., Watkins, E., Mansell, W., & Shafran, R. (2004). Cognitive behavioural
processes across psychological disorders: A transdiagnostic approach to research
and treatment. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hewitt, P. L., & Flett, G. L. (1991). Perfectionism in the self and social contexts:
conceptualization, assessment and association with psychopathology. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 60(3), 456e470. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
0022-3514.60.3.456.
Hollander, M. H. (1965). Perfectionism. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 6, 94e103. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0010-440X(65)80016-5.
Kobori, O., & Tanno, Y. (2012). Self-oriented perfectionism and its relationship to
selective attention: an experimental examination using social cognitive para-
digm. Japanese Psychological Research, 54(4), 418e423. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-5884.2012.00514.x.
Kraemer, H. C., Wilson, G. T., Fairburn, C. G., & Agras, W. S. (2002). Mediators and
moderators of treatment effects in randomized clinical trials. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 59, 877e883.
Lavy, E., & van den Hout, M. (1994). Cognitive avoidance and attentional bias: causal
relationships. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18, 179e191. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/Bf02357223.
Lloyd, S., Schmidt, U., Khondoker, M., & Tchanturia, K. (2015). Can psychological
interventions reduce perfectionism? A systematic review and meta-analysis.
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 43, 705e731. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
s1352465814000162.
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states:
comparison of the depression anxiety stress scales (DASS) with the beck
depression and anxiety inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3),
335e343. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-U.
MacLeod, C. (1993). Cognition in clinical psychology: measures, methods or
models? Behaviour Change, 10, 169e195. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0813483900005519.
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (2012). Cognitive bias modification approaches to
anxiety. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8, 189e217. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032511-143052.
Macleod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95(1), 15e20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-
843X.95.1.15.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we know: Verbal reports on
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231e259. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
0033-295x.84.3.231.
Peckham, A. D., McHugh, R. K., & Otto, M. W. (2010). A meta-analysis of the
magnitude of biased attention in depression. Depression and Anxiety, 27(12),
1135e1142. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/da.20755.
Preacher, K., Rucker, D., MacCallum, R., & Nicewander, A. (2005). Use of the extreme
groups appraoch: a critical reexamination and new recommendations. Psy-
chological Methods, 10(2), 178e192. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1082-
989X.10.2.178.
Riley, C., Lee, M., Cooper, Z., Fairburn, C. G., & Shafran, R. (2007). A randomised
controlled trial of cognitive-behaviour therapy for clinical perfectionism: a
preliminary study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(9), 2221e2231. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2006.12.003.
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2012). E-Prime user's guide. Pittsburgh:
Psychology Software Tools, Inc.
Shafran, R., Cooper, Z., & Fairburn, C. G. (2002). Clinical perfectionism: a cogniti-
veebehavioural analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 773e791. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(01)00059-6.
J.A. Howell et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 51 (2016) 100e108 107
Shafran, R., Egan, S. J., & Wade, T. D. (2010). Overcoming perfectionism: A self-help
guide to using cognitive behavioral techniques. London: Robinson.
Steele, A. L., & Wade, T. D. (2008). A randomised trial investigating guided self-help
to reduce perfectionism and its impact on bulimia nervosa: a pilot study.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(12), 1316e1323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.brat.2008.09.006.
Steele, A. L., Waite, S., Egan, S. J., Finnigan, J., Handley, A., & Wade, T. D. (2013).
Psycho-education and group cognitive-behavioural therapy for clinical perfec-
tionism: a case-series evaluation. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy,
41(2), 1e15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352465812000628.
Stoeber, J. (2011). Perfectionism, efficiency, and response bias in proof-reading
performance: extension and replication. Personality and Individual Differences,
50(3), 426e429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.10.021.
Stroup, W. W. (2012). Generalized linear mixed models: Modern concepts, methods
and applications. CRC Press.
Yiend, J., Savulich, G., Coughtrey, A., & Shafran, R. (2011). Biased interpretation in
perfectionism and its modification. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49(12),
892e900. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2011.10.004.









School of Psychology and  
Speech Pathology 
 
GPO Box U1987 
Perth Western Australia 6845 
 
Telephone +61 8 9266 3575 
Email joel.howell@curtin.edu.au 
Web psych.curtin.edu.au 








School of Psychology and Speech Pathology 
Curtin University, 
GPO Box U1987, 
Perth, Western Australia, 6845 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
I, Joel Howell, was the major contributor to the conceptualisation, coordination, and implementation of my PhD 
project, An examination of cognitive biases and imagery in perfectionism, which resulted in the following paper.  
 
Selective attention in perfectionism: Dissociating valence from perfectionism relevance. By Howell, J. A., 
Peter, M. McEvoy, Grafton, B., Macleod, C., Kane, R. T., Anderson, R. A., & Egan, S. J. (2016). Published in the 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 51, 100-108. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2016.01.004 
 
I am the lead author, and it was primarily my responsibility to conceptualise, draft, and proofread the paper based 
on data collected for my PhD thesis, which involved the development of a computerised dot-probe attention task, 
individual assessment on the computerised task with each participant, collation and analysis of data, and draft 
writing and editing of the present paper. This paper investigated the relationship between those considered to 
have high levels of perfectionism and whether their attention was captured differently by any particular stimuli 
compared to those considered to have low levels of perfectionism.  
 
 
Joel Howell  ________________________________________ 
 
 
I, as Co-Author, endorse that this level of contribution by the candidate indicated above is appropriate. 
As co-author, I contributed to the development of the research, statistical analyses, and interpretation 
of the data. 
 
Peter McEvoy   
 
 
Ben Grafton  
  
 
Colin Macleod   
 
 











Appendix C: Permission to Use Copyright Material  
ELSEVIER LICENSE 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 




This Agreement between Joel Howell ("You") and Elsevier ("Elsevier") consists of your 
license details and the terms and conditions provided by Elsevier and Copyright Clearance 
Center. 
License Number 3998631440929 
License date 
 
Licensed Content Publisher Elsevier 
Licensed Content Publication Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 
Licensed Content Title Selective attention in perfectionism: Dissociating valence 
from perfectionism-relevance 
Licensed Content Author Joel A. Howell,Peter M. McEvoy,Ben Grafton,Colin 
Macleod,Robert T. Kane,Rebecca A. Anderson,Sarah J. 
Egan 
Licensed Content Date June 2016 
Licensed Content Volume 51 
Licensed Content Issue n/a 
Licensed Content Pages 9 
Start Page 100 
End Page 108 
Type of Use reuse in a thesis/dissertation 
Portion full article 
Format both print and electronic 
Are you the author of this Elsevier 
article? 
Yes 
Will you be translating? No 
Order reference number 
 
Title of your thesis/dissertation An examination of cognitive biases and imagery in 
perfectionism 
Expected completion date Feb 2017 
Estimated size (number of pages) 205 
Elsevier VAT number GB 494 6272 12 
Requestor Location Joel Howell 
School of Psychology & Speech Pathology 
Curtin University 





Perth, Western Australia 6845 
Australia 
Attn: Joel Howell 
Total 0.00 AUD   
Terms and Conditions   
INTRODUCTION 
1. The publisher for this copyrighted material is Elsevier.  By clicking "accept" in 
connection with completing this licensing transaction, you agree that the following terms 
and conditions apply to this transaction (along with the Billing and Payment terms and 
conditions established by Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. ("CCC"), at the time that you 
opened your Rightslink account and that are available at any time 
at http://myaccount.copyright.com). 
GENERAL TERMS 
2. Elsevier hereby grants you permission to reproduce the aforementioned material subject 
to the terms and conditions indicated. 
3. Acknowledgement: If any part of the material to be used (for example, figures) has 
appeared in our publication with credit or acknowledgement to another source, permission 
must also be sought from that source.  If such permission is not obtained then that material 
may not be included in your publication/copies. Suitable acknowledgement to the source 
must be made, either as a footnote or in a reference list at the end of your publication, as 
follows: 
"Reprinted from Publication title, Vol /edition number, Author(s), Title of article / title of 
chapter, Pages No., Copyright (Year), with permission from Elsevier [OR APPLICABLE 
SOCIETY COPYRIGHT OWNER]." Also Lancet special credit - "Reprinted from The 
Lancet, Vol. number, Author(s), Title of article, Pages No., Copyright (Year), with 
permission from Elsevier." 
4. Reproduction of this material is confined to the purpose and/or media for which 
permission is hereby given. 
5. Altering/Modifying Material: Not Permitted. However figures and illustrations may be 
altered/adapted minimally to serve your work. Any other abbreviations, additions, 
deletions and/or any other alterations shall be made only with prior written authorization 
of Elsevier Ltd. (Please contact Elsevier at permissions@elsevier.com) 
6. If the permission fee for the requested use of our material is waived in this instance, 
please be advised that your future requests for Elsevier materials may attract a fee. 
7. Reservation of Rights: Publisher reserves all rights not specifically granted in the 
combination of (i) the license details provided by you and accepted in the course of this 
licensing transaction, (ii) these terms and conditions and (iii) CCC's Billing and Payment 
terms and conditions. 
8. License Contingent Upon Payment: While you may exercise the rights licensed 
immediately upon issuance of the license at the end of the licensing process for the 
transaction, provided that you have disclosed complete and accurate details of your 
proposed use, no license is finally effective unless and until full payment is received from 
you (either by publisher or by CCC) as provided in CCC's Billing and Payment terms and 
conditions.  If full payment is not received on a timely basis, then any license 
preliminarily granted shall be deemed automatically revoked and shall be void as if never 
granted.  Further, in the event that you breach any of these terms and conditions or any of 
CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions, the license is automatically revoked and 
shall be void as if never granted.  Use of materials as described in a revoked license, as 





copyright infringement and publisher reserves the right to take any and all action to 
protect its copyright in the materials. 
9. Warranties: Publisher makes no representations or warranties with respect to the 
licensed material. 
10. Indemnity: You hereby indemnify and agree to hold harmless publisher and CCC, and 
their respective officers, directors, employees and agents, from and against any and all 
claims arising out of your use of the licensed material other than as specifically authorized 
pursuant to this license. 
11. No Transfer of License: This license is personal to you and may not be sublicensed, 
assigned, or transferred by you to any other person without publisher's written permission. 
12. No Amendment Except in Writing: This license may not be amended except in a 
writing signed by both parties (or, in the case of publisher, by CCC on publisher's behalf). 
13. Objection to Contrary Terms: Publisher hereby objects to any terms contained in any 
purchase order, acknowledgment, check endorsement or other writing prepared by you, 
which terms are inconsistent with these terms and conditions or CCC's Billing and 
Payment terms and conditions.  These terms and conditions, together with CCC's Billing 
and Payment terms and conditions (which are incorporated herein), comprise the entire 
agreement between you and publisher (and CCC) concerning this licensing transaction.  In 
the event of any conflict between your obligations established by these terms and 
conditions and those established by CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions, 
these terms and conditions shall control. 
14. Revocation: Elsevier or Copyright Clearance Center may deny the permissions 
described in this License at their sole discretion, for any reason or no reason, with a full 
refund payable to you.  Notice of such denial will be made using the contact information 
provided by you.  Failure to receive such notice will not alter or invalidate the denial.  In 
no event will Elsevier or Copyright Clearance Center be responsible or liable for any 
costs, expenses or damage incurred by you as a result of a denial of your permission 
request, other than a refund of the amount(s) paid by you to Elsevier and/or Copyright 
Clearance Center for denied permissions. 
LIMITED LICENSE 
The following terms and conditions apply only to specific license types: 
15. Translation: This permission is granted for non-exclusive world English rights only 
unless your license was granted for translation rights. If you licensed translation rights 
you may only translate this content into the languages you requested. A professional 
translator must perform all translations and reproduce the content word for word 
preserving the integrity of the article. 
16. Posting licensed content on any Website: The following terms and conditions apply 
as follows: Licensing material from an Elsevier journal: All content posted to the web site 
must maintain the copyright information line on the bottom of each image; A hyper-text 
must be included to the Homepage of the journal from which you are licensing 
at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/xxxxx or the Elsevier homepage for 
books at http://www.elsevier.com; Central Storage: This license does not include 
permission for a scanned version of the material to be stored in a central repository such 
as that provided by Heron/XanEdu. 
Licensing material from an Elsevier book: A hyper-text link must be included to the 
Elsevier homepage at http://www.elsevier.com . All content posted to the web site must 
maintain the copyright information line on the bottom of each image. 
 
Posting licensed content on Electronic reserve: In addition to the above the following 




to bona fide students registered on a relevant course. This permission is granted for 1 year 
only. You may obtain a new license for future website posting. 
17. For journal authors: the following clauses are applicable in addition to the above: 
Preprints: 
A preprint is an author's own write-up of research results and analysis, it has not been 
peer-reviewed, nor has it had any other value added to it by a publisher (such as 
formatting, copyright, technical enhancement etc.). 
Authors can share their preprints anywhere at any time. Preprints should not be added to 
or enhanced in any way in order to appear more like, or to substitute for, the final versions 
of articles however authors can update their preprints on arXiv or RePEc with their 
Accepted Author Manuscript (see below). 
If accepted for publication, we encourage authors to link from the preprint to their formal 
publication via its DOI. Millions of researchers have access to the formal publications on 
ScienceDirect, and so links will help users to find, access, cite and use the best available 
version. Please note that Cell Press, The Lancet and some society-owned have different 
preprint policies. Information on these policies is available on the journal homepage. 
Accepted Author Manuscripts: An accepted author manuscript is the manuscript of an 
article that has been accepted for publication and which typically includes author-
incorporated changes suggested during submission, peer review and editor-author 
communications. 
Authors can share their accepted author manuscript: 
• −         immediately 
o via their non-commercial person homepage or blog 
o by updating a preprint in arXiv or RePEc with the accepted 
manuscript 
o via their research institute or institutional repository for internal 
institutional uses or as part of an invitation-only research 
collaboration work-group 
o directly by providing copies to their students or to research 
collaborators for their personal use 
o for private scholarly sharing as part of an invitation-only work 
group on commercial sites with which Elsevier has an agreement 
• −         after the embargo period 
o via non-commercial hosting platforms such as their institutional 
repository 
o via commercial sites with which Elsevier has an agreement 
In all cases accepted manuscripts should: 
• −         link to the formal publication via its DOI 
• −         bear a CC-BY-NC-ND license - this is easy to do 
• −         if aggregated with other manuscripts, for example in a repository or other site, 
be shared in alignment with our hosting policy not be added to or enhanced in any 
way to appear more like, or to substitute for, the published journal article. 
Published journal article (JPA): A published journal article (PJA) is the definitive final 
record of published research that appears or will appear in the journal and embodies all 
value-adding publishing activities including peer review co-ordination, copy-editing, 
formatting, (if relevant) pagination and online enrichment. 





Subscription Articles: If you are an author, please share a link to your article rather than 
the full-text. Millions of researchers have access to the formal publications on 
ScienceDirect, and so links will help your users to find, access, cite, and use the best 
available version. 
Theses and dissertations which contain embedded PJAs as part of the formal submission 
can be posted publicly by the awarding institution with DOI links back to the formal 
publications on ScienceDirect. 
If you are affiliated with a library that subscribes to ScienceDirect you have additional 
private sharing rights for others' research accessed under that agreement. This includes use 
for classroom teaching and internal training at the institution (including use in course 
packs and courseware programs), and inclusion of the article for grant funding purposes. 
Gold Open Access Articles: May be shared according to the author-selected end-user 
license and should contain a CrossMark logo, the end user license, and a DOI link to the 
formal publication on ScienceDirect. 
Please refer to Elsevier's posting policy for further information. 
18. For book authors the following clauses are applicable in addition to the 
above:   Authors are permitted to place a brief summary of their work online only. You 
are not allowed to download and post the published electronic version of your chapter, nor 
may you scan the printed edition to create an electronic version. Posting to a 
repository: Authors are permitted to post a summary of their chapter only in their 
institution's repository. 
19. Thesis/Dissertation: If your license is for use in a thesis/dissertation your thesis may 
be submitted to your institution in either print or electronic form. Should your thesis be 
published commercially, please reapply for permission. These requirements include 
permission for the Library and Archives of Canada to supply single copies, on demand, of 
the complete thesis and include permission for Proquest/UMI to supply single copies, on 
demand, of the complete thesis. Should your thesis be published commercially, please 
reapply for permission. Theses and dissertations which contain embedded PJAs as part of 
the formal submission can be posted publicly by the awarding institution with DOI links 
back to the formal publications on ScienceDirect. 
  
Elsevier Open Access Terms and Conditions 
You can publish open access with Elsevier in hundreds of open access journals or in 
nearly 2000 established subscription journals that support open access publishing. 
Permitted third party re-use of these open access articles is defined by the author's choice 
of Creative Commons user license. See our open access license policy for more 
information. 
Terms & Conditions applicable to all Open Access articles published with Elsevier: 
Any reuse of the article must not represent the author as endorsing the adaptation of the 
article nor should the article be modified in such a way as to damage the author's honour 
or reputation. If any changes have been made, such changes must be clearly indicated. 
The author(s) must be appropriately credited and we ask that you include the end user 
license and a DOI link to the formal publication on ScienceDirect. 
If any part of the material to be used (for example, figures) has appeared in our 
publication with credit or acknowledgement to another source it is the responsibility of the 
user to ensure their reuse complies with the terms and conditions determined by the rights 
holder. 
Additional Terms & Conditions applicable to each Creative Commons user license: 
CC BY: The CC-BY license allows users to copy, to create extracts, abstracts and new 




Article (including reuse and/or resale of the Article by commercial entities), provided the 
user gives appropriate credit (with a link to the formal publication through the relevant 
DOI), provides a link to the license, indicates if changes were made and the licensor is not 
represented as endorsing the use made of the work. The full details of the license are 
available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0. 
CC BY NC SA: The CC BY-NC-SA license allows users to copy, to create extracts, 
abstracts and new works from the Article, to alter and revise the Article, provided this is 
not done for commercial purposes, and that the user gives appropriate credit (with a link 
to the formal publication through the relevant DOI), provides a link to the license, 
indicates if changes were made and the licensor is not represented as endorsing the use 
made of the work. Further, any new works must be made available on the same 
conditions. The full details of the license are available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0. 
CC BY NC ND: The CC BY-NC-ND license allows users to copy and distribute the 
Article, provided this is not done for commercial purposes and further does not permit 
distribution of the Article if it is changed or edited in any way, and provided the user 
gives appropriate credit (with a link to the formal publication through the relevant DOI), 
provides a link to the license, and that the licensor is not represented as endorsing the use 
made of the work. The full details of the license are available 
at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0. Any commercial reuse of Open 
Access articles published with a CC BY NC SA or CC BY NC ND license requires 
permission from Elsevier and will be subject to a fee. 
Commercial reuse includes: 
• −         Associating advertising with the full text of the Article 
• −         Charging fees for document delivery or access 
• −         Article aggregation 
• −         Systematic distribution via e-mail lists or share buttons 
Posting or linking by commercial companies for use by customers of those companies. 
  
20. Other Conditions: 
  
v1.8 







Appendix D: Information Sheet 
 
My name is Joel Howell and I am currently completing my PhD program at Curtin 
University.  
 
PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH 
The goal of my research is to investigate how individuals with high perfectionism compare 
with individuals low on perfectionism when completing cognitive tasks. The purpose is to 
help our understanding of how individuals with perfectionism focus their attention, interpret 
situations, and how this may impact their day-to-day life. Studies have found that high levels 
of perfectionism can result in people experiencing symptoms of anxiety, depression and 
eating disorders. By understanding how perfectionism impacts on individuals then better 
treatments can be developed. 
 
PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY 
Participation in this research is voluntary. You do not have to participate if you do not want 
to, and if you do choose to participate and change your mind, you can withdraw from the 
research without any negative consequences. You can withdraw up until the data collected 
has been entered; this is because random numbers are allocated to the information that is 
gathered from questionnaires or cognitive tasks to ensure that everything is completely 
confidential. 
 
WHAT DOES IT INVOLVE? 
- If you want to participate then please sign the consent form provided and complete 
the questionnaire attached, you can then send it back in the envelope provided.  
- You will be asked a few quick questions to see if you are eligible for the study. If 
you are eligible to participate I will invite you to come to the School of Psychology 
and Speech Pathology at Curtin University to complete the study. 
- Upon meeting me, I will take you to one of the computer rooms that are located in 
the School of Psychology and Speech Pathology.  
- The computer task will take between 40 to 60 minutes and consists of a few 
questionnaires about perfectionism, and then two computer tasks will be completed. 
One will examine how quickly you can react to a line that will appear on the screen, 
while the second task will involve you reading series of short paragraphs and then 
rating interpretations of the scenarios. 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS  
There is no anticipated risk. This research is completely voluntary and you may withdraw at 
any time, for any reason, before the data you provide is saved. You will not face any 
negative consequences if you do withdraw from the study.  
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS  
Though there are no immediate benefits for yourself, this research will help developing our 
understanding about perfectionism. All participants will be able to submit an e-mail upon 
completion of the study that will not be linked to your answers and will put you in to a draw 
to win 1 of 10 $25 gift vouchers for Coles Group & Myer Gift Card. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information will remain confidential to those outside the study. All information provided 
will be stored in a locked data file that only the primary researcher and supervisors will have 
access to. The data from each person will be given a randomised code when starting the 
experiment, which is what will be used to link all of your answers. If the study is published 




locked cabinet only accessible to myself and my supervisors (Dr Sarah Egan, Dr. Rebecca 
Anderson and Dr. Robert Kane). 
 
FOR MORE INFORMATION 
If you have any questions you can contact Joel Howell on 0416 165 635, or by email 
joel.howell@postgrad.curtin.edu.au. Alternatively, if you wished to contact my supervisors 
Dr. Sarah Egan: (08) 9266 2367; s.egan@curtin.edu.au or Dr. Rebecca Anderson: (08) 9266 
3012; Rebecca.Anderson@curtin.edu.au  
 
 
This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Approval Number HR 88/2012). The Committee is comprised of 
members of the public, academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers. Its main 
role is to protect participants. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained 
either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- 
Office of Research and Development, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 












































Principal Researcher: Joel Howell, Curtin University 
Research Supervisor: Dr. Sarah Egan, Curtin University 









 I acknowledge that I have been informed of and understand the purposes of the 
study. 
 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study. 
 
 I understand that after I sign and return this consent form it will be retained by the 
researcher as a record of my consent. 
 
 I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary, and that I can 
withdraw from this study until data collation without negative consequences. 
 
 I understand that this study may be published; however no information will be used 
to identify me. 
 







NAME  _____________________________________ 
 




































































































































Appendix F: Interpretation Bias Stimuli Development 
 
To develop the scenarios and the range of associated test sentences used in 
the study, Yiend et al. (2011) provided a copy of their interpretation stimuli used in 
their study. These stimulus materials consisted of 75 scenarios previously identified 
as perfectionism relevant. The scenarios from Yiend et al. were screened for the 
present study based on their relevance to perfectionism by clinical researchers (JH, 
RA, and SE) with experience treating clinical perfectionism. From this screening, 
with possible options ranging from not relevant, slightly relevant, moderately 
relevant and highly relevant, 20 scenarios were identified as being highly relevant by 
all three raters to perfectionism and were subsequently chosen for the current study. 
An additional 45 scenarios were developed and rated as being highly relevant by 
clinical researchers (JH, RA, SE), with a focus on domains pertinent to 
perfectionism, including employment, academics, social interactions, physical 
appearance, sporting activities, and domestic situations.  
The 20 scenarios from Yiend et al (2010) and the newly developed 45 
scenarios (65 scenarios in total) had eight test sentences that were designed by the 
primary researcher (JH) to meet the critical subtypes required. For each scenario, 
four of the interpretations focused on the affective outcome/experience of the 
protagonist and the other four interpretations focused on the event 
outcome/experience of the protagonist. Six clinical psychology trainees rated all 
candidate interpretations on emotionality (-3 = extremely negative to +3 = extremely 
positive), and interpretation type to distinguish between target and foil interpretations 
(i.e. “can this possible extrapolative interpretation in principle be drawn from the 
detailed imperfection event detailed?” [yes / no]). These ratings were used to 
determine which scenarios would be used in the present study.  
As the scenarios were already identified as highly relevant to perfectionism, 
the materials used in the present study were selected by ensuring any scenario had all 
eight test sentences that were rated as meeting each critical subtype. This selection 
was to ensure that across the interpretations for the scenarios there would be an 
equitable average rating of the positive/negative ratings across both affective and 
event oriented interpretations. On this basis, the scenarios that contained 
interpretations that were above a rating of 2 (moderately positive) or below rating of 




clearly belonged to either the positive emotional valence or the negative emotional 
valence. On this basis 40 scenarios met these criteria and were used to assess the 
critical subtypes. Means and standard deviations of perfectionism and emotional 
ratings for the final interpretations from the raters are listed in Table 9.  
To ensure that these interpretations were adequately distinguished from one 
another a four-way ANOVA was carried out on the emotional valence ratings for the 
selected sentences by the independent raters, with test sentence situation type (affect 
vs. event), Interpretation test sentence valence (positive vs. negative), and tests 
sentence status (target vs. foil) as within-participants factors. This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for the Test sentence valence factor, reflecting, as required, 
more negative valence ratings for interpretations in the negative subset than for 
interpretations classified in the positive subset; F(1, 312) = 21726.97, p <.001, 
ƞ2=.99 (negative valenced stimuli M = -2.44, SD = .27; positive valenced stimuli M = 
2.50, SD = .31). It should be noted that a consequence of selecting items that were 
rated high (above 2) or low (below - 2) in affect was that the mean difference score 
(i.e., the difference score between the positive and negative items averaged across 
raters) was relatively large compared to the standard error of the mean difference 
score (i.e., the difference score within the positive and negative items averaged 
across raters). The test statistic for the ‘Emotional Valence Ratings’ was derived by 
dividing the mean difference score by its standard error, which explains why the 
magnitude of the test statistic (i.e., F[1, 312] = 21726.97) was extremely large. 
There was no significant main effect on valence ratings for either the Test 
sentence situation type factor, F(1,312) = 0.52, ns, ƞ2<.002, or Test sentence stats 
factor, F(1,312) = 0.70, ns, ƞ2<.002). There was also no two-way (all F(1,312) < 
0.70, ns, ƞ2<.01), or three-way interaction, F[1,197] = 0.60, ns, ƞ2<.002) between 
Test sentence valence, Test sentence situation type, and Test sentence stats factors. 
Thus, as intended, the selected interpretations for perfectionist scenarios, the 
affective and event focused interpretations, and the target and foil interpretations, did 





Table 10. Mean interpretation rating scores (and SD) for emotional valence and domain as obtained on ratings by six independent raters.  
Rating 
category 
Test sentence situation type 
 Affect Event 
 Test sentence valence 
 Negative interpretations   Positive interpretations Negative interpretations Positive interpretations 
 Test sentence stats 
 Target Foil Target Foil Target Foil Target Foil 
Emotional 
Valence 



















The questions in this booklet are designed to help us better understand 
clinical perfectionism. 
 
Please answer all questions as honestly as you can.  
 
Your answers will remain strictly confidential. It is important that you 
complete all of the questions, but if you feel you cannot answer a particular 
question, or if you have any questions feel free to ask the researcher with 
you. 
 




























Please consider each statement and circle the corresponding number that 
best reflects your agreement with the statement. Please be sure to read each 
statement carefully. 
(Please circle one number on each line) 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. My parents set very high 
standards for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Organisation is very important to 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. As a child, I was punished for 
doing things less than perfect. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. If I do not set the highest 
standards for myself, I am likely 
to end up a second-rate person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. My parents never tried to 
understand my mistakes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. It is important to me that I be 
thoroughly competent in 
everything I do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am a neat person. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I try to be an organised person. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. If I fail at work/school, I am a 
failure as a person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I should be upset if I make a 
mistake. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. My parents wanted me to be the 
best at everything. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I set higher goals than most 
people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. If someone does a task at 
work/school better than I, then I 
feel like I failed at the whole 
task. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. If I fail partly, it is as bad as 
being a complete failure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Only outstanding performance 
is good enough in my family. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I am very good at focusing 
efforts on attaining a goal. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Even when I do something very 
carefully, I often feel that it is 
not quite right. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I hate being less than the best at 
things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 






Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
19. I have extremely high goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. My parents have expected 
excellence from me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. People will probably think less 
of me if I make a mistake. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. I never felt like I could meet my 
parents’ expectations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. If I do not do as well as other 
people, it means that I am an 
inferior human being. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Other people seem to accept 
lower standards from themselves 
than I do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. If I do not do as well all the time, 
people will not respect me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. My parents have always had 
higher expectations for my future 
than I have. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. I try to be a neat person. 1 2 3 4 5 
28. I usually have doubts about the 
simple everyday things I do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. Neatness is very important to 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. I expect higher performance in 
my daily tasks than most people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31. I am an organised person. 1 2 3 4 5 
32. I tend to get behind in my work 
because I repeat things over and 
over. 
1 2 3 4 5 
33. It takes me a long time to do 
something “right”. 
1 2 3 4 5 
34. The fewer mistakes I make, the 
more people will like me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
35. I never felt like I could meet my 
parents’ standards. 

















This questionnaire is concerned with “perfectionism”.  By perfectionism, we mean trying to 
meet really high standards whether or not you actually succeed in reaching them.  
 
In this questionnaire we are only concerned with perfectionism that affects areas of life other 
than your eating, weight, or appearance. 
 
Have you been trying to achieve high standards over the past month whether or not you have 
succeeded (excluding standards for your eating, weight or appearance)? 
Please circle YES or NO. 
                      YES / NO 
 
If so, in what areas of your life (other than eating, weight or appearance) has this applied?  
- For example, it might have been in your performance at work, at sport, at music, at home, 



























Please consider each statement and circle the corresponding number that best 
reflects your agreement with the statement. Please be sure to read each statement 
carefully. 
 (Please circle one number on each line) 






All of the 
time 
1. Over the past month, have you pushed 
yourself really hard to meet your 
goals? 
1 2 3 4 
2. Over the past month, have you tended 
to focus on what you have achieved, 
rather than on what you have not 
achieved? 
1 2 3 4 
3. Over the past month, have you been 
told your standards are too high? 
1 2 3 4 
4. Over the past month, have you felt a 
failure as a person because you have 
not succeeded in meeting your goals? 
1 2 3 4 
5. Over the past month, have you been 
afraid that you might not reach your 
standards? 
1 2 3 4 
6. Over the past month, have you raised 
your standards because you thought 
they were too easy? 
1 2 3 4 
7. Over the past month, have you judged 
yourself on the basis of your ability to 
achieve high standards? 
1 2 3 4 
8. Over the past month, have you done 
just enough to get by? 
1 2 3 4 
9. Over the past month, have you 
repeatedly checked how well you are 
doing at meeting your standards (for 
example, by comparing your 
performance with that of others)? 
1 2 3 4 
10. Over the past month, do you think that 
other people would have thought of you 
as a “perfectionist”? 
1 2 3 4 
11. Over the past month, have you kept 
trying to meet your standards, even if 
this has meant that you have missed 
out on things? 
1 2 3 4 
12. Over the past month, have you 
avoided any tests of your performance 
(at meeting your goals) in case you 
failed? 









Please consider each statement and circle the corresponding number that best 
indicates how much the statement applied to you over the PAST WEEK. 
Please be sure to read each statement carefully. 
(Please circle one number on each line) 














me to a 
considerable 
degree, or a 








1. I found it hard to wind down. 0 1 2 3 
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth. 0 1 2 3 
3. I couldn't seem to experience any 
positive feeling at all. 
0 1 2 3 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g. 
excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of 
physical exertion). 
0 1 2 3 
5. I found it difficult to work up the 
initiative to do things. 
0 1 2 3 
6. I tended to over-react to situations. 0 1 2 3 
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the 
hands). 
0 1 2 3 
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous 
energy. 
0 1 2 3 
9. I was worried about situations in 
which I might panic and make a fool 
of myself. 
0 1 2 3 
10. I felt that I had nothing to look 
forward to. 
0 1 2 3 
11. I found myself getting agitated. 0 1 2 3 
12. I found it difficult to relax. 0 1 2 3 
13. I felt down-hearted and blue. 0 1 2 3 
14. I was intolerant of anything that kept 
me from getting on with what I was 
doing. 
0 1 2 3 
15. I felt I was close to panic. 0 1 2 3 
16. I was unable to become enthusiastic 
about anything. 
0 1 2 3 
17. I felt I wasn't worth much as a 
person. 




18. I felt that I was rather touchy. 0 1 2 3 
19. I was aware of the action of my heart 
in the absence of physical exertion 
(e.g. sense of heart rate increase, 
heart missing a beat). 
0 1 2 3 
20. I felt scared without any good 
reason. 
0 1 2 3 





Please consider how you respond when you feel distressed or upset and circle the 
corresponding number that best reflects your experience WHEN YOU ARE 
DISTRESSED OR UPSET. 
Please be sure to read each statement carefully. 
(Please circle one number on each line) 








1. You have thoughts about all your 
shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. You have thoughts about events that come 
into your head even when you do not wish 
to think about them again 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. You have thoughts that “I won’t be able to 
do my job/work because I feel so badly.” 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. You have thoughts that are difficult to 
forget. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Once you start thinking about the situation, 
you can’t stop. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. You notice that you think about the 
situation a lot. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. You have thoughts of the situation that you 
try to resist thinking about. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. You think about the situation all the time. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. You know you shouldn’t think about the 
situation, but can’t help it 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. You have thoughts about the situation 
and wish it would go better. 









This next section will explore what goes through your mind when you are 
striving to meet personally demanding standards that are very important to 
the way you think, feel, or judge yourself.  
 
In particular, any thoughts or fleeting pictures you experience when you are 
trying to achieve a very important goal that you feel reflects on the sort of 
person you are… 
 
Note: When referring to mental images are remembered or invented events 
you can imagine, that you can picture in your mind’s eye, but can also involve 





Please IDENTIFY THREE FUTURE events which you have been thinking about by 
imagining over the past 7 days (e.g. positive or stressful life events). For each event, 
please indicate whether your imagining of it was positive or negative by circling the 


























Please consider each statement on the following page about imagining events in the 
future and select the corresponding number that best reflects how frequently each 
comment was true for you during the past 7 days due to imagining the future.  
Please be sure to read each statement carefully. 
(Please circle one number on each line) 
 
 
The way I felt about future life events 







Moderately Quite a 
bit 
Extremely 
1. I believed my thoughts about the 
future would definitely happen and 
would become real. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I had trouble staying asleep. 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Other things prompted me to think 
about the future. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I felt irritable and angry. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I avoided letting myself get 
emotional when I thought about the 
future or was reminded about it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. I thought about the future when I 
didn’t mean to. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. Any reminders evoked feelings 
about the future. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I stayed away from reminders of 
the future. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. Pictures about the future popped 
into my mind. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I was jumpy and easily startled. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I tried not to think about the 
future. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I was aware that I had a lot of 
feelings about the future, but I 
didn’t deal with them. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. My feelings about the future were 
kind of numb. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. I found myself acting or feeling 
like it was really happening. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I had trouble falling asleep. 0 1 2 3 4 
16. I had waves of strong feelings 
about the future. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I tried to remove thoughts of the 
future from my mind. 
0 1 2 3 4 




19. Reminders of the future caused 
me to have physical reactions, 
such as sweating, faster breathing, 
or a racing heart. 
0 1 2 3 4 
20. I had dreams about the future. 0 1 2 3 4 
21. I felt watchful and alert. 0 1 2 3 4 
22. I tried not to talk about the future. 0 1 2 3 4 
23. I felt energetic and excitable. 0 1 2 3 4 





Thank you  
 
We appreciate your effort to 
complete this package 
 
 
 
